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Abstract

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has yielded more litigation and less local competition than its supporters expected or intended. Calls for its reform
are multiplying. The article diagnoses the 1996 Act’s failings and prescribes a
framework for reform. The successful deregulations of the transportation industries and of long-distance telecommunications (precedents the 1996 Act sought
to follow) demonstrate that the Act should have taken additional steps to promote intermodal telecommunications competition. Transportation deregulation
successfully prompted competition where (as in the case of airlines and trucking)
multiple firms could compete on an intramodal basis or where (as in the case of
railroads) the single firm was subject to intermodal competition from firms using
other technologies. The 1996 Act’s reliance on the unbundling of incumbent local
telephone companies’ networks reveals that its supporters thought that portions of
the local wireline networks would remain bottlenecks. The lesson, therefore, is
that the 1996 Act should have taken additional steps to create the conditions for
intermodal competition. Based on this analysis, the article outlines a new communications law that increases the possibilities for intermodal competition. Indeed,
the glimmers of hope for local competition - cell phone substitution and voiceover-Internet-protocol (VoIP) telephony - are intermodal competitors. Although
the 1996 Act did move in this direction and the Federal Communications Commission is vigorous on several fronts, more can be done. Spectrum reform (the most
significant missed opportunity in the 1996 Act) and other steps would decrease
legal and economic barriers to intermodal competition. The article also addresses
local and state control of telecommunications carriers, regulatory parity, universal service reform, and government funding of research and infrastructure, and
it offers a technology-neutral regulatory scheme for VoIP. The proposed deregulatory agenda seeks a law capable of accommodating the speed and diversity of
technological change in this “Internet time.”
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Abstract
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has yielded more litigation and less
local competition than its supporters expected or intended. Calls for its
reform are multiplying. In this Article, Professor Speta diagnoses the
1996 Act’s failings and prescribes a framework for reform. The successful
deregulations of the transportation industries and of long-distance
telecommunications (precedents the 1996 Act sought to follow)
demonstrate that the Act should have taken additional steps to promote
intermodal telecommunications competition.
Transportation
deregulation successfully prompted competition where (as in the case of
airlines and trucking) multiple firms could compete on an intramodal
basis or where (as in the case of railroads) the single firm was subject to
intermodal competition from firms using other technologies. The 1996
Act’s reliance on the unbundling of incumbent local telephone
companies’ networks reveals that its supporters thought that portions of
the local wireline networks would remain bottlenecks. The lesson,
therefore, is that the 1996 Act should have taken additional steps to
create the conditions for intermodal competition.
Based on this analysis, Professor Speta outlines a new communications
law that increases the possibilities for intermodal competition. Indeed,
the glimmers of hope for local competition—cell phone substitution and
voice-over-Internet-protocol (VoIP) telephony—are intermodal
competitors. Although the 1996 Act did move in this direction and the
Federal Communications Commission is vigorous on several fronts, more
can be done. Spectrum reform (the most significant missed opportunity in
the 1996 Act) and other steps would decrease legal and economic
barriers to intermodal competition. The Article also addresses local and
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state control of telecommunications carriers, regulatory parity, universal
service reform, and government funding of research and infrastructure,
and it offers a technology-neutral regulatory scheme for VoIP. The
proposed deregulatory agenda seeks a law capable of accommodating the
speed and diversity of technological change in this "Internet time."
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I. Introduction
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was both intended and expected to
usher in a new era of competition in telephony and emerging data services.
Advertised as the "most deregulatory [law] in history,"1 the Act was designed to
"fundamentally restructure[]"2 local telecommunications—replacing longmonopolized markets with vigorous competition. Unfortunately, the Act has
largely failed on its own terms. Its core provisions—opening the incumbent
monopolists’ networks to lease by other providers—have yielded more legal
battles than competition.3 Key parts of this structure have been to the Supreme
Court twice, 4 and the D.C. Circuit has just reversed the FCC’s third attempt to
devise rules to implement the Act’s network sharing scheme, the first two
attempts having been struck down as well. 5 Indeed, in recent years, the
percentage of local markets served by new carriers purchasing pieces of the
incumbents’ networks has actually fallen.
And yet, despite the poor showing of the 1996 Act’s unbundling regime,
there are glimmers of hope for local telecommunications competition. Increasing
numbers of young people are "cutting the cord"—relying on their cell phones for

1. H.R. REP . NO . 104-204, at 48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11.
2. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999).
3. This proposition needs qualification, of course, which I will provide (see infra notes
129–46 and accompanying text), because there is substantial competition in some local markets,
such as the large-business market. Nevertheless, there is substantial sentiment, justified in my
view, that local competition has failed to develop in many local markets with the robustness
expected in 1996.
4. See generally Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (upholding
FCC’s choice of pricing methodology for unbundling rules); AT&T, 525 U.S. 366 (upholding
FCC jurisdiction to make unbundling rules under the 1996 Act but striking down central parts of
those rules).
5. See generally United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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all of their voice needs. And, with a giddiness not seen since before the Internet
crash, cable and Internet companies—and even regulators—are touting voiceover-Internet-protocol (VoIP) services that could provide alternative phone
service for the increasing number of broadband users. Finally, direct broadcast
satellite has begun competing well against cable television companies.
These glimmers require a reassessment and reworking of communications
law to ensure that, now, true competition can take hold. Although sixty-two
years passed between the original 1934 Communications Act and its 1996
overhaul, and only eight since, technological developments and competitive
markets now require a regulatory structure that can accommodate the rapid and
unpredictable advances of "Internet time."6 Indeed, the 1996 Act’s focus on
fostering competition through the device of unbundling the incumbent’s network
seems incomplete at best.
This Article begins a reassessment of the 1996 Act and a comprehensive
prescription for a new regulatory agenda. This reassessment necessarily begins
with the precedents upon which Congress itself relied: deregulation of the
transportation industries and of long-distance. Congress thought that the 1996
Act would prompt the same, relatively quick development of competition that
followed these earlier deregulatory efforts. It is indisputable that, shortly after
deregulation of the transportation industries, those markets began to behave much
more competitively—with the benefits and detriments that usually accompany
competitive markets. And long-distance markets became more competitive
shortly following the Bell System’s demise. This paper therefore compares these
previous examples of deregulation to the 1996 Act’s approach to local markets
and, by so doing, identifies the piece missing from Congress’s attempt to
introduce competition into local telecommunications markets. If deregulation
could produce competition in so many other markets, the 1996 Act’s failure to
prompt widespread local telecommunications competition demands some
explanation.
The answer, or at least a significant part of the answer, is that the most
significant prior efforts at deregulation—the elimination of traditional regulation
over transportation industries—shared a common presumption that the markets
had become (or always were) structurally competitive. Once deregulated, the
6. There is no consensus on who coined the term "Internet time," but it is generally held
that Internet time (for example, Internet technologies and business methods) moves four times as
fast as real time. See M ICHAEL A. CUSUMANO & DAVID B. YOFFIE, COMPETING ON INTERNET
T IME : LESSONS FROM NETSCAPE AND ITS BATTLE WITH M ICROSOFT 3 (1998) (describing the
explosion in the development of the Internet in the 1990s). For an example of the difficulties the
FCC faces in responding to events in Internet time, see Chairman Michael K. Powell, Remarks
Before Cellular Telecommunications Internet Association’s CTIA Wireless 2001, at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkp101.html (Mar. 20, 2001) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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markets very quickly conformed to expectations and competition developed. In
the case of trucking and airlines, the consensus and reality was that the markets
were internally competitive. The elimination of legal entry barriers and other
regulatory burdens permitted multiple trucking firms and airlines to compete
freely, with the familiar results of lower prices and increased quantity. In the
case of the railroads, a similar consensus prompted deregulation, although it was
competition from other forms of transportation—such as trucks, air carriers, and
water carriers—that rendered the market structurally competitive. In economics
short-hand, the trucking and airline markets could support adequate intramodal
competition while railroads were subject to intermodal competition. The
development of competition in long-distance telecommunications was similar: the
Justice Department prosecuted the case against the Bell System based on the
conviction that technological change made competition in long-distance markets
structurally possible. 7 Other deregulatory efforts in natural gas and electricity
showed a similar consensus, albeit limited in some regards.
What was different about the 1996 Act was Congress’s conviction that local
telecommunications markets likely would not be structurally competitive—at least
not for a significant period of time. Congress assumed that certain elements of
these local networks would remain bottlenecks that new entrants would not find
economical to duplicate. The 1996 Act attempted to deal with this by creating the
network-sharing provisions of the Act, which require the incumbent local
telecommunications companies to lease portions of their networks to new local
carriers.8 This was an attempt to create some intramodal competition at the retail
level of local telecommunications, even if the underlying infrastructure remained
monopolized. To say the least, no one has been satisfied with the implementation
of these provisions, as almost no one is satisfied with the level of competition that
has developed in local telecommunications markets.
This inquiry yields more than an interesting historical comparison; it also
demonstrates what ought to be done to promote local telecommunications now—
to maximize the possibility that local competition will take hold and flourish. If
Congress was right that new entrants into local telecommunications markets
would not duplicate the incumbents’ telephone wires, then the development of
7. Whether that competition is characterized as intermodal, because MCI used wireless
long-distance technologies and AT&T used copper wires, or intramodal, because both soon
switched to fiber optic technologies, is an interesting question, but not one relevant to this
paper’s project. For a discussion of the development of microwave for long-distance and its
being the basis for the government’s antitrust case, see infra notes 92–94 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the industry-wide transition to fiber optics, see generally JONATHAN
M. KRAUSHAAR, FCC, FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPDATE -END OF YEAR 1998 (1999), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/Fiber/fiber98.pdf.
8. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–56 (2000) (establishing interconnectivity requirements). See
generally AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–90 (1999); infra note 128.
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complete alternatives to those wires—that is, the development of true intermodal
competition—ought to have been recognized as the best way to develop
competition in local markets. To be sure, Congress made provision in the 1996
Act for the possibility of some intermodal competition, by affirming and
expanding the incumbents’ duties to interconnect with (many) other
telecommunications carriers. And Congress took the important step of
eliminating legal barriers to entry into all telecommunications markets,9 which
was necessary for any intermodal competition to develop. But Congress did
nothing further to assist the development of intermodal competition. Rather, it
continued the historic, but increasingly irrelevant, regulatory divisions between
services, based on the technologies used to deliver them.
What is needed today is a clear agenda to increase intermodal (and all other
facilities-based) competition in local telecommunications markets. The glimmer
of competition in many local markets is the prospect of intermodal competition—
competition with the traditional telephone companies from wireless, cable, and
even electric companies and competition with the traditional cable television
services from satellite, wireless, and (maybe) the telephone companies. Already a
substantial number of proposals exist that could form the core of such an agenda,
and these ought to be the highest legislative and regulatory priorities. The FCC is
working on some of these fronts, confronting both new technology and old law
with admirable results. But much of its energy is also consumed by the failed
experiment with compulsory access to local networks and by a series of legal
battles foisted upon it by new services that do not neatly fit in old regulatory
categories. More importantly, to avoid costly litigation and uncertainty, Congress
should embody many of these proposals in new legislation. In particular,
Congress ought to quickly adopt proposals that decrease the barriers to entry
faced by wireless and cable competitors. These are the main hopes for true,
effective local telecommunications competition.
This Article seeks to make the case for such a new agenda: for such
deregulation that encourages the multiple technologies of the Internet and that is
flexible enough for "Internet time." Part II provides a brief overview of earlier
deregulatory statutes in the transportation industries, establishing the essentials of
the model just described. Because no economic impediments existed in the
underlying industry structure, legal deregulation quickly yielded competition. Part
III extends the analysis to telecommunications, noting first that deregulation
before the 1996 Act succeeded for the same basic reason as transportation
deregulation—all agreed that the underlying markets had competitive shape.
Second, the Part contrasts the passage of the 1996 Act with both the experience
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000) (forbidding state and local regulation that "prohibits or has
the effect of prohibiting" any entity from providing telecommunications services).
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in transportation deregulation and with early telecommunications deregulation:
despite general deregulatory rhetoric, Congress did not emphasize true facilitiesbased competition, nor has such competition substantially developed in local
telephone markets. Part IV details how the unbundling regime itself has not
succeeded, legally or economically, but how intermodal competition may be on
the horizon for a variety of services. Part V provides the outlines of a
comprehensive program to substantially increase the prospects for intermodal
competition in local telecommunications services, the true hope for introducing
competition. The Part details a number of specific proposals, such as spectrum
reform, and also discusses a number of consequences that a focus on intermodal
competition will have, for example, on universal service policy. Intermodal
competition also raises the challenge of regulatory parity—ensuring that markets
and not governments determine winning technologies and services—and this Part
offers a framework for addressing parity arguments. At bottom, these individual
proposals justify a wholesale rewriting of the Communications Act, and this Part
offers a rough framework for doing so. Part VI concludes with some additional
observations on the political possibilities of wholesale legislative reform,
regulatory resources, judicial review, and codifying this "new" reform agenda.
II. The Market Structure of Deregulated Transportation Markets
A wide consensus exists that the legal deregulation of the transportation
industries was rapidly followed by the more or less competitive provision of these
services. This "Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law"10 began with
the substantial deregulation of railroads, trucking, and airlines in the 1970s and
1980s. "Deregulation," although it differed in these industries in many regards,
had a common core, just as the regulation that preceded it was based upon a
similar model. In particular, based upon common law notions of common
carriage and the seminal Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA), the
transportation industries (and related industries, including telecommunications)
had long been subject to administrative agency control over entry, exit, pricing,
and other terms of service. 11 In general terms, deregulatory statutes eliminated
entry controls and price regulation and permitted competitive markets to operate.

10. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
11. See generally id. at 1327–30 (providing an overview of economic regulations);
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (discussing the need for regulation,
possible solutions, and reform); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., T HE REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES: T HEORY AND PRACTICE 10–35 (3d ed. 1993) (examining the significance and new
environment of public utilities).
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Deregulatory statutes eliminated the quality of service regulation that attempted to
specify what the consumer received while maintaining basic safety regulation.
Deregulation was generally followed by the rapid development of
competition, as evidenced principally by lower prices and higher output. This
section briefly reviews these deregulatory successes to demonstrate that the legal
deregulation was preceded by, and in large part driven by, a consensus that the
markets were structurally competitive. Because the elimination of regulation was
premised on the view that these transportation markets were structurally
competitive (or largely so), and because this presumption turned out to be correct
(or largely so), the deregulation was quickly followed by competitive
performance. 12
It is useful to divide transportation deregulation into two different categories,
with airline and trucking deregulation in a first category and railroad deregulation
in a second. Trucking and airline markets were deregulated because a consensus
emerged that these markets were internally competitive—that a significant
number of trucking or air carriers could simultaneously operate in competition
with one another, mimicking classically competitive markets. Railroad was
deregulated not because of internal competition; indeed, deregulation led to quite
substantial consolidation of railroads and the elimination of much rail route
competition. But railroads faced effective competition from trucking in most
markets, so deregulation was followed by declining prices and other indicia of
competition.
A. Airline and Trucking Deregulation: Intramodal Competition
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,13 called by one leading commentator
"the most significant piece of legislation in the field of transport regulation in the
[previous] forty years,"14 began the process of deregulating the previously highly
regulated transportation industries. Prior to its passage, air carriers were

12. I do not claim to be tilling new ground with the argument that these successfully
deregulated markets were structurally competitive; indeed, that would be inconsistent with my
claim that substantial consensus recognized this fact even prior to the legislation’s being passed.
I will therefore proceed to retell the story in summary fashion, principally to establish the
contrast with the 1996 Act. For more complete retellings, see, for example, Stephen G. Breyer,
Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL . L. REV. 1005 (1987)
(summarizing the risks and policy problems existing in deregulated industries); Kearney &
Merrill, supra note 10.
13. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
14. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board—Opening
Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 T RANSP . L.J. 91, 93 (1979).
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governed by the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act15 and its controls on entry, exit, and
rates.16 The statute borrowed its general agency-centered approach and many of
its specific provisions from the Interstate Commerce Act’s provisions regulating
railroads.17 But, unlike the ICA, the principal justification for which was
controlling the monopoly power of railroads, 18 the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act
was based upon the notion that competition would be "destructive," both in the
sense of failing to provide adequate service and in the sense of providing
inadequate safety to the traveling public.19
The deregulatory legislation largely eliminated barriers to entry,20 phased out
barriers to exit,21 phased out price regulation,22 and, in fact, calendared the
15. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (codified before
repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1952)). For discussions of the origins of the 1938 Act, see
generally Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revisited? Airline Deregulation and the Public
Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 179 (1981); ROGER NOLL , REFORMING REGULATION
(1971).
16. See generally SAMUEL B. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR
T RANSPORTATION 15–20 (1961) (discussing the Act and the Board which implements the Act).
17. See infra Part II.B (examining railroad deregulation). See generally Kearney & Merrill,
supra note 10, at 1335 (comparing the 1938 Act to the Interstate Commerce Act).
18. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (describing the burdens the ICA placed
on railroads).
19. See, e.g., S. REP . NO . 75-686 (1937) (examining airline competition). The Senate
stated:
The air lines . . . are engaged in intensive competition with each other and with . . .
other carriers. This competition is being carried to an extreme which tends to
undermine the financial stability of the carriers and jeopardize the maintenance of
transportation facilities and service appropriate to the needs of commerce and
required in the public interest and the national defense.
Id. at 2. Academic commentary of the time (that is, influenced by the Great Depression),
"which mostly supported airline regulation on grounds similar to those being advanced to
support the suppression of competition elsewhere in the economy, . . . took this view into the
1960s." Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG . 393, 398 (1987).
20. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 12, 92 Stat. at 1716–18
(1978).
21. Id. § 19. As in the case of railroad deregulation, carriers’ ability to exit a market was a
contentious and important issue. It was contentious because the original regulatory paradigm
maintained air service to many locations that did not generate enough traffic to justify service on
purely economic criteria. In the familiar story of promoting internal cross-subsidies, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) limited entry on profitable routes and required airlines to provide
service on unprofitable routes. See Dempsey, supra note 14, at 111–14 (examining CAB’s
entry criteria in various markets). The legislation therefore required service for ten years
following enactment to every market receiving service on the date of its passage. Nevertheless,
after the period ended, many cities lost commercial air service, and virtually no city that was not
previously served gained service. For evidence that some optimism exists that the development
of smaller but more efficient jets could increase service to small or medium communities, see
T RANSP . RESEARCH BD ., ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY 155–58
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demise of the regulatory agency itself.23 The consensus of academic research
finds that the Act was quickly and wildly successful in creating a more or less
competitive market in air service: prices fell, service improved (except where a
city lost service entirely), and efficiency measures climbed. One early review
concluded that the welfare gain to travelers through lower fares and increased
service exceeded six billion dollars per year;24 more recent work has concluded
that the benefits from increased competition continue, even if certain
developments (such as decreasing fuel prices and the development of more
efficient jets) have made it more difficult to determine the magnitude of the
benefits.25 Following deregulation, almost all served routes experienced entry by
multiple carriers, and, although entry declined in the mid-1990s following the
ValuJet crash, entry by so-called low-cost carriers continued to increase. 26
Deregulation of airlines was prompted by a broad consensus—shared first
by academics and later by leading regulators and legislators—that the market for
air carriage was structurally competitive. (By structurally competitive, I simply
mean that there are no important economic barriers to multiple entry and
competition, such as economies of scale or scope or network effects.) As one
commentator put it, "by the mid-1970’s it was probably fair to say that no
impartial academic observer of any standing doubted that the airline business, if
unregulated, would reach something that more or less resembled a competitive
equilibrium."27 This academic consensus was able to point to several significant
pieces of evidence in the real world, most importantly the much lower prices and
more frequent service prevailing on intrastate routes in California and Texas
where state regulation permitted free entry.28 Additionally, in the late 1970s and

(1999), but no such developments have yet occurred.
22. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 31.
23. The 1978 Act required the CAB to prepare a report in 1984 describing the effects of
deregulation, 49 U.S.C. § 1551(c), (d) (Supp. 1981), but it scheduled the CAB to terminate, with
its residual functions being passed to the Department of Transportation, in 1985. Id. § 1551.
24. See STEVEN M ORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, T HE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE
DEREGULATION 1–2 (1986) (analyzing the impact of deregulation).
25. See, e.g., T RANSP . RESEARCH BD ., supra note 21, at 61–63 (summarizing collected
studies).
26. See id. at 40–42 (analyzing trends in market entry activity).
27. Levine, supra note 19, at 394.
28. See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 14, at 116 (concluding that travelers accepted more
crowded aircraft if prices were lower); Michael E. Levine, Note, Is Regulation Necessary?
California Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416, 1430–43
(1965) (analyzing California data). Other evidence included the success of air charter service,
which provided much lower fares and proved that the traveling public would tolerate morecrowded planes in exchange for lower fares, until the CAB killed the market. See Levine, supra
note 19, at 402 (noting CAB’s elimination of the threatening non-scheduled carriers).
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early 1980s, the air market became the principal example used by the new
economics of market "contestability" to show that (under certain conditions
argued to prevail in airline markets) even a carrier that had a natural monopoly
over a market would price its service close to its cost. In other words, this
argument suggested that even if a route was served by only a single carrier, that
carrier was likely to price at cost and not at a monopoly level. 29
Regulators, most famously Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Chairman Alfred
Kahn (an economist), and legislators soon adopted this academic consensus and
explicitly referred to it in the proceedings leading to the 1978 Act. The famous
"Kennedy hearings" in 1975 were scripted to build to the conclusion that air
carriers should be deregulated and included testimony from a number of
academics.30 And the committee reports as well as the floor testimony on the
1978 Act repeatedly referred to the consensus that airline markets were
structurally competitive. 31
29. On the theory of contestable markets generally, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL.,
CONTESTABLE M ARKETS AND THE T HEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); John C. Panzar &
Robert D. Willig, Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 BELL J. ECON. 1
(1977). On the application to the airline industry, see ELIZABETH E. BAILEY ET AL.,
DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 153–72 (1985); Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Panzar, The
Contestability of Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP .
PROBS. 125 (1981).
The essential argument is this: Where market participants can enter and exit costlessly at
efficient scale, even a natural monopolist will price at cost because any attempt to price above
cost will invite entry at an undercutting price that would take the entire market. Two summaries
of the theory, reasonably accessible to lawyers, are Michael Spence, Contestable Markets and
the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review Article, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 981 (1983), and
Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets,
1 YALE J. ON REG . 111 (1984).
With respect to airline markets, the essential intuition can be seen in a grossly simplified
example. Imagine a route (say Peoria to Chicago) on which demand is such that only a single
airline will serve the route, for example because 125 people a day wish to fly from Peoria to
Chicago, and the most efficient way to serve that demand is by a single 125-seat aircraft. That
is, flying any bigger plane is more costly, as is flying multiple flights of smaller planes. This is
the definition of a natural monopoly market. See WILLIAM W. SHARKEY , T HE T HEORY OF
NATURAL M ONOPOLY 19 (1982) (determining that where market demand is most efficiently
served by a single carrier, natural monopoly obtains). If entry and exit from a market are
costless, however, the single carrier serving the market cannot price above its cost, or another
carrier will enter the market and undercut it. Entry and exit were hypothesized to be relatively
costless in airline markets because other airlines had many planes on multiple routes and could
divert a plane into a market in which the incumbent was charging above-cost fares and then
withdraw from the market and put the plane to another use. See generally Bailey & Baumol,
supra; Bailey & Panzar, supra.
30. See generally SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ,COMM.
ON THE J UDICIARY , 94TH CONG ., CIVIL A ERONAUTICS BOARD P RACTICES AND P ROCEDURES
(1976). For a description of the Kennedy hearings, see BREYER, supra note 11, at 321–39.
31. The most forceful statements in 1978 came from Senator Kennedy, even though he
was not the manager of the bill.
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The deregulation of trucking presents a case similar to that of airlines.
Indeed, although the Motor Carrier Act of 193532 adopted "utility-type regulation,"
few argued even then that the industry had any characteristics of natural
monopoly.33 Rather, industry stabilization, as well as the need to protect railroads
from emergent competition, provided the bases for expanding the Interstate
Commerce Commission’s (ICC) jurisdiction to include motor carriers.34 Between
1935 and the mid-1970s, the ICC followed these two purposes and largely
forbade any entry into interstate trucking. "By protecting carriers from new
competition and by keeping rates at a level where profits were guaranteed, the
ICC helped assure the emergence of a trucking oligopoly."35
Although the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 did not do away with the regulator,
it did eliminate entry and exit restrictions and rate regulation.36 And, again,
significant academic commentary had argued that trucking involved no
economies of scale or scope and few network effects—in other words, that
multiple firms could readily compete against one another to provide service. 37
In my 16 years in the Senate, I have seldom come across a national economic
problem of such apparent complexity and political sensitivity that has been studied
by so many independent and diverse sources, yet prompted sets of
recommendations that are so similar. Virtually every independent study undertaken
in the last 20 years has concluded that less regulation is the appropriate policy . . . .
[T]he message has always been the same: namely, it is time to revitalize the airline
industry with competition.
H.R. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS & T RANSP ., 96TH CONG ., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, at 971 (Comm. Print 1979); see also Air Service Improvement Act
of 1978, H.R. REP . NO . 95-1211, at 2–3 (discussing favorable experience of low-fare carriers
permitted unrestricted entry in Texas and California).
32. Act of Aug. 9, 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543. For general descriptions of the 1935 Act
and its purposes, see, for example, Warren G. Magnuson, The Motor Carrier Act of 1935: A
Legislator Looks at the Law, 31 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 37 (1962); William E. Thoms, Rollin’
on . . . to a Free Market: Motor Carrier Regulation 1935–1980, 13 T RANSP . L.J. 43 (1983);
Note, Federal Regulation of Trucking: The Emerging Critique, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 460, 461–
501 (1963).
33. See Thoms, supra note 32, at 47–50 (explaining the arguments for regulation).
34. See, e.g., id. at 50 (describing why the ICC’s jurisdiction was expanded); Paul Stephen
Dempsey, Entry Control Under the Interstate Commerce Act: A Comparative Analysis of the
Statutory Criteria Governing Entry in Transportation, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 730–40
(1977).
35. Thoms, supra note 32, at 58.
36. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Congressional Intent and Agency Discretion—Never the
Twain Shall Meet: The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1981)
(discussing traditional entry criteria from 1935 to 1977); Donald V. Harper, Entry Control and
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 12 T RANSP . L.J. 51, 56–62 (1980) (examining entry control
restrictions on common carriers). It did not, curiously, eliminate tariff-filing.
37. See generally Dudley F. Pegrum, The Economic Basis of Public Policy for Motor
Transport, 28 LAND ECON. 244 (1952); James Sloss, Regulation of Motor Freight
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"By 1970, many commentators had remarked upon the inappropriateness of a
utility model of regulation for a possibly competitive industry. Trucking just did
not seem to have many of the characteristics of natural monopoly."38 As was the
case with airlines, the economists had several unregulated industry segments—
including contract carriage, private carriage, agricultural commodities, and
various Canadian provinces—that provided evidence that the market could be
competitive. 39
Deregulation of the trucking industry quickly resulted in more competitive
service. Most commentary has concluded that the decrease in prices reflected
new competition and not merely a shift from nonprice to price competition.40
Indeed, a comprehensive survey of the economic literature in 1992 concluded
that consumers received significantly lower prices, a wider variety of service
offerings, and a wider variety of companies engaged in trucking.41
*

*

*

Three caveats are in order here, half way through the historical review of
deregulation, lest the reader accuse me of telling an overly ambitious "Just So
Story." First, there were, of course, causes for the deregulation of airlines and
trucking other than the academic consensus that regulation was unnecessary in
these markets—including the arguments that entry barriers in trucking were
hurting minorities 42 and that decreasing transportation prices would help fight the
severe inflation of the times.43 The political and economic history of the
Transportation: A Quantitative Evaluation of Policy, 1 BELL J. ECON. & M GMT. SCI. 327 (1970);
Joseph L. Steinfeld, Jr., Regulation Versus Free Competition—The Current Battle Over
Deregulation of Entry into the Motor Carrier Industry, 45 ICC PRAC. J. 590 (1978).
38. Thoms, supra note 32, at 68; see also Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of
Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY :
M ICROECONOMICS 1, 18 (Marten Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1989) (noting academic
consensus on the benefits of deregulation).
39. See Sloss, supra note 37, at 330–35 (using Canadian provinces as an example); Thoms,
supra note 32, at 61, 66–68 (discussing exemptions from Motor Carrier Act generally).
40. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose, The Incidence of Regulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier
Industry, 16 RAND J. ECON. 299, 314 (1985) ("Share price data indicate that regulatory reforms
significantly reduced the expected future profits of firms in the motor carrier industry. The
results are consistent with the presence of monopoly profits for trucking firms in the pre-1978
regulatory environment.").
41. See JOHN RICHARD FELTON & DALE G. ANDERSON, REGULATION AND DEREGULATION
OF THE M OTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY 155–59 (1989) (evaluating the benefits of deregulation). See
generally Office of Economics, ICC, The U.S. Motor Carrier Industry Long After Deregulation
(1992).
42. See Thoms, supra note 32, at 68 ("Minority truckers felt left out of a system where
all of the goodies were divided up in 1935.").
43. See, e.g., Harold T. Johnson, Introduction to LEGISLATIVE HISTORY O F THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, supra note 31, at v ("This type of legislation can be a powerful
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deregulatory statutes is complex, and many works have examined them in greater
depth.44 A few more ambitious works have attempted a synthesis of the
deregulatory movement of the past thirty years.45 The discussion both here and
in the next subpart is designed only to show that, in cases where deregulation
succeeded, there was reason to think that the markets were structurally
competitive.
Second, the debate over the benefits of deregulation is not entirely one-sided,
with some significant minority commentary continuing to question its benefits
and to assert the need for new regulation.46 My agenda here is not to debate the
merits and demerits of competition. 47 Rather, my essential claim is that these
industries, when deregulated, began to behave as competitive industries. Indeed,
most of the criticism of the deregulatory statutes is actually criticism of the
results of competition—that safety is inadequately provided for, that wages fall,
and that service to small markets disappears.48 I acknowledge significant
economic and noneconomic reasons to regulate away from the result that purely
unfettered competition might provide, though I would prefer to utilize direct
weapon in the fight against inflation."); Thoms, supra note 32, at 70 (examining inflation during
the 1970s). Thoms writes:
Beginning with the Ford administration and continuing through the Carter regime,
inflation became the principal concern of the American political economy.
Increased competition was considered to be a weapon to use against the inflationary
forces surrounding us. Regulated industries, because of their controlled oligopolistic
position, could pass on increased costs of equipment, fuel and labor by going to the
appropriate regulatory agency and gaining permission to increase rates.
Id.
44. See generally BREYER, supra note 11; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10; Noll, supra
note 15; infra notes 71–89. My caveat, supra note 12, also notes the scope of this project.
45. In my view, the best is Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10; others include BREYER,
supra note 11; M ARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK , T HE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985)
(concluding that elite opinion favoring deregulation and implementation of the ideas of
competition by an agency prior to legislation were the principal drivers of statutory change);
Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN . SURV.AM.
L. 155 (2001) (examining deregulation and the California energy crisis).
46. See generally M ICHAEL H. BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS
IN T RUCKING D EREGULATION (2000); Mark N. Cooper, Freeing Public Policy from the
Deregulation Debate: The Airline Industry Comes of Age (and Should Be Accountable for Its
Anticompetitive Behavior), 13 AIR & SPACE LAW ., Spring 1999, at 1; Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure, 24
T RANSP . L.J. 73 (1996).
47. My view, recorded elsewhere, is that this sort of extensive economic regulation is
justified only in very narrow circumstances. See generally James B. Speta, A Vision of Internet
Openness by Government Fiat, 96 NW . U. L. REV. 1553 (2002) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG,
T HE FUTURE OF IDEAS: T HE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001)).
48. See, e.g., BELZER, supra note 46, at 175–92 (discussing the benefits and harms of
economic competition).
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safety regulation and explicit government subsidies to reach most of those results.
(I return to this issue in the context of universal service policies for
telecommunications later in the paper.49 )
Third, I do not wish to portray any of these markets as mirrors of the
perfectly competitive markets described in microeconomics texts. Imperfections
remain, most notably in air carriage due to the (largely unforeseen) development
of hub and spoke systems and the related scarcity of gate and runway slots.50
But the consensus evidence is that deregulation was followed by significant gains
to competition.
B. Railroad Deregulation: Intermodal Competition
Railroads present a different case, for deregulation occurred simultaneously
with a consolidation of the industry that left many major routes with only one rail
carrier. With railroads, the consensus was not that railroading itself was
competitive, but that competition from other forms of transportation largely
controlled any market power that the remaining railroads could exercise. Indeed,
such was the competition from other modes of transportation that two leading
commentators have quipped: "The railroad industry is perhaps the only U.S.
industry that has been, or ever will be, deregulated because of its poor financial
performance under regulation."51 But it is clear that the government-financed
bailout of Penn Central, together with the prospect of further railroad
bankruptcies, created the impetus for government to do something to help
railroads, and that "something" was deregulation.52

49. See infra notes 397–413 and accompanying text (asserting a need for a universal
service policy).
50. See T RANSP . RESEARCH BD ., supra note 21, at 65–67 (explaining the spread of hub
and spoke systems); Cooper, supra note 46, at 23–25 (examining the effect of a hub and spoke
network on regulatory concerns). See generally Daniel R. Polsby, Airport Pricing of Aircraft
Takeoff and Landing Slots: An Economic Critique of Federal Regulatory Policy, 89 CAL.L.REV.
779 (2001).
51. Curtis Grimm & Clifford Winston, Competition in the Deregulated Railroad Industry:
Sources, Effects, and Policy Issues, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT’SNEXT?
41, 41 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000).
52. See id. at 42 (evaluating railroad deregulation); see also William E. Thoms, Clear Track
for Deregulation: American Railroads, 1970–1980, 12 T RANSP . L.J. 183, 212 (1982) (discussing
the motive behind passing the Staggers Act). Thoms states:
The main concern for Congress in passing the Staggers Act was the financial
condition of the railroads. This Congress was faced with the spectre of more
bankruptcies. . . . But this time Congress faced an electorate worried about
government spending. The idea of paying for another Conrail, much less buying up
independent, solvent lines was too vexing.
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The Interstate Commerce Act’s model of extensive economic regulation has
already been described.53 By the 1970s, the principal feature of that regulation
that hurt the railroads was the restriction on exit. Under the ICA, a railroad could
neither discontinue nor abandon service on a particular route without ICC
approval, 54 and such approval was rarely granted. Thus, "a large fraction of the
nation’s rail service was provided at an economic loss, with returns on
investment for most major railroads falling below the returns of other U.S.
nonfinancial corporations."55 To address this problem, the various statutes
deregulating rail carriers,56 and in particular the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,57
intended to assist the financial situation of the railroads by permitting
consolidation and streamlining the railroads’ exit from unprofitable routes.58
Indeed, by contrast to airline and trucking deregulation, which were
premised on the notion that these separate markets were internally competitive, no
one expected that deregulation would lead to entry of new railroads. Everyone—
on all sides of the deregulation debate—expected that it would cause more
consolidation in rail service, with more routes being served by only one railroad,
and substantial abandonment of rail routes.59 These results were consistent with
a competitive market because of the intermodal pressures to which railroads were

Id.
53. See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text (describing subsequent legislation’s
reliance on the ICA).
54. See Dempsey, supra note 34, at 732–34 (describing § 1(18) of the ICA).
55. Grimm & Winston, supra note 51, at 41; see also Richard C. Levin, Railroad Rates,
Profitability, and Welfare Under Deregulation, 12 BELL J. ECON. 1, 3 (1981) ("attempt[ing] to
predict the impact of rate flexibility on . . . the rail industry"). See generally T HEODORE E.
KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983).
56. For a summary of the progression of these statutes, which include most significantly
the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (easing rail carrier exit from passenger carriage and
creating Amtrak), the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (the 3R Act) (creating Conrail as
the successor to the bankrupt Penn Central system and easing route exit for Conrail), the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 4R Act) (easing rate regulation
generally), and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, see generally FRANK J. DOOLEY & WILLIAM E.
T HOMS, RAILROAD LAW A DECADE AFTER DEREGULATION 1–13 (1994).
57. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
58. See Rodney D. Peterson, Entry and Exit: An Economic Analysis of Statutory Changes
in Rail Carrier Entry and Exit, 13 T RANSP . L.J. 189, 210–20 (1984) (analyzing three major
railroad deregulation acts). The Staggers Act also assisted entry, most significantly by requiring
railroads to share trackage. Id. at 218.
59. See, e.g., H.R. REP . NO . 96-1035, at 44, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3989
("Restructuring would involve a consolidation and reduction of duplicate tracks and facilities,
discontinuance of uneconomic service, rationalization of routes and terminal facilities, and
improvement in operating efficiencies."); Christopher A. Vellturo et al., Deregulation, Mergers,
and Cost Savings in Class I U.S. Railroads 1974–1986, 1 J. ECON. & M GMT. STRATEGY 339,
341–47 (1992) (summarizing fifteen years of railroad mergers).
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subject. Somewhat ironically, the prior deregulation of air and trucking had put
significant pressure on railroads, for, although unit costs for rail transportation
were probably lower than those for air or trucking, the deregulated carriers were
able to undercut rail significantly.60
Congress recognized these competitive pressures 61 and the academic work
that had long argued that competition from other types of carriers would
constrain the railroads’ ability to price above cost.62 And, although the examples
were fewer than in air and trucking, a few earlier ICC actions that decreased
constraints on railroads nevertheless provided some evidence that wholesale
deregulation might improve performance and would not hurt consumers.63 The
Staggers Act did not eliminate the regulator (that came in the 1990s 64 ) nor did it
eliminate all economic regulation. The Act retained rate control in markets, such
as coal, in which shippers were thought to be captive to the railroads,65 but it did
increase the railroads’ flexibility to raise rates.66 Even in its retention of regulation
for these markets, however, the legislation recognized intermodal competition as
the appropriate measure of the railroads’ market power.67
60. See Peterson, supra note 58, at 217 ("Results of both statutes caused further
difficulties for railroads. Congress, by its partial deregulation of air and motor carriers, fostered
additional entry, lower rates and fares.").
61. For example, the House Report repeatedly noted that the poor financial condition of
the railroads was due to competition from trucking and water carriers (barges) and noted that
"[b]oth motor carrier and water carrier competition have continued to take intercity
transportation business away from the railroads. Today, the once dominant railroad industry
accounts for but 36 percent of the inter-city ton miles of freight. In 1947 railroads had twice the
market share." H.R. REP . NO . 96-1035, at 35, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3980.
62. See H.R. REP . NO . 96-1035, at 35–40, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3980–85
(discussing the history of freight rates).
63. See, e.g., Thoms, supra note 52, at 210 ("A definite philosophy change ranged at the
ICC during the 1970s. With the Ford and Carter administrations enthusiasts for deregulation,
and with air deregulation approaching, the ICC began to change its attitude. The Commission
has applied in motor carrier cases a less protectionist policy, and this began to occur with
railroads as well.").
64. See generally ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
65. The House Report stated that the new statute "provides the Commission with
jurisdiction to determine rate reasonableness only when there is not effective competition."
H.R. REP . NO . 96-1035, at 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3978.
66. See Thoms, supra note 52, at 213–15 (analyzing decreased rate regulation).
67. See 49 U.S.C. § 10701 (2000) (conditioning rate regulation on a finding of dominance);
id. § 10707(a) (defining dominance with respect to competition from other railroads and from
other modes of transportation); see also H.R. REP . NO . 96-1035, at 39, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3978, 3984 (discussing the impact of competition). The committee stated:
The test of a transportation alternative is a sound one. If a shipper can rely on a
transportation alternative, which could include another railroad, a barge, or a truck,
at a transportation cost which is not substantially greater than the rail
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All in all, railroad deregulation is considered to have resulted in a more
competitive transportation market, notwithstanding the rail consolidation and
route abandonment. For some years, there was a dispute about whether the fall
in real rates was due to deregulation,68 but later work showed that, after 1980,
rates became more sensitive to the elasticity of demand for rail service and that
deregulation was responsible for this result.69
*

*

*

It is probably gilding the lily to go on further, but the same point could be
made with respect to deregulation of natural gas pipelines, wholesale electricity
transmission, and a variety of other markets. Deregulation succeeded because
none was needed—intra- or intermodal competition became possible and lifting
regulatory barriers opened the market.70
III. Telecommunications Deregulation: Computer I Through the 1996 Act
By contrast to the legislative action that deregulated the transportation
industries in the 1970s and 1980s, those decades saw only limited deregulatory
steps in telecommunications. These limited steps were taken either by the
regulators or the antitrust enforcers without significant involvement of (indeed,
transportation cost, then competition is present. Competition will serve to hold
down rates, and the railroad would not have market power.
Id.
68. Compare Kenneth D. Boyer, The Costs of Price Regulation: Lessons from Railroad
Deregulation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 408, 411 (1987) (concluding that deregulation raised overall
prices), with C. Barnekov & A. N. Kleit, The Efficiency Effects of Railroad Deregulation in the
United States, 17 INT’L J. T RANSP . ECON. 21 (1990) (concluding that deregulation caused a
relative price decline).
69. See CLIFFORD WINSTON ET AL., T HE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SURFACE FREIGHT
DEREGULATION 13 (1990) ("Deregulation appears to have changed both carrier and shipper
behavior as policymakers intended. Carriers have taken significant steps to improve the
efficiency of their operations and to set rates that are more responsive to competitive market
conditions."); Wesley W. Wilson, Market-Specific Effects of Rail Deregulation, 42 J. INDUS.
ECON. 1, 20 (1994) ("[W]hile differences exist across commodities (especially in the early
periods of deregulation), the effect of deregulation on prices has generally been to lower them.
With price decreases and cost savings from deregulation, welfare gains from deregulation are
likely positive.").
70. See, e.g., T IMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM: RESTRUCTURING
AMERICA ’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 61–63 (1996) (discussing Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission orders opening long-distance transmission markets); PAUL W. M ACAVOY, T HE
NATURAL GAS M ARKET 10 (2000) ("[W]ith technical limits on pipe size, at approximately
thirty-six inches in diameter, and demands growing to levels that allowed multiple companies,
each with lines of that diameter, to serve a metropolitan region, entry and overlap of carriers
grew widespread.").
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with some resistance from) Congress. These moves in telecommunications, of
course, were not taken in a vacuum, for the FCC and the antitrust division were
influenced by the general change in thinking that favored deregulation and
markets. Importantly, this "new" thinking affected not only these two executive
institutions, but also the courts that reviewed the FCC’s decisions and that
prodded the agency toward competition on several important occasions.71 Given
that the original Communications Act drew largely upon the Interstate Commerce
Act for its regulatory principles,72 telecommunications law had long looked to
transportation law. Many in the communications sector were now influenced by
deregulation in transportation.73
The FCC’s deregulatory actions during this time and the antitrust breakup of
the Bell System provided examples of competition in telecommunications markets
(or in closely related markets, such as for telecommunications equipment), and
these examples were additional precedents for the 1996 Act’s focus on
introducing competition for local markets. In this Part, I first briefly review these
telecommunications precedents to show again that the successes came where
there was strong reason to believe that the markets were structurally competitive.
Indeed, the FCC’s deregulation of computer and customer equipment markets,
for example, was based upon findings that the markets were internally
competitive (intramodal), while the impetus for the long-distance portion of the
government’s case against AT&T was the development of a technology that
promised intermodal competition.
Cable television provides a useful contrast to administrative attempts at
deregulation in telephony, confirming the importance of intermodal competition
and of using regulation where necessary to eliminate other barriers to entry. In
1992, Congress provided that states and municipalities could no longer grant
exclusive franchises to cable operators. But, despite the lifting of that legal
barrier, very little competition developed in cable markets until recently. In only a
71. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1370 ("There can be no question that in
some industries the courts have pried open doors to competition that legislators or regulators
preferred to keep shut. . . . This has been especially true in . . . telecommunications."); Clifford
Winston, Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1263, 1264–66 (1993) ("[C]ongressional action was not the sole source of the
deregulation movement and, in fact, was often the last step in the process."); Thomas S. Ulen,
Book Review, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1997) ("[M]ore typically, Congress keeps its
distance from the regulators and allows the courts to hold the agencies accountable."). See
generally Günter Knieps & Pablo T. Spiller, Regulating by Partial Deregulation: The Case of
Telecommunications, 35 ADMIN. L. REV. 391 (1983).
72. See generally Glen O. Robinson, Title I: The Federal Communications Act: An Essay
on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF 1934, at 3 (Max D. Paglin ed. 1989).
73. See PETER T EMIN, T HE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS
129, 344–45 (1987) (discussing the influence of deregulation on telecommunications).
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few areas did new cable companies install wires to provide intramodal
competition. The more significant competition today is intermodal—from direct
broadcast satellite (DBS). Even this intermodal competition, however, was
possible only with regulation that affirmatively enabled DBS to offer a truly
competitive multi-channel video product. Subpart B briefly reviews these
episodes of cable competition.
In the final subpart of this Part, I look at the 1996 Act as a historic matter to
show that both the economists and the legislators had significant doubt that the
local telephone markets were structurally competitive. Everyone was hopeful that
new telephone companies would enter to compete with incumbent local carriers,
and some legislative leaders did tout the possibility that wireless or satellite or
cable companies would provide this competition. But doubts about the viability of
local competition were prominent, and these doubts explain both the Act’s
reliance on provisions "unbundling" elements of the incumbent carriers’ networks
and the Act’s more limited steps to provide a framework for intermodal
competition.
A. The Pre-1996 Act Precedents
During the 1970s, prodded by the courts, the FCC took several steps that
introduced competition to formerly monopolized telecommunications networks.
The most significant deregulation came when the FCC used its authority to
essentially define certain services out of the common carrier title of the
Communications Act and therefore out of the agency’s economic regulation. The
FCC also began the process of liberalizing entry into long-distance markets,
which was completed by the AT&T Consent Decree that settled the
government’s antitrust case against the Bell System.
1. Redefining the Network
In the 1970s, the FCC faced a variety of challenges brought about by the
development of the computer and the integration of computer and
telecommunications services. In response, the Commission began the famous
Computer Inquiries, which resulted in two significant decisions concerning the
scope of regulation under the Communications Act.74 First, the agency held that
74. The story of the Computer Inquiries is comprehensively reviewed in Robert Cannon,
The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED.COMM.
L.J. 167 (2003), and in James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet
Interconnection, 54 FED . COMM. L.J. 225 (2002).
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computer processing services that employed telecommunications services would
be considered "enhanced services" and not common carrier communications
services. These services would therefore be outside of the traditional regulatory
structure provided by Title II of the Communications Act.75 Second, the
Commission held that consumer premises equipment (CPE), such as telephones,
fax machines, and other devices that hooked up to the telephone network, was
also outside of the Act.76 Each of these decisions 77 was based upon an explicit
finding that the respective markets could be competitively supplied—that, apart
from the power of the telecommunications company to control the market by
limiting its provision of communications services, computer services and
customer premises equipment could be provided by multiple companies in
competition with one another.78 And each of these decisions spawned serious
competition—with lower prices and increased diversity of service offerings to
consumers.79 In subsequent years, both before and after the 1996 Act, the FCC
continued to use the device of redefining the services subject to common carrier
regulation, when it could find that these adjunct markets were competitive. 80
75. See Amendment of section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, Final
Decision, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, ¶¶ 16–26 (1980) [hereinafter Final Decision] (determining issues
related to data processing).
76. See id. ¶ 144 (discussing the demand for various CPE products).
77. The FCC’s decision to deregulate customer premises equipment was prompted by a
series of court decisions questioning AT&T tariffs (approved by the FCC) that sought to
prevent customers from using any but the carrier’s own equipment. For this history, see, for
example, Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J.
ON REG . 325, 327 (1990).
78. See Final Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 109 ("There are literally thousands of unregulated
computer service venders offering competing services connected to the interstate
telecommunications network. . . . [W]e have concluded that the enhanced services market is
competitive. By removing this barrier the entire market for enhanced services should be even
more competitive."). The decision stated:
The competitive potential of terminal equipment markets is reflected in the fact that
there are hundreds of manufacturers and suppliers of modems, terminals, storage
devices, front end processors, large and small central processing units, multiplexers,
concentrators, and virtually innumerable related devices. While some segments of
the CPE market may be more competitive than others, we have been given no
evidence that, given certain modifications in the markets, any segment is inherently
less competitive than another.
Id. ¶ 143.
79. See Cannon, supra note 74, at 175 (noting the FCC’s concerns about the pure
communications market’s potential to become a monopoly).
80. See James B. Speta, Maintaining Competition in Information Platforms: Vertical
Restrictions in Emerging Telecommunications Markets, 1 J. T ELECOMM. & HIGH T ECH . L. 185,
198–99 (2002) (discussing the FCC’s decisions to take inside wiring and payphones out of the
Act); see also 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2000) (establishing an independent regulatory system for
commercial mobile services, based upon competition).
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There can be little doubt that the FCC’s definitional moves followed from its
conviction that these services could be competitively provided and therefore
should not be regulated, rather than from some pure interpretive exercise that
simply happened to provide the happy result that these competitive services
would not be subject to regulation.81 Although many computer-based services
were "new," CPE and customer-premises wiring had long been considered
common carrier services that were subject to economic regulation.82 Moreover,
had it chosen to do so, the FCC had ample precedents to draw upon which would
have placed the new computer-based services inside its jurisdiction. The ICC had
long regulated terminals, docks, freight forwarders, and other "adjuncts" to
railroad shipping.83 The FCC could have similarly held that retail computer
services which depended on telecommunications services were themselves a new
form of telecommunications service subject to regulation. The FCC’s decision to
invent the new regulatory category of enhanced services to exempt these from
full economic regulation—for all of the economic benefit and regulatory
confusion that choice has caused—was a policy choice for competition. And, by
all accounts, competition successfully followed deregulation in customer
premises equipment and enhanced computer services.84
As the FCC was deciding that the common carrier companies (read: the Bell
System) could not control the provision of all services and equipment related to
the network, the courts were also prodding it to allow entry into even traditional
communications services. In the so-called Execunet decisions, in particular, the
courts pushed the Commission to justify its protection of the Bell System from
competitive entry.85 At issue was MCI’s attempt to provide regular long-distance
81. See Cannon, supra note 74, at 176–77 ("The Computer Inquiries policy had as its
explicit goal the promotion of economic growth and innovation in the computer services
market.").
82. Id. at 177.
83. See Jurgen Basedow, Common Carriers: Continuity and Disintegration in U.S.
Transportation Law, 13 T RANSP . L.J. 1, 21 (1983) ("The [1906] Hepburn Act widened the range
of regulated activities performed by these carriers by extending the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission . . . to terminal facilities, freight depots, and all services connected with
receipt, delivery, transfer, or storage of goods.").
84. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommunications Services,"
Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System,
16 YALE J. ON REG . 211, 222 (1999) ("That approach was wildly successful in spurring
innovation and competition in the enhanced-services marketplace.").
85. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter
Execunet I]; MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The story of the
Execunet decisions, including MCI’s entry into regular retail long-distance service without
explicit FCC approval, the FCC’s resistance thereto, and the D.C. Circuit’s insistence that
MCI’s authority be broadly construed (or the FCC explicitly justify AT&T’s monopoly), is
retold in Glen O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG . 517, 523–27 (1988).
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services by combining certain retail services it purchased from AT&T with its
own long-distance networks.86 The FCC was undoubtedly correct when it held
that MCI’s operating permits had been issued solely with the idea that it would
provide private-network services to large business customers.87 And the FCC
was also correct that its Communications Act precedents did not contemplate
competition in such services. But after MCI demonstrated that it was technically
feasible, the courts forced the agency to supply a reason—and, importantly, a
reason grounded in economics—that MCI should not then have been permitted to
provide these services.88
This was the beginning of the end of AT&T’s service monopoly. Nothing
in the 1934 Act had changed, of course, and the courts would have been hardpressed under traditional administrative law doctrines to reverse an FCC that
adopted a vigorous and consistent defense of market protectionism. But the
courts’ prodding was enough to cause the FCC, in partial touch with the times, to
begin to change its course. 89
2. The Bell Breakup

86. See Execunet I, 561 F.2d at 367–68 (describing the cause of the Execunet litigation).
87. See id. at 368–70 (recounting the Commission’s proceedings and findings). Glen
Robinson (an FCC Commissioner during some of the relevant years) denies that the FCC had
any particular intent as to the scope of MCI’s services when it licensed MCI. See Robinson,
supra note 85, at 523–24 (speculating about the FCC’s motives). Robinson stated:
If God knew what the FCC meant in 1971, He didn’t say; neither did the FCC. It
seems that what the FCC originally had in mind was specialized services tailored to
distinctive service needs of particular customers, as opposed to the homogenized
services provided by MTS and WATS. . . . But this was never precisely stated in
the FCC’s decision.
Id. On this point, compare PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL T ELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
§ 2.3.3.2 (2d ed. 1999) (disagreeing with Robinson). Huber stated:
MCI rushed to move far beyond private lines to a full-fledged, switched-access
long-distance service available to all. This was not what the FCC had in mind when
it licensed MCI in 1969 or when it issued its Specialized Common Carriers decision
in 1971, but it was what the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit desired in 1977,
as it indicated in its imaginative Execunet I ruling.
Id.
88. See Execunet I, 561 F.2d at 379–80 (questioning whether AT&T should be granted a
de jure monopoly).
89. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1374 (summarizing the court’s
prompting of the FCC to change course); Knieps & Spiller, supra note 71, at 399, 412
(analyzing the impact of partial deregulation).
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These precedents partially inspired Assistant Attorney General William
Baxter’s prosecution of the antitrust case against the integrated Bell System.90
Indeed, the explicit theory presented by the government throughout the litigation
was that "new technology [had] introduced new competitive opportunities into
telecommunications markets,"91 particularly the long-distance and manufacturing
markets. Thus, the government alleged that these markets were structurally
competitive and that only AT&T’s "actions, based on its control over the local
exchange monopolies, unreasonably imped[ed] competition that technological
developments increasingly made possible."92 In long-distance, the well-known
story is that the new microwave transmission technology did not exhibit the same
severe economies of scale that traditional in-ground copper trunks suffered.93
The conclusion, drawn by many economists as well as MCI and the government,
was that long-distance was competitive. 94 (The same conclusion did not apply to
90. Although the case was filed in 1976, before Baxter came to the antitrust division, it did
not move significantly forward until it was transferred to Judge Greene, and Baxter was then the
lead prosecutor. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the
Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 1395, 1407–09 (1999) (discussing role of Judge Greene in moving case forward); Richard A.
Posner, Introduction to Baxter Symposium, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1999) (discussing
importance of Baxter in prosecution).
91. United States v. Western Elec. Co. & AT&T; Competitive Impact Statement in
Connection with Proposed Modification of Final Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7172 (1982).
92. In its Competitive Impact Statement, filed in connection with the Consent Decree’s
approval process, the Department summarized its positions:
At the time of the 1956 Judgment and thereafter, new technology was developing
that introduced new competitive opportunities into telecommunications markets.
As a result of research conducted in World War II and increased demand for
telecommunications products and services after the war, various firms began to
develop new means of providing telecommunications services and equipment. In
the AT&T Case, the United States contended that, in response to these actual and
potential new competitors in AT&T’s traditional markets, AT&T took actions,
based on its control over the local exchange monopolies, unreasonably impeding
competition that technological developments increasingly made possible. These
alleged actions, detailed at length in various pleadings the United States filed in the
suit and summarized here, occurred in three relevant markets—intercity
telecommunications services, customer-provided terminal equipment, and
telecommunications equipment.
Id.; see also Kearney, supra note 90, at 1405–08 (examining the events preceding and during the
litigation).
93. See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications
Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 843 (1997) ("Microwave transmission posed the most
immediate threat to Bell, for its modest economies of scale invited corrosive entry onto AT&T’s
IX turf."); Leonard Waverman, The Regulation of Intercity Telecommunications, in PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN REGULATED M ARKETS 201, 232–33 (Almarin Phillips ed., 1975) (evaluating the
probability of increased competition).
94. See, e.g., id. at 232–34 (analyzing the effect of increased competition on prices);
Robinson, supra note 85, at 530–35 (discussing changing view of economists on need for
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local service, both because microwave was a point-to-point service and because
local traffic volume was too low to support multiple providers.)95
The Bell breakup decree was not, of course, deregulation in the sense that it
eliminated any legal barriers to entry or changed the amount of legal regulation to
which long-distance service was subject. Long-distance carriers were still
required to receive certificates of operating authority from the FCC and state
regulators,96 and the requirements of just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
rates, and of tariff-filing still applied.97 Indeed, from a purely formalistic
perspective, the decree required additional regulation because it required the FCC
to regulate the local carriers’ access charges and other terms of service to longdistance carriers.98 And it added to the agency’s regulation a layer involving the
Decree court’s interpretation of the Bell Companies’ permitted and forbidden
activities under the Decree. 99 The Decree did, however, decrease the economic
barrier to entry into long-distance telecommunications markets by providing the
means by which a carrier could enter that market without replicating for itself the
local access networks controlled by the Bell Companies. 100 Entry occurred, and
economists substantially agree that divestiture dramatically increased competition
in long-distance markets.101
regulation).
95. See Kearney, supra note 90, at 1409 (discussing this theory).
96. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2000) ("No carrier shall undertake the construction [or] . . .
extension of any line, . . . unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the
Commission a certificate.").
97. See id. §§ 201–03 (requiring charges to be just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory);
see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994) ("For better or worse, the
Act establishes a rate-regulation, filed-tariff system for common-carrier communications, and the
Commission’s desire ‘to "increase competition" cannot provide it authority to alter the wellestablished statutory filed rate requirements.’"). The 1996 Act changed this, of course. See
infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text (illustrating the desire to provide authority to
promote competition).
98. See United States v. AT&T Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131, 232 (D.D.C. 1982) (requiring
Bell Operating Companies to provide service to other long-distance carriers that was equal to
that provided to AT&T), aff’d Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also, e.g.,
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?: Applying the New Antitrust Learning to Foster
Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1479, 1483 (1999) (discussing FCC’s
implementation of access regime, requiring BOCs to file access tariffs).
99. Judge Greene’s supervision of the Decree and of (at least a portion of) the
telecommunications industry between 1982 and 1996 is comprehensively discussed in Kearney,
supra note 90, at 1403–20. Judge Greene’s superintendence has been much criticized. See
generally PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE : ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET THE
COMMON LAW RULE THE T ELECOSM 98–99, 150–57 (1997) (discussing Judge Greene’s role in
implementing the Decree). Kearney largely defends Judge Greene. See Kearney, supra note 90,
at 1403–20 (recounting Judge Greene’s supervision of the case).
100. See id. at 1403–05, 1409–16, 1420 (examining the theories behind the lawsuit).
101. Not all economists agree, with Paul MacAvoy notably arguing that little competition
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B. Cable Competition Precedents

Until recently, cable television has been entirely apart from
telecommunications regulation, notwithstanding that one can find FCC statements
from the early 1970s expressing the hope that cable television systems would
begin to compete with telephone companies.102 Nevertheless, developments in
cable television regulation in the 1980s and 1990s confirm some of the general
lessons from early telephone deregulation. Cable television service, like local
telephony, has long been considered a natural monopoly service. Fixed costs are
high; multiple wires to the home risks stranded investment; economies of both
scale and density apply.103 In 1984 and again in 1992, Congress responded to
this by imposing traditional rate regulation on cable television services; an FCC
interpretation of the 1984 statute, however, left its provisions largely toothless.104
Also, various other rules applicable to cable programmers—ranging from the
must-carry and other programming rules to vertical and horizontal ownership
limits (some of which have been repealed)—have been based upon the view that
cable companies exercised significant market power in both the programacquisition and retail video markets.105

existed for more than ten years after the Decree, because AT&T, MCI, and Sprint simply
engaged in oligopolistic pricing. See generally PAUL W. M ACAVOY, T HE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST
AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN LONG -D ISTANCE T ELEPHONE SERVICES (1996);
William E. Taylor & Lester D. Taylor, Postdivestiture Long-Distance Competition in the United
States, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 185 (1993). The weight of evidence is against them, however. See
Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U.CHI.
L. REV. 1, 40 (2001) (discussing competition post-decree).
102. See Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel
Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Final Report and
Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, ¶ 47 (1970) ("[T]here is a substantial expectation that broadband
cables, in addition to CATV services, will make economically and technically possible a wide
variety of new and different services involving the distribution of data, information storage and
retrieval, and visual, facsimile and telemetry transmission of all kinds.").
103. See STUART M INOR BENJAMIN ET AL., T ELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 378
(2001) (noting that cable has "long [been] regulated as a natural monopoly," and discussing
reasons that cable systems may be natural monopolies); see also Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v.
City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (same).
104. For a general history of these periods of rate regulation, see ROBERT W. CRANDALL &
HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH , CABLE TV: REGULATION OR COMPETITION? 24–49 (1996). The
1984 Act required rate regulation of cable television systems unless those systems were subject
to "effective competition." In implementing this statute, the FCC held that cable systems
operating in areas where there were three broadcast signals were subject to "effective
competition." "Since most cable systems operated in environments meeting that criterion, this
standard effectively abolished rate regulation for all cable systems." BENJAMIN ET AL., supra
note 103, at 413.
105. See id. at 441–74 (discussing the broadcast/cable relationship).
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Legal barriers to entry into cable television markets were lifted in stages in
the 1990s. Because cable companies extensively use public streets to install their
cables, the 1984 Cable Act confirmed the right of municipalities to franchise cable
operators, although it both limited local authority to deny renewals and capped the
local franchise fee at 5% of a cable system’s revenues.106 Under this scheme,
most municipalities granted exclusive franchises.107 In 1992, Congress addressed
the franchise as a legal barrier to entry and specifically provided that state and
local governments could not grant exclusive franchises.108 Nevertheless, the
FCC had, in 1970, forbidden telephone companies to provide cable television
service in their local territories,109 and Congress continued this ban in the 1984
Cable Act. This ban continued until Bell Atlantic won a First Amendment
challenge to this exclusion110 and the 1996 Act confirmed that telephone
companies may offer video services.111
Despite the absence of legal barriers to entry, only very few places in the
United States have more than one cable television provider. Indeed, considering
not only cable television services but any form of facilities-based competitor, the
FCC recently concluded that "competition from a wire-based competitor [with
cable companies for video programming] is limited to a very few markets."112 In
the past several years, significant competition with cable has come from DBS (on
which more in Part IV), providing an example of intermodal competition similar

106. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000) (granting franchising authority); id. § 542(b) (limiting fee
to 5%); id. § 546 (addressing renewal expectancy).
107. See CRANDALL & FURCHTGOTT-ROTH , supra note 104, at 7 ("[C]able . . . developed as
a municipally franchised service that was also subject to local government franchise fees,
municipal or state regulation of rates, and various local service requirements such as free cable
for schools and town halls.").
108. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000) ("[A] franchising authority may not grant an
exclusive franchise.").
109. See Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel
Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 752 (1970) (concluding what is in the public interest).
110. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 932 (E.D.
Va. 1993) (concluding that § 533(b) violated the right to free expression), aff’d, 42 F.3d 181 (4th
Cir. 1994), vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996).
111. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56,
210 (repealing cable/telco entry ban, previously codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)); see also 47
U.S.C. § 571 (2000) (establishing open video system regulations as one option for telephone
companies offering video service); id. § 543(c)(4) (sunsetting rate regulation in 1999 for all tiers
of cable service except for the "rebroadcast services" basic service (which no one buys
anyway)).
112. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Tenth Annual Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, ¶ 78 (2004) [hereinafter Tenth
Annual MVPD Report].
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to the development of microwave in long-distance. 113 But competition by DBS
came only as a result of specific regulatory moves that made cable programming
networks and broadcast networks available through that service. In particular, in
1992, Congress required that cable companies make their affiliated programming
channels available to satellite providers, and this ensured that DBS would have the
content, such as HBO and ESPN, necessary to offer a competing service. 114 And
in 1999, following technological developments that permitted satellite providers to
beam signals to selective locales, Congress established rules by which satellite
providers could carry local broadcast channels—which was necessary to put
DBS on equal footing with cable’s content.115
C. The 1996 Act
The statements made in support of the 1996 Act very much mirrored the
deregulatory rhetoric preceding the trucking, air, and railroad statutes, and
Congress drew explicitly on these precedents and on the earlier development of
competition in long-distance. The central House Report declared that the bill
"promotes competition and reduces regulation in order to secure lower prices and
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid development of new telecommunications technologies."116
Adopting the rhetoric of markets, the Report declares that "services would be
more widely available and at lower prices if telecommunications markets were
competitive rather than regulated monopolies."117 And so the Report talks
generally of "open[ing] all communications services to competition" and "lifting
the shackles of monopoly regulation."118 Indeed, many of the legislation’s
supporters, and some of its opponents, drew an explicit comparison to the prior
deregulatory statutes. Representative Klug’s statement was typical of the
supporters:

113. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (reviewing the lesser economies of scale
of microwave transmission technology).
114. See James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO . L.
REV. 975, 1006–07 (2002) (comparing Microsoft’s attempt to restrict Netscape’s access to its
browser market with cable companies’ attempts to restrict access to their wires).
115. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG . 107, 228–29 (2002) (discussing the passage of the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Amendments of 1999).
116. H.R. REP . NO . 104-204, at 47 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11.
117. Id. at 48.
118. Id.
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This bill . . . will usher in a new era of competition where the market instead
will pick winners and losers, and ultimately the major winner in all of this will
be consumers. It is the way that consumers won when we deregulated the
airline industry in 1978, and it is the way that consumers won when we
deregulated the trucking industry back in 1980. Those changes have
resulted in savings of hundreds of billions of dollars to the economy.119

The 1996 Act removed many legal barriers to entry into communications
markets. As to telecommunications, it preempted any state or local law that
would "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to
provide ‘telecommunications services.’"120 The 1996 Act also gave the FCC the
rather remarkable authority to completely deregulate telecommunications, by
giving it the authority to "forbear" from any statutory provision that the agency
found was unnecessary in light of the development of competition.121 As noted
above, earlier federal legislation had forbidden state and local governments from
restricting entry of multiple cable television companies, and the 1996 Act both
repealed restrictions on telephone company entry into cable television service and

119. 142 CONG . REC. 2208 (1996); see also H.R. REP . NO . 104-204, at 202 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 95 ("Title II has its roots in the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887. Ironically, the railroad industry whose activities were governed by that century-old law
was largely deregulated in 1980 by the Staggers Rail Act."); 141 CONG . REC. 15,341 (1995)
(statement of Sen. McCain) (asserting the need for deregulation). McCain stated:
We need to have a deregulated industry. In the past, we have deregulated the airline
industry, the trucking industry, the railroad industry in America, and there is very
little doubt in my mind that world events, as well as national events, indicate very
clearly and very strongly that the free enterprise system, unfettered by Government
interference and regulation, not only prospers best but provides the best services
for the citizens of any nation, including this one.
Id. But see 141 CONG . REC. 27,962 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (saying that the "bill is
set up pretty much like it is for airlines," but arguing that this would result in too many
mergers).
120. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000). For a more extended discussion of § 253, see James B.
Speta, Competitive Neutrality in Right of Way Regulation: A Case Study in the Consequences of
Convergence, 35 CONN . L. REV. 763, 770–72 (2003).
121. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000) ("[T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any
regulation . . . to a telecommunications carrier or . . . service, . . . if the Commission determines
that—(1) enforcement . . . is not necessary."). Congress also gave the FCC a statutory push in
that direction, by requiring that it review its telecommunications regulations every two years and
"modify or repeal" any that were no longer necessary "as the result of meaningful economic
competition between providers of such service." Id. § 161. The D.C. Circuit has made clear that
it will hold the FCC’s feet to the fire in these biennial review proceedings, requiring it to justify
existing regulations where evidence of competition has been presented. See Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding FCC decisions not to
eliminate rules in biennial review proceedings are subject to judicial review).
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eliminated much of the remaining rate regulation under which cable companies
had operated.122
The market as to which the 1996 Act intended the greatest change,
however, was the historically monopolized local telecommunications market.
Replacing laws under which "the majority of States restrict full and fair
competition in the local exchange, . . . [the bill] reflects the Committee’s belief
that more competition, rather than more regulation, will benefit all consumers."123
Indeed, Congress acknowledged that competition had already developed in many
telecommunications markets—the local exchange was the last bastion of
monopoly.124 As Joseph Kearney has written, "[t]he hope underlying much of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 [was] that sufficient competition will
develop in local telecommunications that this area of the industry will witness a
transformation similar to the one that occurred in the long-distance segment over
the last twenty-five years."125
Congress was not convinced, however, that the mere elimination of
regulation would spur competition in the local markets, and this was the genesis
of the Act’s so-called "local competition provisions."126 Uncontroversially, the
Act strengthened the requirement that all carriers interconnect with one another—
a requirement necessary to permit a transition to a competitive market, so that
incumbents cannot use embedded network size as a barrier to entry.127 The Act
122. See supra Part III.A–B (discussing early regulations that the 1996 Act sought to
modify or repeal).
123. H.R. REP . NO . 104-204, at 50 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 14.
124. See id. at 49–51, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 12–14 (recounting the history of
local competition in the local exchange).
125. Joseph D. Kearney, Will the FCC Go the Way of the ICC?, 71 U. COLO . L.REV. 1153,
1178 (2000); see also Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 101, at 91 ("The break up now is widely
acknowledged to have unleashed powerful forces of competition in long-distance telephone
markets; to have induced policy makers to recognize (in the Telecommunications Act of 1996)
that not even local telephone service is subject to natural monopoly."). See generally Alexander
C. Larson, Reforming Telecommunications Policy in Response to Entry into Local Exchange
Markets, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (1995).
126. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–56 (establishing the local competition provisions); Jerry A.
Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of
Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 426–34 (2000) (discussing the history of
network unbundling). See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of
1996, 29 CONN . L. REV. 123, 138–41 (1996) (summarizing these provisions).
127. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, ¶ 10 (1996) [hereinafter Local
Competition Provisions] ("[A]bsent interconnection between the incumbent LEC and the
entrant, the customer of the entrant would be unable to complete calls to subscribers served by
the incumbent LEC."), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366 (1999); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 426–27 (1985) (explaining that where the value of a good
depends upon the size of the network, new entrants face a barrier to entry); James B. Speta,
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also prohibited state and local laws that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting"
entry into telecommunications markets.128 The Act, however, went further and
required that incumbents unbundle their existing networks and lease those parts
of their local networks to any requesting carrier that the new entrants would find
economically inefficient to duplicate. 129 These requirements, which were born in
part of a compromise between the BOCs and the long-distance carriers,130 go
substantially beyond a mere interconnection requirement. As implemented by the
FCC, they require the incumbents to "cooperate, against their interests and for
little if any profit, with those very competitors" who will seek to take away their
local business.131
These unbundling requirements were introduced because of the concern that
certain parts of the local telecommunications network could never be
economically duplicated and that sharing of the incumbent’s network was the
only way to create a form of competition. William Baumol, a leading
telecommunications economist, had published a book just before passage of the
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband
Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG . 39, 81–82 (2000) (stating that the Act’s interconnection duties
help overcome network effects).
128. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000); see Speta, supra note 120, at 776–80 (discussing state and
local prohibitions).
129. For example, if it remained uneconomic for new entrants to string their own copper
wires into individual homes to deliver the "last mile" of local phone service, then these
provisions would require the incumbents to lease the incumbents’ own local lines to the new
entrants at "cost." See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (2000) (imposing unbundling obligations); §252(d)
(setting substantive standards for unbundling prices); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366, 387–94 (1999) (discussing the Act’s requirements concerning which elements
must be leased); Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 476 (2002) (discussing
rules for pricing these elements).
130. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment
on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN . L. REV. 217, 225 (1997) ("The stand-off between the
dominant vested players in the regulatory game was, naturally, resolved by compromise.").
131. Howard A. Shelanski, A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local
Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1617, 1621 (1999). It is quite important to note here
that Shelanski’s comment is made against the backdrop of the FCC’s selection of a forwardlooking cost formula (TELRIC) that was designed to squeeze any monopoly profits out of the
charges that incumbents would make for network elements. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 501–28
(describing the standard). A different pricing standard, such as some implementation of the
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), could try to include in the charges sufficient
monopoly profits that the incumbent would be indifferent between acting as a retailer or as a
wholesaler. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic
and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 900–07 (2003) (advocating a fullrecovery price for access). On the other hand, such higher access prices are likely to result in
only "soft competition," if any, because the incumbent does become indifferent to losing
customers, and the new entrant is squeezed by high wholesale prices. See JEAN -JACQUES
LAFFONT & JEAN T IROLE, COMPETITION IN T ELECOMMUNICATIONS 207–09 (2000) (discussing
"unbundling-based entry").
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1996 Act that advocated unbundling on just such a basis.132 His argument for
unbundling rules was based explicitly on the presumption "that the basic network
functions [such as loops, switches, and signaling] rather than the LEC services
constitute remaining bottlenecks."133 Other commentators made similar
arguments about the need for unbundling.134 And both the FCC and numerous
commentators have explained that the unbundling rules are designed to force
incumbents to share economies of scale, scope, and density.135 But if the local
market is characterized by such economies, then these are the conditions of
natural monopoly.136 In other words, the unbundling provisions were included to

132. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK , T OWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
T ELEPHONY 122 (1994) ("[T]he LEC networks should comprehensively unbundle the [basic
network functions], each of which should be offered separately for sale at prices based on
costs."). Baumol had consulted with AT&T and other telecommunications carriers on the 1996
Act. See William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1037
n.** (1997) (stating that Baumol was a consultant for AT&T).
133. BAUMOL & SIDAK , supra note 132, at 122.
134. See, e.g., Craig D. Dingwall, The Last Mile: A Race for Local Telecommunications
Competition Policy, 48 FED . COMM. L.J. 105, 120–21 (1995) (reviewing nascent unbundling
policies); Krattenmaker, supra note 126, at 158–59 (explaining that unbundling requirements
were included in the law because "[i]t is most likely that running a telecommunications wire to
the home is a natural monopoly and so one ought to concentrate on regulating that monopoly or
mitigating its ill effects"). Schwartz and Hoagg state:
Taken together, competition (with and without interconnection) and unbundling
mean that the best customers are no longer captive, and that the BOCs must
compete for them on the basis of product and services. While the erosion of
telephone company revenues caused by competition and network unbundling has
been small (probably less than two percent on average), this erosion will increase in
places where it has begun, and spread to places where it has not yet begun.
Gail Garfield Schwartz & Jeffrey H. Hoagg, Virtual Divestiture: Structural Reform of an RHC,
44 FED . COMM. L.J. 285, 293 (1992).
135. See Local Competition Provisions, supra note 127, ¶¶ 315–16 (setting forth what
incumbent LECs must provide new carriers), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
136. That is, if local markets truly are characterized by economies of scale, scope, and
density that are so severe that it is inefficient to duplicate infrastructure, then this is the natural
monopoly condition that market demand is most efficiently met by a single supplier. See
generally SHARKEY , supra note 29, at 24–30 (defining natural monopoly); W. KIP VISCUSI ET
AL ., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND A NTITRUST 337–44 (3d ed. 2000) (same). Some have made
the argument that the unbundling rules are merely transitional rules that enable a competitor to
enter an economic or advertising market while gradually building facilities, and this argument
regards unbundling as largely a means for dissipating the incumbent’s advantage of incumbency.
See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman & Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications:
Iowa Utilities & Verizon, 2002 SUP . CT. REV. 41, 51–52 (examining three different formulations
of the baseline for unbundling rules). But the more often heard rationale about dissipating
economies of scale, scope, and density refers not to the incumbency advantage but to the
economics of supply in the market.
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allow retail competition to develop, notwithstanding that the incumbents might be
wholesaling all or some of the facilities necessary for other competitors to
provide service.
Needless to say, the unbundling provisions have been extraordinarily
controversial and time-consuming to implement. Some of the processes’
protraction is inherent in Congress’s design, which required new entrants and
incumbents to individually negotiate interconnection agreements, subject to
arbitration in front of state public utility commissions if the parties could not
reach agreement.137 The idea was that voluntary, quasi market-based
negotiations would provide a better starting point than an agency-centered
administrative process.138 But much of the delay has been regulatory: each of
the FCC’s rulemakings has been challenged, with central aspects of the FCC’s
rules twice going to the Supreme Court,139 and almost every carrier request for
unbundling has resulted in a contested proceeding first before a state commission
and then on appeal to a federal distric t court.140
Indeed, even today, more than eight years after the Act, the FCC’s
implementing rules are still substantially unsettled. The basic questions of how
much of the incumbents’ networks they must share with competitors and at what
price have not yet come to rest. The Supreme Court has resolved that the FCC
has authority to set the rules as to both matters, 141 but the FCC’s rules defining
the elements to be unbundled have yet to survive judicial review. The agency’s
137. See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2000) (establishing "[p]rocedures for negotiation, arbitration, and
approval of agreements").
138. See generally Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479, 488, 492
(2002) (noting how negotiation processes used in earlier deregulatory efforts were carried in to
the 1996 Act).
139. See generally id. (challenging FCC’s interconnection and unbundling pricing rules);
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (challenging FCC’s first local competition
order on FCC jurisdiction to prescribe rules and on the scope of its unbundling rules); United
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating FCC’s local competition
order on remand from AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.).
140. For a discussion of the somewhat odd system ("decidedly novel" in Justice Scalia’s
view, AT&T, 525 U.S. at 385 n.10 (1999)) under which (a) the FCC has rulemaking power, but
(b) the state PUCs are charged with adjudicating the controversies under this federal statute, and
(c) the state agency decisions are appealed to a federal district court, see Philip J. Weiser,
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1757–60 (2001). For representative court of appeals decisions addressing
interconnection and unbundling proceedings, see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. U.S. W.
Communications, 204 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing arbitrated agreement, which included
topics such as unbundling, co-location of remote switching units, and cost arrangements); AT&T
Communications Sys. v. Pac. Bell, 203 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing arbitrated
agreement under which competitor sought entry into ILEC market).
141. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 378 (concluding that the FCC’s authority encompasses §§251
and 252 of the Act).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

1096

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2004)

first rules required incumbents to provide any element that a new entrant
requests; the Supreme Court held that this misinterpreted the statute, 142
notwithstanding that the Court itself derided the statute as, "in many important
respects[,] a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction."143 When the
FCC then promulgated a limited list of elements to be unbundled,144 the D.C.
Circuit struck down the rules because they applied nationwide—that is, without
taking account of potentially different competitive conditions in different
locales.145 And when the FCC attempted to respond to the D.C. Circuit’s
criticism of nationwide rules by delegating to the state utility commissions, which
under the Act resolve disputes in interconnection and unbundling negotiations, the
authority to also determine which elements would be unbundled, the court said,
"Again, regrettably, much of the resulting work is unlawful."146
IV. The Uncertain State of Telecommunications Competition
Having just limped through the three years of wreckage wrought by the
Internet meltdown, making firm predictions about the future of
telecommunications technology, markets, and competition would seem a fool’s
errand. In fact, a communications revolution—in which broadband will be
ubiquitous, competition abundant, and services cheap—has been predicted in
some quarters for more than twenty years.147 Nevertheless, an accurate
142. See id. at 394–96. Gary Lawson has called the Supreme Court’s decision in this regard
remarkable as its first invalidation of agency rules under the very deferential second prong of
Chevron review, in which an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute must be accepted
by the courts if the interpretation is reasonable. See GARY LAWSON , FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 643 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that this case was "the first step two loss that an agency ever
suffered in the Supreme Court"); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (creating Chevron two-step analysis).
143. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 397 (recognizing the statute’s ambiguity). The Court stated:
It would be gross understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity.
It is in many important respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even selfcontradiction. That is most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that profoundly
affects a crucial segment of the economy worth tens of billions of dollars.
Id.
144. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15
F.C.C.R. 3696, ¶¶ 162–64 (1999) (listing the network elements to be unbundled).
145. See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 422–24 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(finding problems with a national mandate).
146. United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
147. It should be no slight to Ithiel de Sola Pool’s far-seeing work that his predictions of
"digital and broadband, . . . pluralistic and competitive communications systems" that expand
human culture have not yet been fully realized. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL , T ECHNOLOGIES OF
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summary of central characteristics can be briefly stated. On the whole,
substantial frustration continues with the state of local competition, with editorial
pages and prospective competitors alleging that the local telephone companies still
"enjoy near-monopolies in their service territories."148 The recent release of a
General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of cable rates unleashed a similar wave
of sentiment that, in the words of Senator John McCain, due to the lack of
competition, "consumers . . . continue to be fleeced by their cable operators."149
To justify this Article’s call for fundamental change in the regulatory
landscape, this Part surveys the current state of local competition. First, except
in relatively dense business markets, little intramodal competition has developed to
incumbent telephone companies in their traditional markets. Despite its
prominence in the legislation and subsequent implementation, the 1996 Act’s
experiment with unbundled network elements has been something of a failure,
with relatively few markets showing effective competition. Cable overbuilding is
also virtually nonexistent. On the other hand, in high-speed Internet access,
where incumbent telephone companies and cable companies both offer service,
these two companies are increasingly competing with one another. Second,
some solid prospects for intermodal competition are on the horizon. In fact, DBS
already provides some real competition to cable. In telephony, competition is
nascent, but wireless and Internet telephony look increasingly like promising
substitutes. Indeed, it is hard not to get caught up in the excitement over VoIP
telephony. Wireless and VoIP are the "glimmers of hope" that justify another
reworking of communications policy. Third, despite these "glimmers," some
scenarios exist in which nascent competition might be cut off—either because of
technological and market developments or by the strategic action of companies,
or both.
A. Limited Wireline (Intramodal) Competition

FREEDOM 226, 229 (1983).
148. Call Baby Bells to Account, L.A. T IMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at B16; see also, e.g., Reza
Dibadj, Competitive Debacle in Local Telephony: Is the 1996 Telecommunications Act to
Blame?, 81 WASH . U. L.Q., 1, 12 (2003) (comparing the role of competition in long-distance and
local telephony); Sanford Nowlin, Battling the Bells; Telecom Champion; Phone Company CEO
Fights for Access to SBC’s Networks, SAN ANTONIO-EXPRESS NEWS, May 22, 2003, at 1D
(discussing competitors’ battles with SBC).
149. Leon Lazaroff, Cable Rates Still Sore Subject; Report Says Competition Benefits Few,
CHI. T RIB., Oct. 25, 2003, at C1. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE , ISSUES
RELATED TO COMPETITION AND SUBSCRIBER RATES IN THE CABLE T ELEVISION INDUSTRY, GAO04-8 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d048.pdf.
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The objective data reveal that some substantial telephone competition has
developed in big business and dense urban markets;150 notably, however, that
competition was developing even before the 1996 Act.151 Overall, competitors
are providing about 15% of switched local access lines.152 In residential markets,
and especially in suburban and rural markets, the percentages are lower.153 More
significantly, most of this service—approximately 80%—is provided by
competitors leasing the incumbents’ local loops.154 As a result, the long-term
viability of the service is entirely contingent on the availability and pricing of these
incumbents’ elements.155 Reflecting this, most analysts agree that competitive
local exchange carriers face an uncertain business future. 156
In cable markets, the FCC has stopped tracking so-called cable overbuilders
as a separate category, reflecting that they are present in only a very few
150.

See INDUS. ANALYSIS & T ECH . DIV., FCC, LOCAL T ELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS
DECEMBER 31, 2002, at 1–2 (2003) (summarizing recent changes), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom0603.pdf; see
also Nicholas Economides, US Telecommunications Today, in IS M ANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 19
(Carol V. Brown & Heikki Topi eds., 2003) ("[O]ver six years after the signing of the Act by
President Clinton, entry in the local exchange has been small.").
151. See Dingwall, supra note 134, at 108–12 (comparing long-distance and local
competition).
152. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & T ECH . DIV., FCC, LOCAL T ELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS
AS OF J UNE 30, 2003, at 1–2 (2003) (summarizing changes in competition), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom1203.pdf.
153. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & T ECH . DIV., supra note 150, at 2–3 (summarizing recent data).
154. See id. at tbl. 3 (reporting number of end-user lines acquired from other carriers).
155. See, e.g., CONSUMER FED ’N OF AM., COMPETITION AT THE CROSSROADS: CAN PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSION SAVE LOCAL PHONE COMPETITION 7–9 (2003) (looking at the major states
where "the stakes for competition and consumers are huge"), available at http://www.
consumerfed.org/unep_200310.pdf. As Laffont and Tirole explain, the price at which the
element is made available to the entrant entirely determines the shape of the competition
between the entrant and the incumbent. See LAFFONT & T IROLE, supra note 131, at 129–35
(examining various aspects of access pricing).
156. See Donny Jackson, Reports: FCC Votes for Interim UNE Rules, T ELEPHONY
ONLINE ,
at
http://www.telephonyonline.com/microsites/newsarticle.asp?mode=print&newsarticleid=272
7632&releaseid=&srid=11357&magazineid=7&siteid=3 (July 23, 2004) (considering the
prospects for competitive local exchange carriers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Jackson states:
Some sources indicated the rates for existing CLEC customers would increase
automatically by 15% under that scenario, while others believe special-access rates
will apply. Either option would have a ‘drastic’ negative impact on CLECs,
according to a letter sent yesterday to Powell by five equity firms with investments
in competitive carriers.
Id. See generally Edie Herman et al., White House Won’t Seek an Appeal of the UNE Decision,
COMMUNICATIONS DAILY , June 10, 2004, 2004 WL 60706285 (summarizing analyst reports
suggesting that CLEC prices would significantly rise).
AS OF
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locales.157 The few local telephone companies that entered the video service
market have largely exited.158 Nationwide, fewer than 2% of all customers of
multi-channel video service purchase from a wireline carrier other than the
incumbent cable operator.159 The largest cable overbuilder, RCN, recently
announced that it is seeking bankruptcy protection.160
The story is somewhat better (and worse) in the local high-speed Internet
access markets. Unlike in telephone, these markets now largely have two
competitors—the cable companies providing cable modem service and the
incumbents providing DSL service. 161 Nonincumbent provision of DSL, which
largely depended on leasing loops in any event, has been falling in share of the
market, and third-provider entry has been falling and is, as noted above,
threatened by uncertainty.162 The cable companies and the incumbent DSL
providers seem to be competing, at least for the initial acquisition of customers,
by offering initial discounts on installation and service. 163
Alternatives to cable and DSL are limited. Due to their longer delays and
more limited capacity, satellite-based services, which are provided by the DBS
companies, are considered viable only in rural areas where DSL and cable do not
reach.164 Several companies, in particular Sprint, deployed fixed wireless
157. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 78 ("Competition from a wirebased competitor such as a BSP is limited to a very few markets.").
158. See id. ¶¶ 112–15 (evaluating LEC experience over the past decade).
159. See id. ¶¶ 11–13 (examining competition’s effects on cable television).
160. See Bankruptcy Filing in the Cards for RCN, CHI. T RIB., Feb. 18, 2004, at 47
(announcing RCN’s plan to file bankruptcy).
161. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & T ECH . DIV., FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET
ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2002, at 3 (2003) (finding that incumbent share of DSL
service increased to 95% of market), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carner/
Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd0603.pdf.
162. Id. The only exception to a duopoly market is the few areas in which a second cable
company has built its own network, but this accounts for only several percent of the market.
See id. at 4–5 (indicating where high-speed providers are located). Some other possibilities
started but then faded. In the late 1990s, Sprint introduced in some areas a wireless high-speed
Internet access service, and there was much discussion about the possibility of using various
wireless services for such high-speed services. See Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Ninth Annual Report, 17
F.C.C.R. 26,901, ¶¶ 13–14 (2002) [hereinafter Ninth Annual MVPD Report] (evaluating
particular distribution technologies in the video program delivery market); Speta, supra note
127, at 58–60 (examining multichannnel and local multipoint distribution systems). Sprint
discontinued its service and no significant others have been deployed.
163. See Jim Hu, SBC Sees Surge in DSL Subscribers, CNET NEWS.COM,
http://news.com.com/2100-1034-5094331.html (Oct. 21, 2003) (discussing SBC’s increase in
broadband customers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
164. See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
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platforms for Internet access in 2000 and early 2001, but those services have
largely folded.165 There are suggestions at the FCC and in the markets of a
reinvigoration of fixed wireless, but these offerings are only just emerging
again.166 In other words, in the vast majority of markets, the incumbent
telephone company and the incumbent cable company are the only providers of
high-speed Internet access.
B. Intermodal Competition in Video Markets
Although incumbent cable operators still have an overwhelming 75% share
of the market,167 competition from direct broadcast satellite has been increasing
in recent years, and the double-digit growth rates for DBS far surpass cable’s
single-digit rates.168 Moreover, in areas where the satellite providers offer local
broadcast channels, competition between cable and DBS is more vigorous.169
The FCC reports a DirecTV claim that "approximately 70%" of their new
customers were former cable customers, which suggests head-to-head
competition.170 In 2002, the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) declared
that DBS had "failed" to provide "intermodal competition" to cable, 171 and this
analysis provided the basis for Professor Reza Dibadj’s proposal that cable be
subject to unbundling and resale obligations similar to those the 1996 Act applied
to incumbent telephone companies.172 But the data relied upon in the CFA study
largely predates the availability of local broadcast channels on satellite, and the
Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, ¶ 78 (2002) (examining projections for subscribers to highspeed satellite systems).
165. See supra note 162 (describing Sprint’s experience in the late 1990s).
166. See Paul Davidson, Inventive Wireless Providers Go Rural, USA T ODAY , July 14,
2004, (explaining how new wireless technology is using fixed wireless technology to provide
Internet access in remote areas), available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-07-14wireless_x.htm; Nick Wingfield, Technology (A Special Report)—Tomorrow’s Wi-Fi: It’s Called
WiMax—and Its Promoters Say Broadband Will Never Be the Same, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2004,
at R8 (discussing the technology and potential impact of WiMax).
167. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 6 (finding a decline in purchasing
cable from a franchise operator).
168. See id. ¶¶ 45–50 (examining the demand for video-on-demand and HDTV services).
169. Id.
170. See id. ¶ 65 (reporting on the subscribership of DBS services).
171. See generally M ARK COOPER, CONSUMER FED ’N OF AM., T HE FAILURE OF
INTERMODAL COMPETITION IN CABLE M ARKETS (2002) (asserting the shortcomings of intermodal
competition), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/intercomp.20020423.pdf.
172. See Reza Dibadj, Toward Meaningful Cable Competition: Getting Beyond the
Monopoly Morass, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL ’Y 245, 267–71 (2003) (surveying the national
cable market and consumer satisfaction).
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GAO has more recently concluded that cable companies act to improve service,
increase channel packages, and generally respond to DBS’s offerings where local
channels are available. 173 This is competition on the service dimension instead of
the price dimension, but the GAO has also found that incumbent cable
companies’ prices are between 15% and 41% lower in cities in which an
overbuilder operates.174 With the FCC poised to issue licenses for additional DBS
providers, competition may expand further.175
On the other hand, the DBS providers assert that they are constrained by
their available bandwidth as to the number of markets in which they can offer
local broadcast channels.176 Perhaps most telling, cable rates continue to rise far
faster than the general rate of consumer inflation.177
C. Coming (?) Intermodal Competition in Telephony
Competition may be increasing for voic e telephone services, coming from
two directions—cell phone companies and Internet telephony. Cell phone
competition is a story of relatively gradual change, while VoIP could create a
rapid break in the competitive landscape. These are the types of intermodal
competition that changes in regulation should seek to exploit. In fact, both the
history of telecommunications competition and current marketplace developments
suggest that one looking to find significant competitors for traditional wireline
services should look to intermodal services. As noted above, it was a wireless
service (microwave) that provided the first viable competition to AT&T’s Long
Lines and that led the United States to seek and achieve the breakup of the
integrated Bell System.178 That episode is concluded, as all long-distance has

173. See GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 3–4 ("Competition from wire-based and DBS
operators leads to lower cable rates and improved quality and service among cable operators.");
Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 11 (exploring competition’s effect on prices).
174. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE , WIRE -BASED COMPETITION BENEFITED
CONSUMERS IN SELECTED M ARKETS, GAO-04-241, at 4 (Feb. 2004) (summarizing results of
study), available at http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d04241.pdf. The GAO study employed a
case-study methodology, selecting six cities in which overbuilders operated, and does not
purport to be generalizable to other areas. Id. at 2. Yet it is strong evidence that competition
will occur on the price dimension as well.
175. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶¶ 62–64 (detailing current and
prospective license holders).
176. See id. ¶ 12 (explaining developing technology ’s impact on cable offerings).
177. See GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 20 (providing a variety of factors that
contributed to cable rate increases); Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 4
(summarizing the telecommunication events of the 1993–2003 decade).
178. See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text (discussing the Bell breakup).
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moved to fiber optics,179 but DBS provides a current example. 180 And, although
currently limited to only 2–3% of all consumers, the number of people who will
completely give up their wireline voice service in favor of a wireless phone is
expected to rise as telephone number portability rules take effect.181
Moreover, short of complete substitution, in some limited parts of the
telephone market "[t]here is much evidence . . . that consumers are substituting
wireless service for traditional wireline communications."182 For example, due to
the ubiquity of wireless telephones, the payphone market is declining rapidly, the
demand for second telephone lines is significantly depressed, and up to 20% of all
long-distance access has migrated to wireless because of the ability to "bucketprice" instead of charge by the minute. 183 Overall, the FCC concludes that "this
is due to the declining cost and widespread use of wireless service. In fact, a
number of analysts argue that wireless service is cheaper than wireline."184
Indeed, it has been true for some time that the deployment of wireless telephone
systems, measured on a per-line basis, has been cheaper than the creation of new
wireline systems, as demonstrated by the worldwide deployment of those
systems in less developed countries.185 In the Internet access markets, a variety
of wireless solutions have become available, including Wi-Fi hotspots, higherspeed access through cell phone companies, and DBS -based satellite services. 186
It is not clear, however, that any of these are (yet) substitutes for the high-speed
services sold by the cable and DSL providers.187
179. See LINDA BLAKE & JIM LANDEY , FCC, T RENDS IN THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL
T ELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY , tbls. 3–5 (2001) (showing that satellite use is largely
restricted to a limited amount of international service and some services that are not sensitive to
the greater delays in satellite transmissions), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/Intl/itltrd97.pdf.
180. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (describing DBS’s competition with
cable).
181. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Eighth Report, 18 F.C.C.R. 14,783, ¶¶ 101–06 (2003) [hereinafter
Eighth Report].
182. Id. ¶ 102.
183. See id. ¶¶ 103–04 (discussing the trend towards wireless phones); see also Speta,
supra note 120, at 794 (analyzing data from 2000 and 2001).
184. Eighth Report, supra note 181, ¶ 104.
185. See, e.g., Peter Haynes, The End of the Line: A Survey of Telecommunications,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1993, at 1, 7 (examining the possibilities for expansion in places like China,
Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union).
186. See Eighth Report, supra note 181, ¶¶ 124–84 (evaluating mobile service data).
187. Indeed, it is unlikely that they are because the technical characteristics are not
comparable. Wi-Fi hotspots are currently quite localized, and even the fastest cell phone data
services are a small fraction of the speed of cable and DSL broadband. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 180–84
(explaining Wi-Fi technology). These services are focused on the mobile markets and not on the
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Perhaps because the news has been so bad for so long in the
telecommunications industry, a significant buzz has recently developed over the
prospects for competition presented by VoIP, with the Financial Times dubbing it
"America’s chance for a free market in telephony."188 FCC Chairman Michael
Powell has described VoIP as potentially bringing a "degree of choice for
consumers never before seen in the residential voice market."189 Although cable
companies have provided limited telephone service for several years (with
approximately three million subscribers as of June 30, 2003),190 VoIP promises to
make that service much less costly to provide. As a result, every significant
cable company has announced a roll-out of VoIP to come within the next year.191
But it is not only the cable companies that are offering the technology; AT&T,
SBC, and Qwest are all announcing new residential or business VoIP offerings.192
In fact, the established telephone companies are playing catch-up to a certain
degree, as Internet-based telephony has long been available to those willing to
initiate their calls from their computers193 and as new starts-ups such as Vonage

fixed residential or business markets. Satellite services are not as fast and experience delays. See
Speta, supra note 127, at 60 (discussing satellite technology ’s competition with cable television
video service).
188. America’s Chance for a Free Market in Telephony, FIN. T IMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at 19.
189. Michael K. Powell, Written Statement on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Before
the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. 6 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://hraun
foss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-244231A1.pdf.
190. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & T ECH . DIV., supra note 152, at 2 tbl. 5 (reporting number of
end-user switched access lines).
191. See, e.g., Peter Grant & Shawn Young, Time Warner Cable Expands Net-Phone Plan,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2003, at A19 (discussing Time Warner’s plans to use the Internet to
provide telephone service); Matt Richtel, Time Warner Deal Raises Ante in Cable’s Bid for
Phone Market, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A1 ("In addition to Time Warner Cable, the cable
giants Comcast, Cox Communications and Cablevision have started deployment of Internet
phone services, with plans to expand those services in 2004.").
192. See, e.g., AT&T to Expand VoIP Service, WASH . POST, Dec. 12, 2003, at E02 ("AT&T
said it plans to sell Internet-based phone service to residential customers in the first quarter of
next year to keep pace with competitors that are rolling out the service. A similar offering of
voice-over-Internet protocol service for businesses, available since 1997, will be expanded.");
Technology Briefing: Telecommunications: SBC to Sell Internet Calling Service to Businesses,
N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 21, 2003, at C2 (publicizing SBC’s efforts to sell Internet calling and data
services); Shawn Young, ‘Naked DSL:’ Qwest to Offer Web Service Separate from Phone,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at D1 (reviewing Qwest’s plans to offer DSL to its customers).
193. See Jonathan Moules, Online Upstarts Target the Titans, FIN. T IMES, Nov. 20, 2003,
at 9 ("Internet protocol (IP) telephony, or the transmission of voice, fax and instant messaging
over networks that use the internet’s ‘packet-switching’ technology, is not new. However, for
home users, it has been largely a hobbyist’s pursuit for those with the time and patience to
connect calls over personal computers.").
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deploy new boxes that attach to broadband connections and allow a consumer to
have a traditional telephone handset.194
The development means that "[t]he issue is now front and center—after a
decade of fits and starts—because Internet telephony finally appears ready to go
mainstream."195 If VoIP is successful, it would certainly increase the competitive
pressure facing local telephone companies in voice markets. To a certain extent,
the level of competition will be constrained by the level of competition in
broadband Internet services. Because VoIP must be provided over broadband,
the price of that service includes the price of the broadband line. But, even if
competition among Internet access networks is imperfect,196 the availability of
Internet telephony increases the level of competition with traditional voice
telephone companies.
D. Or (Maybe) Less Competition
The optimistic view of coming competition in the local telecommunications
market may, however, tell only half of the story. The optimistic view is that
technological developments and the passage of time will inevitably increase
competition among communications platforms. Competitive telecommunications
markets do not, however, always stay that way, and technological advance might
result in lower levels of effective competition as well as greater. As a historical
matter, in the early days of telephone service, competing local companies existed
in many cities, until AT&T invented the "killer application" of long-distance
(which was protected by patents) and refused to share it with its rivals.197
Similarly, broadcast television was an (imperfectly) competitive market, with
three networks and sometimes independent stations competing in most local
markets.198 The advent of cable, however, with vastly superior distribution
technology because of the number of channels it supplied, introduced a monopoly
element into video markets.199
Relevant to the emerging digital broadband world, some commentators and
the FCC have expressed concern that the development of more sophisticated
194. See Glenn Fleishman, An Internet Extension to Your Telephone Twin, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 2003, at G3 (explaining how the SIP phone works).
195. Yuki Noguchi, Identity Crisis; Internet Services Challenge Definition of "Phone
Company", WASH . POST, Oct. 23, 2003, at E01.
196. See supra notes 148–67 and accompanying text (evaluating competition in Internet
access markets).
197. Robinson, supra note 72, at 7–8.
198. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 441–43.
199. Id.
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interactive television services could diminish whatever ability digital broadcast and
satellite have to compete with cable television systems. Interactive television
(ITV) requires sufficient downstream capacity to provide a high-quality video
stream and an efficient upstream channel to return the user’s selections.200 Only
cable systems have both of these characteristics, and, indeed, the cable
companies themselves seem to see interactive services as the logical next step in
trying to win the market back from the satellite companies.201 If this scenario
occurs, even the current level of competition in video and Internet may take a
step backwards. As the FCC put it in a 2001 notice of inquiry into interactive
television services (which is, of course, still pending): "If it turns out that only
one delivery platform in each geographic area has the capability to provide the
most attractive ITV services package, and if the platform provider is vertically
integrated with an ITV service provider, then there would be the potential for
anticompetitive behavior."202 These concerns may or may not materialize. It is
relatively easy to envision the alternatives to the cable companies cornering the
market on interactive television, and the telephone companies are beginning to
work closely with satellite providers to market bundles of voice, video, and highspeed Internet services to compete with cable companies.203 Broadband
terrestrial wireless platforms could also provide interactive packet video. The
installation of substantially more fiber optics in local telecommunications
networks would permit VDSL services that too would provide interactive
video.204 Also, a new set-top box could combine DSL servic e with satellite video
to provide ITV equivalency. But, again, many of these alternatives are not in the
offing.
Wireless services is another area in which technological and market
developments could roll back the current level of competition.205 Wireless
200. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Services over
Cable, Notice of Inquiry, 16 F.C.C.R. 1321, ¶ 6 (2001) (characterizing ITV service).
201. See Dustin Goot, Video May Kill the Satellite’s Star, WIRED NEWS,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,56729,00.html (Dec. 6, 2002) ("Broadband Plus,
formerly the Western Cable Show, opened this week with a call to arms from the chairman of
the California Cable and Telecommunications Association: Cable companies must ‘stop the
bleeding that’s going to DBS (satellite).’") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
202. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 200, ¶ 1; see also Hernan Galperin & François Bar, The
Regulation of Interactive Television in the United States and the European Union, 55 FED .
COMM. L.J. 61, 74 (2002) ("The lack of a credible competitor to discipline cable operators opens
several avenues for discriminatory behavior in favor of affiliated programmers and ITV service
producers.").
203. See, e.g., SBC To Sell TV Packages, CHI. T RIB., Mar. 4, 2004, at C2 (discussing SBC’s
bundling plans).
204. See Speta, supra note 127, at 54 (noting that fiber optics would allow DSL services).
205. The new technology actually creates a new market, one in which there are fewer
companies providing service. This new market may or may not eliminate the old market, but if
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telephony to date has been one of the truly competitive telecommunications
markets.206 Some consolidation has begun, and with AT&T Wireless merging
with Cingular, more is coming.207 But multi-media services and interactive
services are coming to wireless telephones as well, and the experience in Japan
with NTT DoCoMo’s i-Mode service shows that a company that first brings a
new service to market may be able to build an internal network effect that locks
customers into the service, decreasing competition among the platforms.208
Neither of these scenarios is certain of course, and traditional regulatory
tools may suffice to handle them if they develop (though of course competition
would be a superior result to new regulation). Moreover, it is important to
evaluate carefully the types of anticompetitive behavior that arise in any
monopolistic market. In monopoly, prices are higher and output is constrained,
which certainly harms consumers as a theoretical matter. But a static monopoly
may only reflect sequential competition for the market, rather than a durable
monopoly harming consumers.209 Moreover, only in certain types of markets
will the monopolist have an incentive to leverage or to otherwise discriminate
against producers in related markets. It is these scenarios that present greater
threats to innovation and to free communications values and therefore warrant
special attention.
V. Learning the Lesson: Setting a New Agenda for Local Competition
If Congress had considered the precedents of airline, trucking, and railroad
deregulation from the perspective of what market characteristics had preceded
deregulation, the 1996 Act might have pursued a different course for introducing
competition into local telecommunications markets. Given that Congress
apparently did not believe that competitors would duplicate the essential elements
of the incumbents’ networks, this line of reasoning should have led to the
the new technology encompasses or supplants the old, it may.
206. See supra notes 178–96 and accompanying text (describing competition in wireless
telephony).
207. See Dan Thanh Dang, Wireless Customers Could Dial up Better Service if Companies
Merge but Loss of Competition Might Bring Higher Costs, BALT. SUN , Jan. 22, 2004, at 1A
(analyzing possible mergers in the wireless industry). This consolidation has as much to do
with the nearly-complete transition from a local to national wireless telephone market. And
antitrust seems likely enough to ensure that consolidation does not threaten competition
(though, as is discussed later, spectrum reform would do even more).
208. See Speta, supra note 80, at 208–10 (describing a first-mover’s ability to limit later
competition).
209. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 101, at 10–15 (discussing competition for the
market).
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conclusion that complete intramodal competition (the airline and trucking model)
would not in fact develop, or at least would not develop soon. The unbundling
provisions take as their premise that, unlike independent trucking companies and
airlines that provide their own end-to-end networks, new entrants into
telecommunications markets will rely upon elements owned by the incumbent
who maintains a monopoly over a part of the network. In short, the 1996 Act
reveals a concern that true intramodal competition could not develop. This
conclusion, combined with the lesson learned from transportation deregulation,
means Congress should have done more to promote the development of
intermodal competition—competition to the incumbent telephone companies (and
the incumbent cable companies) from providers who would use fundamentally
different network technologies.
Lest I be thought too harsh on Congress, let me be clear that there is much
that is good in the 1996 Act, and indeed, some features of the Act do advance
intermodal competition.
The lifting of legal barriers to entry into
telecommunications markets and the explicit provisions requiring interconnection
were undoubtedly necessary to help competition and, in these regards, were
similar to all of the earlier, successful deregulatory efforts. 210 Many members of
Congress expressed hope that wireless and cable companies would compete with
wireline telephone companies.211 I am not even particularly critical of the
unbundling requirements, for they are an at least somewhat effective way to
introduce a limited form of competition into local markets and, as implemented by
the FCC, a very effective way to limit the incumbents’ ability to monopoly-price
in important markets.212 In this regard, too, I think that the federalization of
much of local telecommunications regulation is a good result of the 1996 Act.213
Rather, I think that the 1996 Act could have done much more to increase the
possibility of true facilities-based competition (especially intermodal), and I think

210. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (explaining how the Act drew on prior
deregulatory statutes).
211. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (quoting Senators McCain and Dorgan).
212. Indeed, this may be their most important characteristic, and the effective price
controls over DSL service may be the principal limit on the pricing by the cable and incumbent
telephone companies for high-speed Internet access service.
213. This result may not have been Congress’s intent, see Weiser, supra note 140, at 1720–
23 (discussing the prospects of agency lawmaking), but the Supreme Court has held that the
inclusion of the local competition provisions in Title II of the Act essentially gave the FCC
regulatory control over many of the most significant aspects of local markets, such as
interconnection and element pricing. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377–86
(1999) (discussing the extent of the FCC’s authority). Of course, the FCC still does not have
control over local retail rates for basic telephone services. I return to the topic of increasing
federal control over certain aspects of telecommunications regulation infra notes 313–15 and
accompanying text.
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that Congress should now consider making these additions to the
Communications Act. Indeed, the current developments described in Part IV
suggest that serious intermodal competition may be in the offing. Reform of
wireless policy is the largest missed opportunity for developing intermodal
competition, and a number of proposals, ranging from the uncontroversial to the
radical, are gaining currency. The FCC is acting where it can to advance
spectrum reform, but legislative direction and confirmation of FCC plans would,
as in the case of transportation deregulation, accelerate the process and ensure
that reforms are safe from judicial challenge. This Part, therefore, reviews a
number of telecommunications reform proposals that are being discussed and
some that are not (but should be) and places them within the general agenda of
promoting facilities-based and intermodal competition.214
Indeed, my principal aim is to attempt a new, comprehensive agenda for
telecommunications policy based on the promotion of true facilities-based
competition and, in particular, intermodal competition. As should become
increasingly clear, however, I regard the important development for
telecommunications competition to be facilities-based competition among
carriers—whether that competition is intra- or intermodal. Only true facilitiesbased competition will eliminate the nearly intractable problems of interconnection
pricing and of bottleneck infrastructure providers attempting to leverage their
carrier services into other markets. The imperative of intermodal or facilitiesbased competition is already recognized in some circles.215 This Part extends the
general imperative to an agenda and to specific policy proposals.
These proposals can be grouped into helpful categories.
First,
communications regulation should focus on eliminating legal and economic
barriers to entry where it can. Regulation completely prohibiting entry for
economic reasons has largely passed from the scene, and as noted in telephone
and cable markets, federal law already forbids legal exclusions. But, in wireless,
aspects of the current regime actually do create legal barriers to entry. Moreover,
legal choices can also change the economics of a particular industry by making
services more or less expensive to bring to market. Thus, a second priority for a
new communications agenda is to seriously consider ways in which legal reform
could decrease the costs of bringing services to market. In a variety of areas,
including wireless policy, right of way management, and local franchising, legal
reform could have this effect. Third, the communications law itself should be
214. For examples of proposals addressing the reform of the unbundling regime, see
Hausman & Sidak, supra note 126; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131. I set these to the side until
the end of this Part.
215. See Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the Public Interest: A Case Study in
Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J. T ELECOMM. & HIGH T ECH . L. 307, 343 (2003)
(discussing wireless as providing particularly effective competition in rural areas).
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reformed to take account of the accelerating pace and diversity of service
deployment. VoIP, for all its prospects, has already endured significant
regulatory uncertainty, and significant FCC proceedings are just commencing.
The statute should be changed to ensure that the regulatory response to new
services is dictated by their economic character and not by their resemblance to
more familiar services. The FCC is already trying to do this, but it operates
within the confines of the current statute.
These changes—some radical and some less so—will have consequences,
of course, and will require a rethinking of other aspects of telecommunications
law. As an initial matter, a more competitive telecommunications marketplace
justifies increased government investment in basic telecommunications research.
Some have called for the government itself to build the broadband networks of
the future; I think that private enterprise, funded by universal service subsidies
where necessary, has proved itself more reliable and presents fewer potentially
anticompetitive problems. Second, universal service will require a new approach.
One of the main concerns with leaving VoIP unregulated is the potential damage
to the revenues raised (today, only from telephone companies) for universal
service. If universal service funds must be raised through an industry-specific
tax, instead of being provided from the general federal revenue, then taxing
customer access to networks is the only competitively neutral manner in which to
raise funds. This does mean taxing Internet access, but it hardly seems
necessary to continue to subsidize the Internet by treating it special, as compared
to telecommunications. Finally, this new regulatory approach raises the question
of what to do about the unbundling rules. If they are not working and if
intermodal competition is likely to take off, then it might seem obvious that they
should be repealed. Although I am generally optimistic about the chances of
increased competition in local markets, I am not yet convinced. Mandatory
unbundling should itself continue, but the pricing rules should be changed to
reflect the increased risks of a developing competitive environment.
A. Wireless Policy
A fairly widespread consensus already exists, at least in academic and
regulatory circles, that significant spectrum reform is necessary, although there is
significantly less consensus about what shape the reform should take.
Commentators have noted spectrum reform as a significant missed opportunity in
the 1996 Act,216 but most of this commentary focuses on the need to reallocate
216. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First
Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 905–06 (1997) ("Despite ambitious rhetoric regarding the
scope of liberalization in telecommunications markets, the omnibus 1996 Telecommunications
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spectrum from low-value to higher value uses, such as the need for additional cell
phone service, or on the manner in which administrative spectrum allocation has
protected incumbents against new entry into wireless services.217 In other
words, this commentary focuses on matters internal to spectrum policy without
integrating it into the larger telecommunications competition picture. Perhaps
tellingly, the FCC’s reorganization after the 1996 Act to emphasize market
competition left it with two different telecommunications bureaus—the Wireline
Competition Bureau and the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau—a regulatory
separation that continues today.218 The agenda I suggest views wireline and
wireless competition not as separate matters, but as overlapping parts of a larger
telecommunications market. The important, developing possibility for wireless
services is the manner in which they can provide competition for existing wireline
services, such as telephone, Internet, and cable television service. 219
The FCC has taken some important steps to increase available spectrum, by
relocating a limited number of services to higher spectrum bands, by authorizing
so-called flexible use spectrum bands, and by increasing the amount of spectrum
in which low-power devices may operate without licenses.220 The FCC has also
begun to authorize more exotic solutions, such as limited ultra-wideband devices,
which can (sometimes) operate on already-allocated frequencies without
additional interference. 221 The FCC also commissioned a task force to review
Act did shockingly little to disturb age-old regulatory arrangements in radio and television
broadcasting."); Krattenmaker, supra note 126, at 157 ("The new Act does very little to reform
broadcasting law and policy in helpful ways. Censorship is not repealed, but rather is extended.
The horrors of spectrum allocation for television are not ameliorated, but compounded.").
217. E.g., Hazlett, supra note 216, at 907–08 (focusing on new entry into broadcast-type
services); Krattenmaker, supra note 126, at 157–58 (exploring how consumers might protect
themselves from a cable monopoly).
218. See FCC, ABOUT THE FCC, at http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2004) (listing bureaus) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
219. Of course, wireless permits mobile communications, and the markets therefore cannot
completely overlap. See Speta, supra note 120, at 797 n.244 (examining wireline and wireless
technology competition).
220. See FCC, Spectrum Policy Task Force, Report, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 7–12
(2002) [hereinafter Task Force Report] (summarizing these developments), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.pdf; see also Ellen P.
Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DEIGO L. REV. 269, 287–88 (2004)
(discussing the FCC’s creation of a common pool of unlicensed frequencies). Goodman stated:
Consistent with the intangible, unpropertied qualities of spectrum, the FCC has set
aside some frequencies as a common pool resource in the form of unlicensed
spectrum. Rather than granting exclusive or even group rights to such frequencies,
the FCC has opened the bands for low-power transmissions by operators or
members of the public without mandating licensing or coordination.
Id.
221. See Revision of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission
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spectrum policy; its report called for a radical overhaul of the regulatory
regime. 222
Nevertheless, the FCC likely cannot, on its own, make any significant
amount of additional spectrum available. The largest single user of spectrum is
the federal government itself, principally controlled by the departments of
commerce and defense. 223 Attempts at interagency consultation have not resulted
in significant spectrum transfers from any part of the federal government to the
FCC so that the FCC could make it available to the public.224 Moreover, any
global change in the method of spectrum allocation, so that spectrum could be
made available for uses that are in greater demand, would require trenching on
some powerful incumbents. As Thomas Hazlett and others have extensively
noted, those incumbent interests have, to date, prevented any real change in
spectrum policy.225
Reform of spectrum policy, in my view, has several important components.
First, at a minimum, spectrum policy ought to be reformed to reduce the manner
in which current policy continues to act as a legal barrier to entry—by requiring
companies proposing innovative services to receive explicit government approval
to offer them. Second, spectrum policy should focus on making significant
amounts of new spectrum available. Third, the most substantial amount of this
new spectrum should be made available by auctioning genuine property rights in
the spectrum, while maintaining and increasing the number of unlicensed bands.
1. Eliminating Legal Barriers to Entry into Spectrum Markets
Most of the currently useable spectrum continues to be restricted to use by
particular kinds of services. This, of course, is the historic command and control
method of spectrum allocation adopted by the Radio Act of 1927 and continued
into the Communications Act of 1934, where licenses were granted to specific
companies (who could not transfer the licenses without regulatory approval), to
Systems, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 18
F.C.C.R. 3857, ¶¶ 7–152 (2003) (considering petitions regarding ultra-wideband systems).
222. See generally Task Force Report, supra note 220.
223. See JANICE OBUCHOWSKI, NAT’L T ELECOMMS. & INFO . ADMIN., U.S. SPECTRUM
M ANAGEMENT POLICY : AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 23 (1991) (addressing concerns about
access to federal spectrum).
224. See Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 9–11 (evaluating spectrum use and reform
considerations).
225. See Hazlett, supra note 216, at 907–12 (discussing how incumbent broadcasters
stymied proposed reform in the 1996 Act); Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle
Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 11–20 (2002) (discussing lobbying
and legislation overturning FCC’s attempts to authorize low power FM stations).
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offer specific services, on specific frequencies, at specific powers, and in
specific locations.226 Today, some spectrum licenses permit so-called "flexible
uses," whereby the licensee is authorized to provide a wide range of services.227
And the FCC has made available increasing amounts of spectrum for "unlicensed"
use that permits anyone operating within broad parameters to provide new
services.228
Nevertheless, truly new services that do not fit comfortably within the
unlicensed bands 229 or the few flexible use bands still need to petition the FCC to
create new license categories or to amend old ones. It is simply not possible for
a new entrant to buy a cell phone or radio station license and convert its use to a
new technology—and over 90% of commercially viable spectrum is still tied up in
limited use licenses.230 Subject to the debate over whether broadcast television
serves an important universal service function (on which more discussed below)
spectrum licenses should be granted without restriction as to the service that the
licensee will provide. In the past, restricting services to particular bands may
have served the important function of coordinating equipment companies with
service companies—for example, by ensuring that radio manufacturers would
know which channels their equipment must be prepared to receive. With radios
becoming more flexible and with internal processors becoming cheaper, such a
coordination function may be less important. New devices may be able to pick
up services on any frequency, using a wide variety of protocols.231
2. Making More Spectrum Available

226. For an overview of this regulatory structure, see BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 103, at
9–34.
227. See, e.g., Service Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands and Revisions to
Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules, First Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 8634, ¶ 4 (2000)
[hereinafter Service Rules] ("Because the record indicates a wide range of possible technical
approaches to serving the expanding demand for wireless services, we have sought to establish
an open regulatory framework with the potential to accommodate both existing and future
technologies."); Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 10–12 (summarizing other proceedings).
228. See id. at 54 (encouraging the additional designation of spectrum for unlicensed use).
229. The unlicensed bands are either very high frequency or require very low power
transmission, which limits the types of applications that can be accommodated. See, e.g., id. at
55 (discussing difficulty of wireless ISPs meeting power limits in unlicensed spectra).
230. See EVAN KWEREL & JOHN WILLIAMS, FCC, A PROPOSAL FOR A RAPID T RANSITION TO
M ARKET ALLOCATION OF SPECTRUM: OPP WORKING PAPER NO . 38, at 1, http://www.fcc.gov/
osp/workingp/html (Nov. 2002) ("Currently, only about seven percent of the most valuable
spectrum (in 300 MHz-3000 MHz range) is available for market allocation, i.e., is flexibly
allocated and exclusively and exhaustively licensed.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
231. See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L.&
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The consensus in favor of spectrum reform is driven in large part by
agreement that significant demand exists for additional spectrum. The FCC’s
report declares: "Increasing demand for spectrum-based services and devices are
straining longstanding, and outmoded, spectrum policies."232 For example,
analysts suggest that one major reason behind the Cingular takeover of AT&T
Wireless was that neither company had sufficient spectrum, standing alone, to
provide adequate service quality to increasing numbers of customers.233 A
variety of new services, ranging from increasing WiFi (or WiFi-like hotspots) to
fixed wireless high-speed Internet could come to market with additional
spectrum.234
The current prospects for additional spectrum to be made available for
flexible, market-driven uses are uncertain at best. In 2000 and 2002, the FCC
reallocated certain of the largely unused UHF television channels (52–69) to new,
flexible use licenses.235 But, 60% of the remaining, most viable spectrum is
currently allocated to other government uses and, therefore, is not within the
FCC’s jurisdiction to retask.236 Some of that spectrum is allocated to defense,
public safety, and other public necessities and could not be reallocated in all
events, but much of the government spectrum is only lightly used.237 Of course,
some commentators argue that the spectrum currently used by the government
should be privatized as well, such that the government would have to purchase,
or acquire by eminent domain, any spectrum that it needs for public uses—just as
it must acquire land and buildings.238 They generally recognize that this solution
will be difficult to adopt politically, unless governments as a whole gain revenues
by granting them the ability to sell the spectrum they currently use. 239 Apart
T ECH . 25, 75 (2002) (comparing the security features of open and closed networks).
232. Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 11.
233. See Dang, supra note 207 (reporting on AT&T Wireless’s attempts to find a buyer).
234. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 102 (noting that "MSOs are
currently undertaking significant cable system upgrades, including digital build-outs").
235. See Service Rules, supra note 227, ¶ 4 (reallocating channels). See generally
Reallocation and Service Rules for the 698-746 MHz Spectrum Band (Television Channels 52–
59), Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 1022 (2002).
236. KWEREL & WILLIAMS, supra note 230, at 28 ("Restructuring spectrum not under
exclusive FCC jurisdiction will be particularly difficult, requiring concurrence by the NTIA and
potentially other government agencies now operating in those bands. . . . Deleting government
and shared bands reduces the spectrum total by approximately 60%.").
237. See Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 11 (reiterating the need to consider national
security and public safety when making spectrum use proposals).
238. E.g., KWEREL & WILLIAMS, supra note 228, at 29 ("[W]e think that government users
should acquire spectrum at market prices the same way they acquire other inputs such as oil,
real estate and computer equipment.").
239. See id. ("[I]n the transition to a market system, government spectrum users are likely
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from political impediments, this proposal is undoubtedly the most efficient, for it
replaces the current regime, in which governments do not have significant
incentives to economize on the use of their spectrum, with one in which
governments at least implicitly feel the opportunity costs of those uses.240 The
Congress should act to retask spectrum from government to private uses and to
permit the FCC to make the spectrum available for any use.
Broadcast television is a particularly ripe area for spectrum reform, to
increase its availability for other uses. Today, the need to make available
additional spectrum is one of the principal motivators behind the FCC’s desire to
accelerate the transition to digital television.241 When television stations have
converted to digital transmission and 85% of consumers have adopted digital
receivers, then the television stations must surrender their former analog licenses,
which occupy some of the most technically desirable spectrum. The original
1995 legislation that confirmed the mandatory transition from analog to digital
television initially required that the analog licenses be surrendered in 2006, but a
1997 amendment added the specific adoption thresholds.242 Currently, 75% of
television stations are broadcasting at least one digital signal, 243 but no one
believes that sufficient numbers of consumers will have purchased digital
receivers such that the licenses will be surrendered in 2006.244
At a minimum, Congress should legislate a firm deadline for the DTV
transition. Ken Ferree, the chief of the FCC’s media bureau, recently advanced a
proposal that would essentially force television companies to surrender their
analog licenses in 2009. The broadcasters did not respond favorably, to say the

to be net sellers of spectrum, creating an initial cash surplus above the cost of replacing their
current wireless communications services."). Kwerel & Williams do not offer any statistical or
economic analysis to support their intuition, and given the current difficulties in state and federal
budgets, it seems unlikely that government will be willing to risk it.
240. Id.
241. See FCC, DIGITAL T ELEVISION FACT SHEET, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/
digitaltv.html (last modified July 15, 2003) ("Converting to DTV will also free up parts of the
scarce and valuable broadcast airwaves, allowing those portions of the airwaves to be used for
other important services, such as advanced wireless and public safety services.") (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
242. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(B) (2000) (extending the date beyond 2006 if necessary).
243. See DTV Build-Out: Requests for Extension of the Digital Television Construction
Deadline; Commercial Television Stations Comply with May 1, 2002 Deadline, Order, 18
F.C.C.R. 22,705, ¶¶ 3–6 (2003) (examining the current DTV licenses).
244. See Edmund Sanders, Trinity Broadcasting Seeks FCC’s Forgiveness on Digital
Deadline by Threatening Sanctions Against Delinquent Stations, the Agency is Trying to Speed up
the Slow Rollout to DTV, L.A. T IMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at C1 ("Congress has set a target date of
2006 to complete the switch to digital television, though few expect that schedule will be met.").
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least.245 Congressional action would circumvent a long regulatory and court
battle and move this spectrum into better uses.
Notwithstanding the broadcast industry’s efforts to deploy digital TV and
the FCC’s efforts to encourage the transition, the need for additional spectrum
raises the question of why over-the-air television transmission remains sensible at
all. Today, nearly 90% of all television households receive video service from
cable or DBS providers,246 and the transition to digital is unlikely to make
broadcast TV a significantly more effective competitor. Even if all of the
spectrum currently allocated to these licenses were used for television service,
broadcast would still provide only about one-quarter as many channels as cable or
DBS. More importantly, the FCC, with Congress’s approval, has decided that
digital television license holders need only provide a single television channel on
each license, instead of the four or five channels each license could
accommodate. 247 Under this rule, the licensees may use the balance of their
spectrum allocation for nonbroadcast services.248 This freedom for broadcasters
could be reversed, which might increase the number of broadcast channels, but
the FCC’s decision was based precisely on the market demand for such data
services,249 and the vigor with which the broadcasters have sought must-carry
rights for digital television suggests (at least weakly) their continued concern that
the broadcast medium, standing alone, will not be competitive. 250 Admittedly,
DTV will provide better quality reception than analog broadcasting, and this
increase in quality will make broadcasting more competitive with cable and

245. See Ted Hearn, Ferree Plan No Picnic for Cable, Either; MSOs May Have as Many
Problems with DTV Plan as Broadcasters, M ULTICHANNEL NEWS, Apr. 26, 2004, at 79, LEXIS,
Multichannel News File ("The Ferree plan [for a firm give-back of analog licenses in 2009] has
been controversial from the start, especially with broadcasters.").
246. See supra notes 167–77 and accompanying text (discussing competition in video
markets).
247. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, ¶ 28 (1997) (holding that each
television broadcaster need only provide one channel of digital television service); id. ¶ 32
(expecting that television stations will provide nonbroadcast services over the remainder of the
spectrum).
248. Id. ¶¶ 4–7 (asserting the benefits of spectrum recovery).
249. Id. ¶ 29 ("[W]e recognize the benefit of permitting broadcasters the opportunity to
develop additional revenue streams from innovative digital services.").
250. See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, First Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, ¶ 1 (2001) (concluding tentatively
against, but calling for additional comment on, must-carry for digital television signals).
Broadcasters would seek must-carry rights even if broadcast is competitive because such rights
would maximize their competitive position, especially in the program supply market.
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satellite, but most analysts believe that few customers will move back to receiving
over-the-air broadcasts exclusively.251
Thinking about broadcasting from the perspective of total communications
competition suggests that television broadcast should be eliminated entirely (or
more accurately in my view, that the market ought to be permitted to eliminate it
entirely). Economist Thomas Hazlett, long a critic of spectrum allocation policy,
has made this argument, and the efficiency of other platforms to provide video
cannot reasonably be doubted. 252 Subject to a universal service policy, such a
result seems tolerable. 253
3. Propertizing the Spectrum
Assuming that incumbent interests could be overcome and Congress
authorized the FCC to make significant changes in spectrum policy, there remains
the question of direction of the spectrum reform. Many commentators, building
on the seminal work of Ronald Coase, 254 suggest complete propertization of the
spectrum—allowing private ownership and free trading, as well as private
definition of the types of service that will be offered on each slice. 255 Others
advocate a "commons" approach, whereby any device meeting certain technical
characteristics is allowed to operate. In a commons model, the spectrum is not
owned, and interference is prevented ex ante through the specification of
appropriate hardware and operating protocols, instead of through ownership of
noninterference rights.256 These approaches share a common goal of permitting

251. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 103 (relating, but not endorsing,
these views).
252. See Hazlett, supra note 216, at 935–40 (expressing criticisms of the current system).
253. See infra notes 398–414 and accompanying text (asserting the need for a universal
service policy).
254. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON . 1 (1959).
255. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth,
the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s "Big Joke": An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & T ECH . 335 (2001); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli,
Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG . 53
(1999); Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It’s Important
and How to Begin, 9 M EDIA L. & POL ’Y 19 (2000).
256. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, T HE FUTURE OF IDEAS: T HE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 241 (2001) (encouraging regulation that will maintain the "commons" nature
of spectrum); Benkler, supra note 231, at 75 (advocating the creation of "a commons of
sufficient magnitude and stability to allow a credible investment effort . . . in building the tools
that can take advantage of an ownerless wireless infrastructure"). For a good summary of the
debate, see generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between
Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003).

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art17

DEREGULATING TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1117

the introduction of new uses and services without administrative approval, but
they differ radically in the implementation. The two approaches can be combined
to a limited degree by, for example, propertizing some spectrum bands and
opening others to commons use257 or creating property rights to spectrum that
are always subject to use by any other device that does not interfere with the
incumbent.258 But their essential outlines are fundamentally opposed.
The need for the development of intermodal competition to the traditional
wireline services provides some guidance in selecting among the various
spectrum reform proposals. On the one hand, a propertized spectrum makes it
easier for a service provider to provide a new service. A provider that owns
spectrum rights can more easily internalize all of the coordination problems that a
new service may entail, such as equipment standards, operating protocols, and
interconnection with other networks. Even more importantly, a spectrum owner
captures all of the returns from monitoring spectrum use. Both owned and
unowned spectrum have the problem of unauthorized users. The commons
model critically depends upon all devices using the commons conforming to
certain technical characteristics that limit their interference with one another.259
While equipment certification processes can ensure compliance by most users,
other users will have the incentive to cheat on the implementation of these
protocols or to modify the commercially available equipment to increase its power
or effectiveness.260 The analogy to Internet hackers and spammers is obvious.
In a commons, however, no party can internalize returns from policing the users
of the commons to limit cheating; it is a classic free-rider problem. Government
enforcement can deter cheating, but private spectrum owners will efficiently
police their own spectrum, for they bear all of the costs from unauthorized uses
and garner all of the benefits from eliminating those uses.

257. Both Benkler and Lessig make this proposal in their most recent works. See Benkler,
supra note 231, at 83 ("What we need is a relatively large-scale experiment in both markets.");
LESSIG, supra note 256, at 242 ("We should be setting aside broad swaths of spectrum as a
commons, intermixed with spectrum as property.").
258. See generally Gerald R. Faulhaber & David J. Farber, Spectrum Management:
Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS:
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW COMMUNICATION T ECHNOLOGIES 193 (Lorrie Faith Cranor &
Steven S. Wildman eds., 2003) (asserting that a property rights market-based regime can increase
efficiency and decrease costs).
259. Benkler, supra note 231, at 79–80.
260. See Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Spectrum Sharing Without Licenses:
Opportunities and Dangers, in INTERCONNECTION AND THE INTERNET: SELECTED PAPERS FROM
THE 1996 T ELECOMMUNICATIONS P OLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 49 (Gregory L. Rosston &
David Waterman eds., 1997) (discussing possibility of equipment cheating on usage rules in
unlicensed bands).
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On the other hand, spectrum commons eliminates one barrier to entry into a
market entirely—the need to acquire spectrum rights on which to operate a
service.
Commons might permit equipment companies to introduce
communications services without themselves becoming or partnering with more
traditional communications companies—a further introduction of supplier
diversity into communications markets. And open spectrum commons might
further diversify the types of infrastructure deployed in at least some
communications markets. Commons advocates focus on technological solutions
that tend to be quite different from those employed by current spectrum
owners—that is, the use of low-powered, high-processing power devices that are
programmed, essentially, not to interfere with one another or with other uses.261
On balance, I think that the imperative to introduce intermodal competition
to wireline services suggests the propertization of significant sections of the
existing spectrum. Property rights simply provide more efficient coordination
and policing incentives. And as to voice and other delay-sensitive services, the
low-power distributed services envisioned by commons advocates are not likely
to provide the quality of service that makes them reasonable competitors to
wireline services. The currently preferred architecture for these services relies
too heavily on multiple hops between devices and an Internet-like routing
structure that has proved inadequate in the context of the wireline Internet for
these types of services.262 Although some of these issues are the subject of
continuing innovation, the expectation is that they are fairly far down the road.263
Moreover, I am not convinced that propertizing the spectrum would eliminate, or
even significantly decrease, the deployment of such new devices and services,
although I do think that Congress and the FCC should significantly expand the
spectrum available for unlicensed uses.264 Even if spectrum were propertized,
equipment manufacturers, or coalitions of manufacturers formed through the
standards-setting process, could purchase spectrum and act as, or hire, band
261. This description is only half accurate, for one of the important features of these
devices is that their high processing power permits them to better filter among multiple received
signals. In other words, while they do interfere less by virtue of their low power and use of
specific protocols, they also do not experience interference at the same level of sensitivity as
more typical wireless devices.
262. See Benkler, supra note 231, at 38–47 (describing network and technical
characteristics of open wireless networks); see also Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark,
Rethinking the Design of the Internet: The End-to-End Arguments vs. The Brave New World, in
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN T RANSITION: T HE INTERNET AND BEYOND 91, 94 (Benjamin M.
Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001) (describing how the Internet’s first in time routing
structure is not optimal for delay-sensitive services); Speta, supra note 47, at 1561 (reviewing
T HE FUTURE OF IDEAS’ analysis of network architecture).
263. Task Force Report, supra note 220, at 23–24.
264. See Speta, supra note 47, at 1562 (reviewing Lessig’s view of Spectrum rights).
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managers.265 If enough spectrum were made available to the market, acquiring
operating rights would not be a significant burden.266
4. Addressing Media Concentration
Some of the proposals above are open to the criticism that they will further
feed the trend towards media concentration, both on a vertical and horizontal
basis. Many have been critical of the 1996 Act’s eliminating the pre-existing
ownership caps on radio licenses, which resulted in substantial consolidation in
the radio market.267 The FCC’s proposals to liberalize ownership and crossownership rules touching television markets created a firestorm of protest that
has not subsided. FCC Commissioner Michael Copps has been eloquent in
arguing that media concentration threatens "fundamental values and democratic
virtues—things like localism, diversity, competition and maintaining the
multiplicity of voices and choices that undergird our precious marketplace of
ideas and that sustain American democracy."268 He is far from alone. 269
265. But see Benkler, supra note 231, at 65 n.47 (objecting to band managers on the
grounds that "collective action problems are similar to those associated with gathering the
property rights necessary for a highway or public park"). But competing equipment
manufacturers routinely overcome those collective action problems in standards setting
processes, which often include the aggregation and exchange of intellectual property. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL . L.
REV. 1889, 1903–07 (2002) (studying the IP policies of forty-three standard-setting
organizations). The formation of the mesh network that Benkler envisions itself requires
significant coordination that would be subject to collective action problems. These networks
only work if equipment standards are carefully coordinated, and an individual manufacturer
would have an incentive to cheat. Moreover, an effective service probably requires robust and
reliable, coordinated interconnection points to other networks. Benkler also asserts that "if the
spectrum used for open wireless networks is owned by some segment of the equipment makers,
the owners are likely to have the opportunity and incentive to make entry by non-owning
competitors difficult." Benkler, supra note 231, at 65 n.47. But there is no reference to why, if
enough spectrum were available, this would be the case or even why the manufacturers would
have any incentive to try. See Speta, supra note 47, at 1577–78 (asserting that regulation should
be tied to an economic theory of preventive rational foreclosure); Speta, supra note 114, at 1010
(arguing that even infrastructure monopolists will not discriminate against new services).
266. See Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 258, at 214–15 (discussing the effects of
increasing available spectrum).
267. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56, 110
(requiring the elimination of "any provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast
stations which may be owned or controlled by one entity nationally").
268. Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Statement at USC Media Consolidation Forum 2
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC233924A1.pdf. See generally Michael J. Copps, The "Vast Wasteland" Revisited: Headed for
More of the Same?, 55 FED . COMM. L.J. 473 (2003) [hereinafter Copps, The "Vast Wasteland"
Revisited] (arguing that there is more cause for concern over the content of television programs
now than there was in 1961).
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Although fewer than 15% of people currently watch television over the
broadcast airwaves, the combination of broadcast licenses with must-carry rules
ensures that broadcasters are a substantial, independent source of programming
on cable systems. Unless other aspects of communications reform yielded
increased competition to cable and satellite companies, eliminating or further
diminishing broadcasters increases the risk that cable and satellite companies
would have increased control over media delivery. The big television networks
may persist as sources of shows for cable because, despite their declining
viewership, they still provide much of the most popular programming.270 But a
number of independent broadcasters depend upon must-carry, and must-carry’s
granting all broadcasters a fallback access right shifts the economic balance
toward broadcasters in their negotiations with cable companies.
There is, of course, a significant debate over the definition of "media"
markets—whether only traditional video services should be included within the
market or whether the market must also include books, magazines and
newspapers, the Internet, radio, video rental stores, and any other means by
which a person might send or receive a message. Judge Posner raised the issue
over ten years ago in just these terms, and the D.C. Circuit’s recent skepticism
toward ownership limits has been based in part on its view that the FCC has not
adequately defined the scope of competing services.271 The FCC has tried to
account for this in its recent media concentration rules;272 but the Third Circuit
specifically found fault with its attempt to develop a new media-diversity index
that took account of "all" media. 273
I believe, however, that policies that permit and encourage the entry of new
facilities-based carriers, combined with antitrust scrutiny of mergers and
structural limits on cable or satellite companies where market power persists, is a
superior alternative to creating broadcast licenses simply to control cable
companies. Antitrust scrutiny in particular should be more vigorous. After the
269. See generally Kerri Smith, The FCC Under Attack, 2003 DUKE L. & T ECH . REV. 19.
270. See Tenth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 112, ¶ 26 (reporting that broadcast
networks continued to have 49% of viewers during prime time and 45% of viewers during the
day time).
271. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (summarizing the court’s 2004
decision).
272. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620,
¶¶ 111–28 (2003) (discussing significant advances in media, compression, and Internet
technology), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d
Cir. 2004).
273. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 402–12 (3d Cir. 2004)
(remanding this aspect of the FCC’s rules).
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1996 Act, consolidation in radio occurred with minimal antitrust scrutiny,274 and
many have argued that the biggest companies now exert market power.275
Broadcast radio is currently without a significant intermodal competitor. Even the
biggest of the new satellite radio services, of which there are only two, is
affiliated with Clear Channel, the largest terrestrial radio company.276 Wireline
services, such as Internet radio, provide competition which is limited by their lack
of mobility. If satellite radio does not develop as an intermodal competitor and
concern over market power continues, then other policies could encourage
competition. The allocation of new digital radio licenses should not proceed in
the same manner as the allocation of digital television licenses—with new
operating authority being allocated only to incumbents—but rather by markets.277
Moreover, level competition policy, which I discuss more fully in the next
subpart, suggests that developing Internet radio solutions should not be subject to
different intellectual property burdens—that is, higher licensing fees—than
broadcasters.278
274. See, e.g., Copps, The "Vast Wasteland" Revisited, supra note 268, at 475 (noting that
"[t]here are thirty-four percent fewer radio station owners than there were before protections
were loosened"); Anastasia Bednarski, Note, From Diversity to Duplication: Mega-Mergers
and the Failure of the Marketplace Model Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 273, 280 (2003) (summarizing the liberals’ and the conservatives’ perspectives on a
marketplace model of radio regulation).
275. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, De-Regulation of the Air Waves: Is Antitrust Enough?,
17 ST. JOHN ’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 67, 71–74 (2003) (analyzing radio mergers from an antitrust
perspective); Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, Comment, The Game of Radiopoly: An Antitrust
Perspective of Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED . COMM. L.J. 473, 481–83 (2000)
(discussing arguments).
276. See Ben Charny, Satellite Network Gets Insurance Static, CNET NEWS.COM,
http://news.com.com/2100-1033_3-5061174.html (Aug. 7, 2003) (reporting 700,000 current
subscribers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). XM Radio, the largest of the
new services, see id., describes Clear Channel as a strategic investor and partner. XM Satellite
Radio, Strategic Partners, http://www.xmradio.com/corporate_info/strategic_partners_category.
jsp?category=investment (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Clear Channel has owned as much as 19% of XM. See generally Gregory L. White &
John Lippman, Media: Satellite Radio Gets a Lift from Ford and GM, WALL ST. J., June 16,
1999, at B1.
277. See generally Digital Audio Broadcasting Systems and Their Impact on the Terrestrial
Radio Broadcast Service, First Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 19,990 (2002) (explaining how
digital radio is to be introduced by incumbent broadcasters).
278. The Digital Millenium Copyright Act required webcasters to pay royalties on their
play of music recordings, while broadcast radio is exempt from royalty payments. See generally
Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin, as Soon as We Figure
Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 HASTINGSCOMM.
& ENT. L.J. 1 (2001). These differentials are justified on intellectual property grounds—that
webcast music is more likely to be pirated than the lower-fidelity broadcast radio. See id. at 4–5
(discussing the recording process). The debate, however, has not focused on the competition
dimension, which puts new, intermodal competitors at a disadvantage to incumbents.
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Structural regulation of cable or DBS, by requiring them to provide
unaffiliated programming for example, is more difficult, for it faces heightened
judicial review under the First Amendment. It was only by five-to-four margins
that the Supreme Court found must-carry consistent with the First Amendment,
and that was on the grounds that the regulation was not content-based but rather
was designed to preserve free broadcasting for those who could not afford pay
services.279 The Supreme Court has otherwise found that cable operators are
entitled to full First Amendment rights in their selection of programming,280 and
the D.C. Circuit precedents strongly suggest that structural limitations on cable
operators (such as vertical, horizontal, and cross-ownership limits) will be subject
to First Amendment scrutiny.281 In a controversial decision, one federal district
court struck down cable open access regulation on the grounds that it violated the
First Amendment.282
Nevertheless, so long as it is based upon well-founded concerns for
monopoly power and the use of that monopoly power to control access to
information, regulation that even-handedly grants access rights to content
providers or that limits certain ownership concentrations would probably be
sustained. The courts have never held that the First Amendment forbade the
imposition of common carrier requirements on telephone companies, under which
those companies were required to provide service to anyone that requested it (no
matter what the content of their conversations). 283 To be sure, the courts have
sometimes held that common carrier rules only apply to those companies that
have already decided to do business with all comers,284 and it might be possible to
279. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224–25 (1997) (5–4) (deferring to
congressional determinations of economically preferred interests); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630–34 (1994) (5–4) (describing the legislative history of the must-carry
provisions).
280. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 628–30 (reviewing the development of cable programming).
281. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1045–47 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(addressing the First Amendment to cable broadcast cross ownership rules); Time Warner
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (implying that the First Amendment
may place restraints on horizontal and vertical concentration limits).
282. See Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 698 (S.D. Fla.
2000) (striking down local open access ordinance); see also William E. Lee, Cable Modem
Service and the First Amendment: Adventures in a "Doctrinal Wasteland," 16 HARV. J.L. &
T ECH . 125, 147–57 (2002) (criticizing decision). See generally Yochai Benkler, Through the
Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 L. &
CONTEMP . PROBS., Winter 2003, at 173.
283. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) (establishing the duty to provide service); § 202(a)
(requiring service provision on a non-discriminatory basis).
284. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(identifying the two-part test to determine common carriage); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util.
Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("What appears to be essential to the
quasi-public character implicit in the common carrier concept is that the carrier ‘undertakes to

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art17

DEREGULATING TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1123

argue that the nondiscrimination requirement is therefore only an antifraud rule.
"[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud."285 But Justice O’Connor’s
dissent in the first must-carry case, representing four justices who would have
struck down the rules as inconsistent with the First Amendment, suggests that
even-handed access requirements would, in these Justices’ view, be more likely
to survive.
Congress might also conceivably obligate cable operators to act as common
carriers for some of their channels, with those channels being open to all
through some sort of lottery system or time-sharing arrangement. Setting
aside any possible Takings Clause issues, it stands to reason that if
Congress may demand that telephone companies operate as common
carriers, it can ask the same of cable companies; such an approach would
not suffer from the defect of preferring one speaker to another.286

At bottom, I am in favor of interconnection rules that require providers of
network services to deliver the content of unaffiliated entities, but a cautious
approach to other forms of structural regulation must prevail. In many cases,
structural regulation of distribution monopolies will be unnecessary, for even a
monopolist will have the incentive to distribute content that its customers want to
receive. 287 Nevertheless, the statute should grant the regulator authority to make
structural rules (on an even-handed basis) where economic theory and available
evidence suggest that there is a need for control, 288 such as occurred
(successfully) with the 1992 rules that required cable companies to stop
withholding the content that was necessary for DBS to come to market.289
B. Decreasing Economic Barriers to Entry
Although federal legislation has already eliminated state and local
governments’ ability explicitly to franchise only a single telecommunications or

carry for all people indifferently.’"); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d
601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same).
285. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003).
286. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 684 (1994) (5–4) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
287. See generally Speta, supra note 127 (making this argument in the context of cable open
access regulations).
288. For a good summary of the current economics applicable to the question of strategic
foreclosure, see Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L & T ECH . 85, 95–102 (2003).
289. See supra notes 104–14 and accompanying text (discussing cable regulation).
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cable provider,290 Congress and the FCC could take additional steps to change the
economic barriers to entry into communications markets.291 The 1996 Act
federalized significant parts of local telecommunications regulation that was
previously within state or local jurisdiction; nevertheless, certain aspects of state
and local regulation remain that could profitably be eliminated. Additionally, some
current regulation puts new entrants at an economic disadvantage relative to
incumbent providers. This subpart discusses several steps that could decrease
barriers to entry, and it addresses the related argument, advanced by incumbents
and others, that "parity" ought to be a guiding regulatory principle.
1. Decreasing the Economic Costs of State and Local Telecommunications
Regulation
Some local regulation continues to create economic barriers both to entry
and to a level competitive playing field among platforms. These regulations ought
to be reformed, either by the federalization of the entire area or by establishing
federal standards that ensure that competition can develop. For example,
although states and local government may not explicitly restrict entry into
communications services through limited franchising, they retain substantial
authority over rights of way and tower siting, and any new entrant, except
satellite carriers, will need access either to rights of way for wireline placement or
to towers for radio placements.292 As to rights of way, states and municipalities
have sometimes imposed burdensome disclosure, planning, and permitting
conditions on access, and worse, many courts have granted them authority to
charge fees that are a percentage of a carrier’s revenues (instead of a function of

290. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (preempting state and local rules that "prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting" the ability of any entity to provide telecommunications services);
§ 332(d)(3) (forbidding state and local franchising of commercial mobile services carriers);
§ 541(a) (forbidding exclusive municipal franchising of cable operators); Final Decision, supra
note 75, ¶ 147 (forbidding state and local regulation of consumer premises equipment); Inquiry
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, ¶¶ 34–69 (2002) [hereinafter
High-Speed Access Declaratory Ruling] (defining Internet access as an interstate information
access service within the exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
291. General spectrum reform is an important way to decrease barriers to entry in its own
right. See supra notes 252–56 and accompanying text (examining opposing perspectives on
spectrum reform).
292. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2000) (preserving local control over right of way); §332(c)(7)
(same); Speta, supra note 120, at 764–70 (discussing right of way). See generally David W.
Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb To Prevent the
Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP . L. 469 (1998) (discussing tower siting).
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the cost of right of way). Both of these features increase the costs of entry.293
Moreover, because the incumbent wireline carrier and all wireless carriers
generally operate without paying for right of way, it tips the competitive balance
against new wireline services.294
As to tower siting, the current federal rules on tower siting are inadequate in
two regards. By contrast to right of way, the difficulty of municipal pricing for
access is not present because a wireless carrier is likely to have sufficient
alternatives that the municipality will not be able to charge an above-economic cost rate. Unlike streets, which are uniquely suited as corridors for the
installation of wireline facilities and which are owned exclusively by
municipalities, private property is generally substitutable for public property as a
location for wireless towers.
The issue, rather, is cities’ use of zoning regulations to exclude towers that
city leaders or residents consider unsightly.295 The current federal law essentially
permits municipalities to exclude any second or third towers in places in which
any current wireless carrier is providing service, 296 and this decreases the
possibility of intramodal competition among wireless carriers. Municipalities
should be permitted to force companies to share towers where such sharing is
feasible, and a federal statute confirming access to towers which is similar to the
current statute that confirms access to utility poles would decrease some of the
economic costs of entry facing a new wireless carrier.297 Indeed, such a statute
293. See Barbara S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes, and Cable Open Access:
Where the Global Information Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of-Way, 10 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 23, 44–45 (2001) (reviewing some court decisions regarding municipalities’ fees);
Speta, supra note 120, at 772 (addressing the exclusive franchise rights granted for over eighty
years). Those defending municipalities’ pricing right of way use above cost do not dispute that
it raises the costs of entry into telecommunications markets. See generally William Malone,
Municipalities’ Right to Full Compensation for Telecommunications Providers’ Uses of the
Public Rights-of-Way, 107 DICK . L. REV. 623 (2003) (analyzing the municipality’s role in
telecommunications regulation).
294. See Speta, supra note 120, at 770–75 (examining the procompetition nature of the
1996 Act). As I discuss, the right of way fee should capture the true economic costs of right of
way use, including both hard costs such as the costs to repair the streets and softer costs such as
traffic congestion costs. A too low rent—that is, one below economic cost—distorts the
competitive balance in the market as well. Id. at 770.
295. See generally Robert B. Foster & Mitchell A. Carrel, Towers of Babble: The
Continuing Struggle over Wireless Siting Issues Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 31
URB. LAW . 849 (1999).
296. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2000) (preserving local zoning authority); see also Foster &
Carrel, supra note 294, at 852 (discussing § 704’s prohibition of regulation which effectively
prevents personal wireless service).
297. See 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000) (establishing federal utility pole access requirements); see
also § 251(b)(4) (requiring all local exchange carriers "to afford access to the poles, ducts,
conduits, and rights-of-way of such carrier to competing providers of telecommunications
services on rates, terms, and conditions that are consistent with section 224"); Implementation
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would probably eliminate the need for municipalities to force sharing.298 But,
where sharing is not feasible, federal law should not permit the exclusion of
multiple towers on a per se basis.
The current federal tower siting regime is also inadequate because it applies
only to towers used for "personal wireless services,"299 which include
commercial cell phone service, private wireless service networks (such as
dispatch services), and "common carrier wireless exchange access services."300
Thus, although the statute covers fixed services that substitute for plain old
telephone service, the section (at least arguably) does not cover fixed wireless
Internet access services.301 A statute sensitive to intermodal competition and the
deployment of new services through new technologies generally would not base
rights or obligations on either the type of service offered or the technology used,
a theme to which I will return shortly.302 Surely the protocols used by the radios
atop the towers bear slightly if at all upon the aesthetic and other local siting
concerns.
It is tempting, given the foregoing, to conclude that all currently local
decisions over rights of way and tower siting should be entirely federalized to
ensure that competition values are given the appropriate weight. But that solution
is impractical. The sheer number of such decisions is probably beyond the
capacity of the FCC and the federal courts to manage. Moreover, the point of
devolving such decisionmaking is to give appropriate consideration to localized
differences. The optimal solution is to set federal rules for those matters in

of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777,
¶ 2 (1998) ("The purpose of Section 224 of the Communications Act is to ensure that the
deployment of communications networks and the development of competition are not impeded
by private ownership and control of the scarce infrastructure and rights-of-way that many
communications providers must use in order to reach customers."), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002).
298. Voluntary tower sharing does limit the municipalities’ power in this regard, and there
is some evidence that the established carriers cooperate with one another due to their mutual
need for access to each others’ towers. Cf. Lynn Hanley, Note, Wireless Communications and
the Telecommunications Act of 1996: An Experiment in Federalism, 12 LOY . CONSUMER L.REV.
48, 59–60 (1999) (discussing forced sharing attempts by certain municipalities).
299. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2000).
300. Id. § 332(c)(7)(C).
301. This answer is uncertain because, as discussed infra notes 368–73 and accompanying
text, there is still no settled regulatory category for Internet services. The FCC’s preferred
classification—that of information services—would probably mean that they are not "common
carrier" services.
302. See infra notes 375–85 and accompanying text (describing the inequities of not
regulating VoIP like every other telecommunications service).

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art17

DEREGULATING TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1127

which there is little need for local variation.303 For example, federal law already
prohibits municipalities from barring wireless towers on the basis of health
concerns.304 Whether RF radiation is linked with cancer or other health concerns
is not a matter on which local decisionmakers have any advantage. For similar
reasons, although there may be diversity among municipalities in their need to
raise revenues through right of way charges, the tradeoff between those revenues
and telecommunications competition should be resolved on a consistent basis.305
Moreover, even where the ultimate decision is made at the local level on the basis
of genuinely local factors, the Congress or the FCC can provide substantial
guidance by developing model local statutes, best practices, or other guidelines
that courts can look to in reviewing local decisions.306 If municipalities were
required to justify their decisions, then the normal processes and costs of
administrative review by the courts would provide incentives to follow federal
guidelines.307
303. Some have argued that economic competition among cities will provide sufficient
limits on municipal zoning decisions, in particular that municipal competition for businesses (tax
base) and residents will yield the socially optimal amount of regulation. See Vicki Been, "Exit"
as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506–28 (1991) (arguing that competition will prevent governments from
overregulating). I have elsewhere argued that there is no reason to believe that this type of
competition will yield efficient right of way and tower siting decisions. See Speta, supra note
120, at 800–02 (asserting a need for a federal rule). Additionally, many commentators
consistently express the concern that state and local regulators do not sufficiently value
competition in telecommunications markets. This was certainly one of Congress’s concerns in
debating the 1996 Act. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (quoting legislators and
their concerns).
304. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2000) (prohibiting local regulation of tower siting
"on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such
facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions").
305. This proposition runs, of course, into the general objection that state and local control
can facilitate experimentation. Apart from whether claims of experimentation are simply masks
for economic protectionism through incumbent capture of local decisionmakers, federalizing the
decisionmaking is not inconsistent with experimentation or variation. Such variation should be
on the basis of objective economic (or other) differences, and not based on any unexpressed
different tolerance for competition.
306. In other words, where local variation is unimportant, the rule should be federal. Where
there is need for local variation or a need for local decisionmaking because of true diversity of
underlying facts, there should be federal standards to be implemented by state adjudicators. To
a large extent, this extends the model of federalism that, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
Congress used in the 1996 Act’s local competition provisions. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 370–75 (1999) (describing the effect of federal law on local standards);
Weiser, supra note 140, at 1720–23 (explaining challenges to agency lawmaking).
307. This highlights one further continuing issue under the wireless tower siting rules: the
extent to which municipalities must build a written record and provide a written justification for
their decisions. Despite a federal statutory requirement of a written decision, a significant
number of court decisions have essentially held that a municipality need not comply with basic
administrative law procedures. See Mitchell A. Carrel & Robert B. Foster, Railroad Tracks by
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Although it was focused only on the unbundling regime, and therefore on the
introduction of intramodal competition, the FCC’s recent third attempt to devise
unbundling rules erred in failing to set adequate federal rules to direct the states in
making important decisions under the Act. Without a doubt, the FCC moved in
this direction because it was prodded by the D.C. Circuit to introduce more
variation into its unbundling rules, to take account of differences in numbers of
competitors and of economic conditions in different markets.308 But nothing in
the D.C. Circuit’s decision required the FCC to leave the field to the states as
much as it did. The FCC’s 576-page opinion sets some minimum unbundling
requirements and gives the states some guidance in determining which additional
network elements must be unbundled.309 But the FCC’s decision does not set
standards or even provide quantitative guidance for addressing most of the
unbundling decisions. The D.C. Circuit was undoubtedly correct that unbundling
rules might vary based on market (although I do not think the D.C. Circuit was
correct to reverse the FCC’s earlier, uniform rules), 310 but the Chicago, New
York, and Houston markets probably have more in common than the Chicago,
Springfield, and Cairo, Illinois, markets.311 In other words, the unbundling rules
are not like the case of tower siting, where local decisionmakers are needed to
take into account local characteristics that cannot be captured in objective market
data. Everything about the relevant market variations can be reflected in market
data, which can form the basis of a decision as to unbundling and pricing.
2. Decreasing Costs Embedded in Federal Regulation
Walden Pond:
The Ongoing Struggle Between Towns and Providers Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 33 URB. LAW . 781, 785 (2001) (summarizing various court
decisions).
308. See generally Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 19,020 (2003) [hereinafter Section 251 Unbundling Obligations], vacated U.S.
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The FCC’s decision would also have
taken some of the judicial review out of the hands of the D.C. Circuit which has questioned the
FCC’s implementation of the Act quite strongly.
309. Id.
310. In particular, the judgment about the appropriate level of "granularity" (as everyone
now describes the level of local variation) involves a balance between administrative costs and
errors on two dimensions—insufficient granularity can have economic costs, but excessive
granularity and poor administrative procedures can create costs as well. The FCC’s prior orders
attempted a balance of these policies, to which the D.C. Circuit did not seem to give sufficient
deference.
311. According to the 2000 Census, the respective populations of these three cities are:
2,900,000; 111,000; and 3,600. 2000 Census Population Compared to 1990: Illinois
Municipalities, http://illinoisgis.ito.state.il.us/census2000/censusData/2000/docs/munipop.pdf
(last visited Sept. 14, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Congress and the FCC should also reform current federal regulation to
eliminate legal rules that unnecessarily raise the costs of companies entering
communications markets. Although wholesale spectrum reform is the largest
area in which this could be accomplished, Congress and the FCC could also
adopt rules that all current spectrum users may introduce noninterfering
secondary uses without administrative permission. The FCC has gone some
lengths in this direction,312 but confirming the general principle would allow the
introduction of additional competing services. For example, the TV spectrum, if
political barriers prevent it from being reclaimed wholesale, could support
additional, lower-power services, perhaps even the types of services that
commons advocates envision. A second-best solution to reallocating the entire
spectrum, both politically and technically, might be to give the incumbents the
(tradeable) rights to introduce noninterfering uses. Politically, vesting these rights
in the incumbents provides them economic incentives both to reduce interference
in their existing uses and to facilitate new entry.313 Technically, vesting the rights
in the incumbent may make the problem of resolving interference disputes more
tractable. 314
3. Beginning the End of "Regulatory Apartheid"

312. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 220, at 339 (explaining the interference determination
process).
313. Advocates of a "big bang" auction of spectrum sometimes structure the auction so that
payments go to the existing license holders, in order to help secure their political acquiescence in
the new regime. See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 255, at 542–43 (explaining why incumbent
licenses support the spectrum allocation regime). Tom Merrill has generalized the point, noting
that in any transition from an administratively controlled regime to one based on markets, some
payout (payoff) to those incumbents with an interest in the administrative scheme has been
necessary. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL .L.
REV. 275, 290–94.
314. Commons advocates and others advocate a rule which permits any person, whether or
not the license holder, to introduce noninterfering uses. The proposal here is a smaller step that
might be easier to manage, both politically and technically. As to the latter, Ellen Goodman has
made the case that neither the property rights advocates nor the commons advocates, both of
whom rely upon noninterference as the touch-stone of operating permission, have given much
thought to how interference disputes will be resolved. Indeed, she makes the case that resolving
such disputes will be quite difficult, especially as the number of users increases. See Goodman,
supra note 220, at 375–79, 402–03 (discussing spectrum etiquette, interference control, and
conflict resolution). If incumbents are given the interference rights, they have an internal
incentive to resolve interference before transferring any underlying rights. They maximize their
returns by doing so.
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Peter Huber called the Communications Act "regulatory apartheid,"315
referring to the way the Act had and still has separate titles and regulatory rules
for telephone (Title II), broadcast (Title III), and cable (Title VI). Remarkably,
the 1996 Act did little to eliminate these categories, despite the sometimes
expressed hope that different types of carriers would compete with one another.
Instead, the 1996 Act added another category by codifying a definition of
"information services"316 mirroring the FCC’s old definition of "enhanced
services,"317 although the Act provided very little in the way of specifics as to
how information services should or should not be regulated.318 New services
therefore confront regulatory uncertainty—uncertainty borne of determining
which definition will apply and what rules will flow from that.
This is not a new problem in communications law, but the prospects for
intermodal competition make it a more pressing one. In the case of the FCC’s
Computer Inquiries, in which the agency invented the "enhanced services"
category to ensure that computing services were not themselves regulated, 319
these new services used telecommunications as an essential component of their
services, but they were not in competition with traditional telephone service.
Instead, they were dependent on the telephone network, and the competitive
concern was that the telephone companies either would discriminate against them
in favor of their own enhanced service offerings or would extract significant
monopoly rents for providing service. 320
Today, the definition of a service can have serious consequences for
competition. Cable modem service is the prime mature example. Although the
service has been in use since the mid-1990s, there is still no definitive statement
about how it is, or is not, regulated under the Communications Act. Some
academic commentators argued for it to be considered an information service
because the FCC had previously classified Internet services as information
315. Hazlett, supra note 130, at 220.
316. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000) (defining "information service").
317. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (describing the FCC’s definitional
moves).
318. Other than the definition, the Act contains only six further references to information
services. See 47 U.S.C. § 228 (2000) (regulating "pay per call" services); § 230 (granting certain
copyright and defamation immunities to information services providers and others); §254(b)(2),
(3) (calling for certain universal service commitments to information services); § 257(a)(requiring
an FCC proceeding to examine barriers to entry for entrepreneurs into telecommunications and
information services markets); § 272(f)(2) (requiring BOCs to offer long-distance information
services through separate subsidiaries for four years after receiving operating authority).
319. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing the first of the Computer
Inquiries).
320. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (summarizing the FCC’s various acts of
redefinition).
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services; as such, it would not be subject to common carrier regulation or to local
franchising rules.321 Others argued that it should be considered a "cable service"
because it was offered by cable companies and because the definition of "cable
service" included "interactive services."322 As a cable service, it would be subject
to local taxation, but no regulator (state or federal) would be permitted to impose
common carrier rules.323 In the first appellate case to consider local regulation of
cable modem service, the parties litigated the case on the stipulation that the
service was a cable service, but the Ninth Circuit rejected that assumption and
held that cable modem services were "telecommunications services," which
would make them subject to all of the Communications Act’s Title II burdens.324
When the FCC finally decided it was time to issue an opinion, it defined cable
modem services as "information services,"325 but the Ninth Circuit, adhering to its
earlier precedents, reversed that decision.326 Further proceedings are ongoing,
ten years in.327
The classification of cable modem service has direct regulatory
consequences for that service, but the decision also affects other services,
regulated under other categories, that compete with it. Today, cable modem
service competes with DSL and, to a limited extent, satellite Internet services.328
The hope is that fixed wireless broadband services will soon be added to the
mix.329 Incumbent telephone companies are subject to the 1996 Act’s unbundling

321. See Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access Over Cable, 16
BERKELEY T ECH . L.J. 677, 696–713 (2001) (analyzing cases which govern the regulation of
broadband Internet access).
322. See Speta, supra note 114, at 989–90 (explaining how some provisions of the Act
appear to inhibit open access regulation).
323. Id.
324. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding an
intention that cable modem service be regulated as a telecommunication service).
325. See High-Speed Access Declaratory Ruling, supra note 290, ¶¶ 34–69 (ruling that
cable modem services are interstate information services).
326. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 27, 2004) (No. 04-281) (concluding "that cable broadband service was not a
‘cable service’ but instead was part ‘telecommunications service’ and part ‘information
service.’").
327. See, e.g., IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, ¶ 43
(2004) (calling for, among other things, comment on: "What effect, if any, do judicial
decisions—including but not necessarily limited to those issued in Brand X Internet Services v.
FCC and Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm’n—have on the Commission’s
discretion to classify IP-enabled services?").
328. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text (discussing competition in local highspeed Internet access markets).
329. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (examining the struggle to successfully
provide fixed wireless platforms).
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regime, which means that they must lease local telephone wires to other
companies for the competing provision of DSL service—a requirement that
would not apply to cable companies unless cable modem service was also a
"telecommunications service." Satellite Internet services and fixed wireless
services would, under the FCC’s classifications, be "information services" and
outside of Title II and unbundling rules as well. 330 There may be good reasons
for different regulatory treatment (which are discussed more in the next section),
but these services are precisely the same from a consumer’s perspective and
basing them in different regulations only as an exercise in applying outmoded
regulatory categories simply makes no sense.
A new Communications Act would attempt to eliminate regulatory apartheid
and time-wasting battles over whether identical services offered by different
technologies will be regulated in the same or different manners. A new Act
would focus on economic realities of service, such as whether certain providers
had market power and the appropriate responses to such market power. In a
new Act, the FCC’s role would be diminished. In my view, and that of others,
the principal role for the agency would be to assure interconnection among
carriers and to serve as an expert body resolving spectrum interference
disputes.331
For a system with eighty years of history with technology dependent rules, a
new Act along these lines is difficult to fully imagine. A number of helpful
precedents exist. The first is antitrust law as it has been re-envisioned by the law
and economics movement.332 The most notable example of this is Frank
Easterbrook’s proposal for a series of "screens" to govern antitrust cases, the
first of which is a required showing of the defendants’ market power.333
Professor Philip Weiser has proposed that the FCC regulate all Internet services

330. See Speta, supra note 127, at 70–71 (summarizing regulatory treatment of these
services).
331. See Kearney, supra note 125, at 1198 ("Telecommunications will . . . benefit from
having a regulator that can adjudicate interconnection disputes . . . [and] some . . .
superintend[ence of] at least some spectrum related matters.").
332. See Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and
in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1404–05 (2003) (noting the evolution of
analysis in antitrust law). McChesney states:
Traditionally in antitrust, each sort of "contract, combination, or conspiracy" or
allegedly "monopolizing" practice has been treated as requiring a separate mode of
analysis . . . . Increasingly, however, the disparate strands of antitrust law have
coalesced [following economics] and have moved away from this needless
taxonomy, with its different cases and analyses for different contracts or practices.
Id.
333.

Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 T EXAS L. REV. 1, 17 (1984).
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by developing a new body of communications law for these services and that it
employ principles consistent with antitrust law.334
A second example is the European Union’s recent attempt to harmonize
telecommunications laws through a series of Directives that extend across
telecommunications markets. A comprehensive treatment of those Directives is
beyond the scope of this Article, 335 and we are still relatively early in their
implementation by the European Union’s Member States. Nevertheless, they do
provide an example of a regulatory approach that attempts to address markets on
a technology-neutral basis. For example, the so-called "Framework Directive,"336
which anchors all of the more specific telecommunications directives, premises
most economic regulation upon a finding that an entity has "significant market
power."337 The prescribed approach to determine significant market power has
the steps of market definition (by considering demand and supply substitutability)
and of ability to raise prices through restricting output without incurring
significant loss of sales of revenues that echo the United States merger guidelines
and antitrust economics generally.338 A series of subsidiary directives—on
access, interconnection, and universal service—likewise adopt a technology
neutral approach to regulation.339 The European Union Directives seem more
334. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY .U.CHI.
L.J. 41, 66 (2003) ("outlin[ing] how the FCC can rely on its Title I authority to employ a
reactive, antitrust-like model of regulation for the emerging broadband market"). Weiser’s is the
best proposal for a comprehensive strategy for the FCC to address Internet services under the
current Communications Act, and it, therefore, may be politically more feasible than a wholesale
revision of the statute (an issue addressed infra notes 384–85 and accompanying text). See
James B. Speta, FCC Authority To Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 LOY.U.
CHI. L.J. 15 (2003), for my own view that the FCC does not have authority under Title I of the
Act to accomplish all that Weiser proposes, and that there are reasons to limit the FCC’s
regulatory authority.
335. For descriptions of the regulatory regimes established, see, for example, L. J. H. F.
GARZANITI , T ELECOMMUNICATIONS, BROADCASTING AND THE INTERNET: EU COMPETITION LAW
AND REGULATION , ch. 1 (2d ed. 2003); EC COMPETITION AND T ELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
(Christian Koenig et al. eds., 2002).
336. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 7, 2002
on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services,
2002 O.J. (L108) 33 [hereinafter Framework Directive].
337. Id. at art. 14(2).
338. See generally id. (determining when an undertaking has "significant market power");
Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power
Under the Community Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and
Services, 2002 O.J. (C165) 6 [hereinafter Commission Guidelines]; Jens-Daniel Braun & Ralf
Capito, The Framework Directive, in EC COMPETITION AND T ELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 309,
312–13 (Christian Koenig et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the significant market power concept).
339. See generally Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and
Associated Facilities, 2002 O.J. (L108) 7; Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

1134

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2004)

concerned with the possibilities of monopoly leveraging than do American
regulation and antitrust law, and other substantial differences would need to be
worked out.340 As a starting point, however, they are undeniably ahead of the
current American regulatory regime.
What I would like to see borrowed from the Directives is their overall
approach. Regulation in the telecommunications field should be directed to all
electronic communications, instead of to particular services defined only on the
basis of the underlying platform technology. Substantive regulatory authority
should be limited to circumstances in which the relevant parties have market
power that threatens consumers, and the regulatory tools should be limited to the
minimum necessary to control that power. The Directives provide a substantial
toolkit to the regulators in individual countries. But, as long as competition
continues to develop along the lines hoped for, regulation limited to
interconnection rules and to preventing the strategic use of monopoly power
should provide all of the protection that the market requires.341
4. Addressing Regulatory Parity
Congress and the FCC should ensure that regulation does not create costs
for new entrants that are not borne by incumbents. For example, municipalities
have the authority to charge franchise fees to cable operators, capped at 5% of
of the Council of 26 February 1998 on the Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to
Voice Telephony and on Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive
Environment, 1998 O.J. (L101) 24.
340. The Framework Directive states:
Where an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it may also
be deemed to have significant market power on a closely related market, where the
links between the two markets are such as to allow the market power held in one
market to be leveraged into the other market, thereby strengthening the market
power of the undertaking.
Framework Directive, supra note 336, at art. 14(3). The Commission states that "[t]his is often
the case in the telecommunications sector, where an operator often has a dominant position on
the infrastructure market and a significant presence on the downstream, services market."
Commission Guidelines, supra note 338, ¶ 84. In the United States, monopoly leveraging as the
basis for communications access rules is receiving very little traction. See Farrell & Weiser,
supra note 288, at 133–34 (proposing a more "anti-trust like" perspective on rethinking the
reasons for the FCC’s rules); see also James B. Speta, Vertical Regulation in Digital Television:
Explaining Why the United States Has No Access Directive, in REGULATING ACCESS TO DIGITAL
T ELEVISION T ECHNICAL BOTTLENECKS, VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED M ARKETS AND NEW FORMSOF
M EDIA CONCENTRATION 69, 76 (European Audiovisual Observatory 2004) (noting the debate
between the "Chicago school" and the "post-Chicago" school regarding monopoly leveraging).
341. See supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text (evaluating interconnection rules in
light of monopoly concerns).
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revenues by federal law.342 Many municipalities have imposed this tax on cable
operators’ high-speed Internet access service, and the FCC has not yet stopped
this practice. 343 Telephone companies are not subject to such franchise fees for
DSL service, and so cable would be at a 5% cost disadvantage. 344 Similarly,
whatever the appropriate pricing rules are for right of way, it should not be the
case that states and municipalities are permitted to charge new
telecommunications carriers right of way fees that are essentially taxes on
revenues while permitting incumbents free use of streets. Yet, this is precisely
the result the Sixth Circuit approved345 and the FCC acquiesced in until recently.
Another example is the permission to incumbent television broadcasters to use
part of their digital licenses for nonbroadcast services such as data, 346 while other
new entrants to those services will have to acquire spectrum rights at auction (if
any such rights are made available). 347
Of course, the story can work in reverse: Regulation can give the upper
hand to new entrants as above-cost long-distance access charges did to voice
over IP services. The FCC eventually limited VoIP’s advantage by informally
expressing the view that phone-to-phone VoIP providers should pay the same
access charges as traditional telephony services and then by substantially
reducing access charges.348 But computer-to-computer voice communications
continue to be exempt from access charges and from direct contributions to
universal service, and as is more fully described in the next section, this informal
regime is breaking down. Similarly, the FCC long justified its decision not to
require enhanced service providers and ISPs to pay access charges as a means of

342. See 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2000) (limiting franchise fees).
343. The FCC has called for comment on the issue and issued its tentative view that this is
the correct result, but it has not yet issued rules. See High-Speed Access Declaratory Ruling,
supra note 289, ¶¶ 106–08 (discussing "franchise fees previously paid pursuant to Section
622").
344. Of course, cable Internet service has approximately two-thirds of the high-speed
Internet access market, see FCC, supra note 161, at tbl. 1 (showing change in percentage of highspeed line ownership), and my portraying the powerful cable companies as disadvantaged new
entrants therefore does not quite fit the bill.
345. TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 625–26 (6th Cir. 2000) (determining
that statutory revisions did not affect pre-existing franchise rights).
346. See supra notes 247–48 and accompanying text (discussing changes in spectrum
licensing).
347. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2000) (requiring the auction of all spectrum rights except
broadcast and satellite services).
348. See JASON OXMAN, FCC, T HE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET: OPP
WORKING PAPER NO . 31, at 22, http://www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html (July 1999) (arguing that
everyone who uses the telephone network should pay the same charges) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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helping a nascent industry develop.349 More recently, although I think it unfair to
blame regulators, dial-up ISPs took advantage of regulatory arbitrage to receive
above-cost termination payments from incumbents—to the tune of millions of
dollars.350
These examples lead to the more general question, which currently goes
under the catch-name "regulatory parity," of whether all providers of a particular
service must be subject to the same regulatory rules. For example, incumbent
local exchange carriers make much of the fact that they are required to provide
unbundled network elements to competing DSL providers who may then market
unaffiliated Internet services, while the cable companies are not subject to any
regulatory requirement that permits other ISPs direct access to cable
customers.351 Similarly, the FCC continues the ISP exemption from access
charges and universal service taxes.352 If competition is the end goal and
converging services provided by multiple platforms the expected market structure
as some commentators argue, then communications regulation ought to strictly
apply principles of regulatory parity to ensure that competition is on equal
footing.353
Regulatory parity is certainly an important touchstone in ensuring that the
market is served by the most efficient providers and efficient technologies,354 but
applying it in any given instance can be elusive, particularly when regulatory
policy must serve multiple goals. For example, William Rogerson has defended
the disparity between the unbundling rules and the absence of cable open access
349. See id. at 10 ("The Commission determined that the participation of common carriers
in the data processing market would benefit consumers by offering them innovative new services
at lower prices.").
350. It is unfair to blame regulators because it appears that the incumbents created the
situation for themselves by insisting that local traffic exchange be made on a paid (and abovecost) basis instead of a bill and keep basis, which is what created the opportunity for ISPs (who
only receive telephone calls) to receive substantial payments.
351. See, e.g., Nirali Patel, Comment, FCC Broadband Policy: More Power for the Bell
Monopolies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 393, 417–19 (2003) (discussing the regulatory parity debate).
352. See, e.g., OXMAN, supra note 348, at 24 (advocating the continued nonregulation of IPbound services).
353. This is the focus of Dan Spulber and Christopher Yoo’s extended defense of "marketbased" prices for access rights. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131, at 895–900, 1023–24
(discussing the economic effects of regulation). I disagree with their proposal. See infra Part
V.F and note 426 (criticizing their proposal). See generally Rob Frieden, Regulatory
Opportunism in Telecommunications: The Unlevel Competitive Playing Field, 10 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 81 (2001); Mark Schankerman, Symmetric Regulation for Competitive
Telecommunications, 8 INFO . ECON. & POL ’Y 3 (1996).
354. See, e.g., Speta, supra note 120, at 795–96 (examining the benefits of efficiency); see
also William J. Baumol et al., Parity Pricing and Its Critics: A Necessary Condition for
Efficiency in the Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitors, 14 YALE J. ON REG . 145, 169
(1997) (addressing the need for regulatory parity in the solid waste management industry).
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by pointing to the different underlying technologies. Because DSL service
requires a much more minimal change to the carrier’s network than does
introducing cable modem service, the risk of regulation interfering with cable
company investment incentives is much greater than the risk of its interfering
with incumbent telephone companies’ incentives. 355 Where regulatory policy is
attempting simultaneously to test the prospect of intermodal competition (cable
companies) and to balance the risk of its not developing with an experiment in
wholesaling and intramodal competition (telephone company unbundling), such an
argument can justify differential regulatory treatment. Similarly, as Ashutosh
Bhagwat has discussed, after the Bell breakup, the FCC successfully applied a
variety of regulatory policies that helped the new entrants get a foothold in the
long-distance market—most notably the rule that local companies could not give
AT&T lower access prices even where AT&T’s more efficient access structure
yielded relevantly lower costs to the local companies.356 Bhagwat makes the case
that without these regulatory assists, AT&T’s scale would have enabled it to
prevent the development of facilities-based competition among long-distance
companies.357
The danger, of course, with any explicit "transition" assist is that it creates a
regulatory process in which the new entrants have a continuing
political/economic interest.358 Gains that regulation creates through earlier
competition than would develop without regulatory assistance may be lost if
regulation continues to tip the playing field longer than necessary.359 The FCC
certainly continued its heavy-handed regulation of AT&T’s long-distance service
long after AT&T lost market power in that market.360 And even regulators
committed to eliminating regulation when it has served its purpose may not be

355. William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the Principle
of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and
Innovation, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 145 (discussing the underlying technology).
356. See Bhagwat, supra note 98, at 1483–84 (examining AT&T’s heavier regulatory and
financial burden).
357. See id. at 1483–89 (critiquing the regulation of AT&T and subsequent analysis).
358. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in
Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252
(1999) ("[R]egulation must accord rights of participation and policy review to anyone
substantially affected by its policies, which invites strategies and tactics that, at best, retard the
competitive process and, with depressing frequency, invite cartelization.").
359. An optimal regulation permits efficient entry but does not induce inefficient entry.
See Baumol, supra note 354, at 147–49 (providing a "parity-pricing solution" for the problem of
inefficiency in access pricing for facilities needed for competitors).
360. See Jim Chen, Standing in the Shadows of Giants: The Role of Intergenerational
Equity in Telecommunications Reform, 71 U. COLO . L. REV. 921, 953 (2000).
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able to develop information adequate to know when the stopping point has been
reached.361
The following general principles seem to emerge. Regulation that burdens
new entrants should be more suspect than regulation that burdens incumbents,
and regulation that absolutely forbids entry into a communications market is
presumptively impermissible. Pure interconnection regulation is justified, even
though its intent is explicitly to assist new entrants. Where a network is
necessary for a communications service, an interconnection rule will almost
always be necessary362 to test whether monopoly is due to demand or supply side
effects and to preserve the social utility of the communications networks. (Of
course, on its face an interconnection rule does not violate regulatory neutrality,
for it applies to new carriers as well as old). Other regulation that burdens
incumbents should be more suspect where it only assists new entrants, and
especially where it does so without a sunset or other reasonably definite
mechanism for reevaluating its continuation. Regulation that burdens incumbents
to serve another goal, such as limiting market power, testing alternative market
structures, providing universal service, or advancing other noneconomic goals
(such as free expression) would be more tolerable. It will always do to weigh the
costs and benefits of those other goals versus the likely efficiency compromises,
but asking for more either oversimplifies the difficulty of policymaking in these
areas or exaggerates the precision with which limited policy tools can be wielded.

361. Some data is easy to come by, and a significant number of active competitors in the
market presents an easy case to imagine. But, where markets are monopolized or oligopolistic,
the question of whether the players have relevant market power is of course much more
difficult.
362. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing generally why structural
regulation of monopolies will be unnecessary). The exception is where the new entrant’s new
network is so superior that all of the incumbent’s customers (or at least a critical mass) expect
that a sufficient number of others will switch to the new entrant. See Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL . ECON. 822,
825 (1986) (evaluating the effects of sponsorship on the standardization of technology);
Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 101, at 6–15 (discussing interaction between network effects and
competition for the market more generally). What is difficult, perhaps intractable on an ex ante
basis, is determining whether a given market with network effects will exhibit inertia or "quick"
tipping. The working assumption has been that, at least in wireline communications markets,
the combination of network effects and economies of scale, scope, and density make an
interconnection rule necessary. See supra notes 150–66 (evaluating the limited competition in
wireline communications); Speta, supra note 127, at 81–82 (examining "common carrier duties to
confront direct network externality"). But with pure wireless networks (that is, where
interconnection with a wireline incumbent is not necessary to maintain the network nature of the
service), the market might be less likely to become entrenched. See id. at 83–84 (discussing
lower economies of scale for deployment of wireless networks).
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C. VoIP as a Case Study
As noted above, VoIP may provide a new source of genuine competition to
incumbent local telephone companies. But VoIP is also a perfect case study in
the regulatory uncertainties that face a new service. As Senator McCain said in
introducing a recent hearing on VoIP:
In many ways, VoIP is a microcosm of the broad array of
telecommunications regulatory issues that have been debated since
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including the role of state
regulators, the legal classification of services, universal service, access
charges, emergency services and access by people with disabilities.363

In this section, I describe these issues in the VoIP context and discuss the
optimal regulatory structure for VoIP services.
To do so, however, requires a bit more technical background about VoIP.364
As the name suggests, it is a voice service run over the Internet protocol, which
means that it transmits voices over Internet networks in the same fashion in
which e-mail, webpages, music, or instant messaging transits the Internet. In
fact, a close technical analogy is simply to think of it as instant messaging that
uses voices instead of text. VoIP can be provided over any moderately highspeed Internet connection as long as the user has the appropriate software and
hardware. As a result, VoIP can actually be provided in a number of
configurations. It can be provided through a computer running a simple
application to which the user has attached a microphone and a speaker; it can also
be provided through a special VoIP phone that looks and feels like a traditional
phone, that itself connects to the Internet, and that does not require an additional
computer to operate. Some VoIP providers will install a box in a person’s home
that connects a high-speed Internet connection to the consumer’s in-home
telephone wires, so that regular telephones may be used in existing telephone
jacks.365
Some VoIP services, such as ICQ’s voic e-chat feature or the currently
popular Skype, which was created by the same programmers who created the
Kazaa software, are only computer-to-computer services and only link to
members of the same network—that is, both parties must be running the same

363. Hearing Before the S. Commerce, Sci. & Transp. Comm., 108th Cong. (Feb. 24,
2004), LEXIS, News Service file [hereinafter S. Hr’g] (Senator John McCain).
364. See generally FCC, Voice Over Internet Protocol, at http://www.fcc.gov/voip (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
365. See S. Hr’g, supra note 363 (Glenn A. Britt, Time Warner Cable) ("Our customers can
use their existing phones and existing phone jacks and they can even keep their same telephone
numbers.").
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software and both must be connected to the Internet when the session begins.366
Other VoIP services, such as Net-2-Phone, have long provided links to the public
telephone network, permitting Internet users to connect through their computers
to any telephone number.367 The current generation of voice services—the ones
that are expected to provide competition to the local telephone incumbents—
provide traditional telephone numbers to users and permit them both to call and to
receive calls from any other person with a telephone number.
This short description should make obvious that VoIP raises a difficult
classification issue under the Communications Act.368 On the one hand, the
service is identical to traditional telephone service—it connects two parties, in real
time, and transmits their voices to one another. As such, it would appear at first
blush to be a telecommunications service. On the other hand, VoIP is carried
over Internet access connections and largely over Internet backbones, and the
FCC has long described Internet and Internet-based services as "information
services."369
Over the past several years, the FCC has taken the position that "phone-tophone" VoIP is a telecommunications service, while "computer-to-phone" or
"computer-to-computer" VoIP is an information service. 370 More recently, the
FCC has held that a VoIP service that does not interconnect with the public
telephone network is not "telecommunications," even though the service is
designed to use a telephone-like device and connects voices in real time. 371
Rather, the FCC declared it to be "an unregulated information service subject to
federal jurisdiction."372 Crucial to the FCC’s decision, however, was the fact that
the provider did not itself provide any transmission service. Rather, users had to
have their own broadband Internet access; the provider simply provided the core
of a peer-to-peer service, matching up users through a central directory.373
366. See Jon Van, Computer-Based Calls Source of Net Concern, CHI. T RIB., Nov. 11,
2003, at C1 (expressing some people’s concern that VoIP will hurt phone companies like
Napster hurt record companies).
367. Id.
368. See S. Hr’g, supra note 363 (Sen. McCain) ("The FCC is forced to shoehorn a newly
emerging technology into Congress’ 1996 vision of communications regulation and to classify as
either fish or fowl that which may be neither.").
369. See OXMAN, supra note 348, at 22–24 (discussing information services definition).
370. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11501, ¶¶ 21–54 (1998) (providing background for statutory definitions).
371. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com’s Free World Dialup is Neither
Telecommunications nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
F.C.C.R. 3307, ¶ 7 (2004) [hereinafter pulver.com Declaratory Ruling] (examining pulver.com’s
perspective on its service definition).
372. Id. ¶ 8.
373. See id. ¶¶ 10–13 (explaining why pulver.com is an information service rather than a
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The FCC’s decisions have been largely driven by a desire to avoid regulation
of Internet-based services. In the very first sentence of his separate statement in
the pulver.com decision, Chairman Powell simply states: "Today we affirm our
commitment—and fulfill our statutory obligation—to keep the Internet free from
unnecessary government regulation."374 But it is clear that decisions like this
stretch the Act’s definitions and may, ultimately, result in different kinds of VoIP
services being regulated differently.
Indeed, the Act’s definition of "telecommunications"—"the transmission,
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s
choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received"375 —would seem to cover many Internet services. That a service uses
protocols other than the protocols traditionally associated with telephone service
does not affect the service’s definition as telecommunications, as the FCC itself
has long held.376 Other Internet services, such as e-mail, that transmit
information from one user to another without changing that information at all
have escaped classification as "telecommunications" only because they are stored
in a server that is intermediate between the sender and the receiver until such time
as the receiver logs on to retrieve his or her e-mail. 377 But VoIP transmissions
are not delayed in this manner.
The FCC’s current decision simply does not address the two more
important manifestations of VoIP service, namely those services that are provided
together with the underlying transmission (as when the Internet access provider
is also the VoIP provider) and those services that interconnect with the public
telephone network. Many cable modem companies are proposing to provide
VoIP services,378 and modern VoIP service is envisioned to provide connectivity
telecommunications service).
374. Id. at 3326 (separate statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell).
375. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).
376. See Final Decision, supra note 75, ¶ 96 (stating that "basic"—now
"telecommunications"—services are those that provide "pure transmission capability over a
communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer
supplied information"); id. ¶ 95 (asserting that the use of packet switching and error control
techniques "that facilitate economical, reliable movement of [such] information do[] not alter the
nature of the basic service"); Application of AT&T for Authority Under Section 214 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to Install and Operate Packet Switches at Specified
Telephone Company Locations in the United States, Memorandum Opinion, Order, and
Authorization, 94 F.C.C.2d 48, ¶¶ 15–20 (1983) (holding that X.25 packet switching networks
provided basic services because they transmitted user-supplied information without changing
the content of that information).
377. See generally Weinberg, supra note 84, at 227–30 (discussing FCC’s precedents in
this regard).
378. See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text (presenting plans to unveil VoIP
services).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

1142

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2004)

to and from all telephone numbers. To accomplish the latter, VoIP providers
need to install equipment that converts VoIP calls into protocols that are
acknowledged by the voice telephone network—and they need to do this whether
or not they provide the Internet access and Internet transit portions of the
service. Each of these types of services, because it provides an element of
transmission, would then be within common carrier and other regulation. At the
Senate Commerce Committee’s recent hearing on VoIP, several witnesses
advocated bringing VoIP within the traditional regulatory regime to ensure that
states and local governments would be able to continue to tax and otherwise
regulate these services.379
If VoIP is not regulated as telecommunications, but is left unregulated as an
Internet (information) service, then many of the issues discussed above arise.
The first and perhaps most important is that of competitive neutrality. Traditional
telecommunications services are not only regulated, but they are subject to a
variety of taxes at the state, local, and federal levels. Exempting VoIP puts it at a
cost advantage, but one that is a feature of the regulatory structure and not of the
superiority of the underlying technology. This is not economically efficient.380
The second issue is jurisdictional. If VoIP is not telecommunications, it may be
subject to regulation at the state and local level, where the prospect of multiple
and varying regulation may (by contrast to telephony) put it at a competitive
disadvantage. 381 The FCC currently intends to exercise its so-called ancillary
jurisdiction over information services to preempt state regulation,382 but the
FCC’s authority in this regard is unsettled.383
Third, if VoIP is not regulated as a telecommunications service, other
important social objectives may be implicated. For example, and as is discussed
more in subpart E, if VoIP begins to take significant market share from traditional
telecommunications services, then revenues raised for universal service and for
other purposes through telecommunications taxes will decrease. Additionally,
VoIP providers will not be required to provide 911 service (although most VoIP
379. See S. Hr’g, supra note 363 (statements of Senator Lamar Alexander and Stan Wise,
Chairman, Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’ns).
380. See Speta, supra note 120, at 795–96 (discussing the costs of economic inefficiency).
381. See Esbin & Lutzker, supra note 293, at 63 (reviewing the Broward County
legislation); see also supra notes 291–93 and accompanying text (describing problems with local
regulation regarding tower siting and rights of way).
382. See pulver.com Declaratory Ruling, supra note 371, ¶ 15 ("We determine, consistent
with our precedent regarding information services, that FWD is an unregulated information
service and any state regulations that seek to treat FWD as a telecommunications service or
otherwise subject it to public-utility type regulation would almost certainly pose a conflict with
our policy of nonregulation.").
383. See Speta, supra note 334, at 16–19 (arguing that the FCC lacks jurisdiction to
develop comprehensive regulation of Internet services).
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services that are designed to substitute for traditional telephone service provide
some kind of 911 access), wiretapping capabilities, or access for those with
disabilities.384
A rational statute would not make the regulatory decision depend upon the
metaphysics of classifying VoIP as telecommunications or not. And a rational
statute would not tip the competitive playing field among services that are
identical from the consumer’s perspective. VoIP, of course, is a new entrant,
and so under the general outlines discussed above, 385 the lack of regulatory parity
may not be of immediate concern. But, if the predictions for its success begin to
materialize, then a new regulatory framework should be adopted.
The difficult issue for current telecommunications policy, however, is that
the appropriate response to the success of VoIP is not necessarily to subject it to
regulation to bring it into parity with telephone regulation, but rather to lift the
regulation and regulatory costs to which telephone service is subject. To take the
easier issues first, it seems to me that VoIP providers that interconnect with the
voice telephone network ought to be required to provide 911 service and access
for people with disabilities. By interconnecting with the traditional network, these
services declare their "publicness" in an important regard, and current policy
requires consistent access to emergency services and for disabled persons.
Similarly, if public policy otherwise demands that law enforcement has the ability
to tap voice telephone calls, then VoIP providers should be required to build this
into their service.
The foregoing regulatory trigger—that the VoIP service interconnects with
the public telephone network—is itself, however, at least potentially an
anachronism. Not tomorrow and not in the next few years, but a time may arrive
when "voice-only" is not the service that unites all Americans. When that day
comes, these policies will need to be tied to access or to whatever that generation
of network turns out to be. 386
If VoIP becomes a real competitor to voice telephone service, then the
regulation currently designed to control the rates of voice service will need
reform. Currently, traditional long-distance carriers pay higher rates to the local
384. See FCC, VoIP/Internet Voice Fact Sheet, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/
voip.pdf (last visited June 14, 2004) (addressing some of the drawbacks of VoIP) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The FCC has recently proposed rules that would require
all VoIP providers to ensure that law enforcement agencies can tap VoIP calls. Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling, FCC 04-187 (Aug. 9, 2004), available at
http:www.hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-187A1.pdf.
385. See supra notes 351–61 and accompanying text (examining various aspects of
regulatory parity).
386. See Speta, supra note 127, at 81–82 (suggesting interconnection policy based upon the
need for a single network to provide service).
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telephone companies for the origination and termination of telephone calls than
VoIP providers would pay because VoIP terminations into the local network
would be considered local telephone calls, not long-distance. This lack of
competitive neutrality is largely indefensible. More radically, competition in local
markets would eliminate the justification for retail rate regulation. The extent of
this reform, however, will depend upon the nature of the broadband market as
this competition takes hold. VoIP, of course, depends upon an underlying access
service; it does not itself provide a connection into a home. VoIP changes the
competitive playing field between facilities-based carriers, because VoIP is an
application that may make cable broadband (or wireless or whatever platform
utilizes it) more attractive to consumers vis-á-vis a traditional voice telephone line.
D. Government Subsidies
Some commentators and industry officials have gone further in suggesting
that government assist the development of new communications services by
advocating government financing or building new communications networks.
Many municipalities are developing their own broadband networks, either because
no broadband service is available or the municipality perceives there to be
insufficient competition.387 And some groups have called for substantial federal
deployment of new "fiber to the home" networks.388 Entry or explicit financing
by governments would introduce new providers into the markets even more
surely than would the simple steps of lifting barriers to entry and a bit of
regulatory hospitality.
In the main, these proposals do not situate the government as the only
communications provider in a market; indeed, no one seems to think the old
European model of a Post, Telephone, and Telegraph monopoly is a good idea.
Rather, these proposals are made with the rhetoric of competition. However,
creating a government stake in a particular provider of service threatens two
kinds of inefficiencies. First, the government provider might be cross-subsidized
from general revenues or by lighter regulatory treatment and might gain an
inefficient advantage over others.389 Second, if not subsidized, the municipal
387. See Kathryn A. Tongue, Municipal Entry into the Broadband Cable Market:
Recognizing the Inequities Inherent in Allowing Publicly Owned Cable Systems to Compete
Directly Against Private Providers, 95 NW . U. L. REV. 1099, 1103–05 (2001) (discussing trend).
388. See, e.g., T ECH NET, A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE : UNIVERSAL AVAILABILITY OF
BROADBAND BY 2010, at 7, http://www.tchnet.org/news/newsreleases/2002-01-15.64.pdf (last
visited May 29, 2004) (calling on network providers to invest billions in infrastructure upgrades
and increased bandwidth capacities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
389. See Tongue, supra note 387, at 1120 (discussing these sorts of subsidies in the context
of municipal and municipal utility-owned communications companies).
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telecommunications company might lose money, creating the politically
unpalatable prospect that city officials are losing taxpayer money and prompting
them to take regulatory measures against their competitors.390 For these reasons,
and because of the possibility of profligate municipal spending, some states have
adopted legislation forbidding municipalities to enter telecommunications markets.
The Supreme Court upheld these laws.391 Despite my general call for the lifting
of legal barriers to entry, I do not think these state laws violate the imperative to
develop new competition in telecommunications markets. The commonly heard
expression from antitrust law, that it is designed for "the protection of
competition, not competitors,"392 seems applicable here. A law that forbids entry
by one narrowly defined entity may or may not be justified (although the
arguments about avoiding anticompetitive subsidy and protecting the public fisc
seem quite important). But excluding one potential entrant should not, itself,
damage competition in an otherwise structurally competitive market.
Nevertheless, while government itself probably should not get into the
telecommunications carrier business, government could accelerate the process of
intermodal competition in the more customary manner of providing funds for
basic research and development. Government-funded research, especially
military, provided some of the essential Internet and wireless technologies now in
commercial service. 393 But, the level of funding such basic research has not kept
pace with the growth of the communications sector,394 nor has it focused
explicitly on funding research into technologies on the basis of their potential to
provide intermodal competition. Indeed, a presidential commission has concluded
that military funding of communications research, while still significant, now
focuses exclusively on near-term war fighting projects and not on the types of
basic research that previously inspired the Internet.395

390. Id. at 1125.
391. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 124 S.Ct. 1555, 1559 (2004) (construing §253’s "any
entity" to not include municipalities). Section 253 forbids any state law that "prohibits . . . any
entity" from providing telecommunications services. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000).
392. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
393. See COMM. ON INNOVATIONS IN COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS FROM
HISTORY , NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR
COMPUTING RESEARCH , at ch. 7 (1999) (discussing the government’s role in and funding of early
Internet projects).
394. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S INFO . T ECH . ADVISORY COMM. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,
INFORMATION T ECHNOLOGY RESEARCH : INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE 21–24 (1999) (concluding
that government funded basic communications research is inadequate and has not grown with the
increasing importance of communications to the economy), available at http://www.hpcc.
gov/pitac/report/pitac_report.pdf.
395. Id.
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Competitive markets, in fact, likely increase the need for government
funding. The Bell System’s ability to subsidize basic research with its monopoly
profits is well known,396 and some economic work argues that competitive
industries invest less in basic (as opposed to applied) research and
development.397
E. A Note on Universal Service
Competitive telecommunications markets need a new universal service
policy. Although airline and railroad deregulation attempted to ease the transition
to competition and to provide some funds to continue service on lightly traveled
routes, both transitions have resulted in the loss of service to a substantial number
of communities.398 By contrast, universal service has long been a goal in
telecommunications regulation; indeed, universal service to some extent provided
the argument that resulted in the comprehensive regulation of what was, at its
outset, a competitive local telecommunications market.399 The 1996 Act did not
decrease the commitment to universal telecommunications service;400 in many
regards, it increased its scope by including Internet access for many entities as
part of universal service. 401
The 1996 Act’s stated goals with respect to universal service are compatible
with the agenda to facilitate intermodal telecommunications competition. The Act
itself states that "[a]ll providers of telecommunications services should make an
equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement
of universal service."402 In practice, however, distortions have been introduced,
because "providers of telecommunications services" has been limited to traditional
wireline and wireless telephony services.403 Thus, if VoIP is successfully kept
396. See generally A. Michael Noll, Bell System R&D Activities: The Impact of Divestiture,
11 T ELECOMMS. POL ’Y 161 (1987) (evaluating Bell’s research and development activities).
397. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 136, at 232–35 (discussing this literature).
398. See supra notes 24–26, 59 and accompanying text (acknowledging loss of service).
399. See M ILTON L. M UELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE : COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION,
AND M ONOPOLY IN THE M AKING OF THE A MERICAN T ELEPHONE SYSTEM 97–98 (1997)
(providing justifications for universal service).
400. See generally Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the
Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 955 (1997) (discussing goals and
challenges of universal service under the Act).
401. For example, the Act provided universal service funds to schools, libraries, and health
care providers for the deployment of broadband services. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000)
(increasing requirements for telecommunications providers).
402. Id. § 254(b)(4).
403. See Robert M. Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and
Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARV. J.L. & T ECH . 395, 399–401 (2000) (examining
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out of the telecommunications category, it will not pay universal service fees, just
as the providers of instant messaging (which already is a limited substitute for
voice calls) do not. The most vocal advocates of VoIP regulation tout concern
for universal service funds as the principal ground for such regulation.404
The long-run goal for universal service should be a funding mechanism—
from both the collection and distribution sides—that is entirely competitionneutral. As many have argued, the least distorting mechanism would be a system
funded through the general federal revenues.405 This has long been considered
politically impossible, and so some specific tax on communications service will
probably continue. But taxing VoIP will prove difficult because the essential
components of VoIP service can be provided overseas.406 One alternative would
be to embed the universal service tax in the allocation of telephone numbers,
although, if the charge were passed through on a "per-number" basis, it would
raise the costs of service for the lightest users. Perhaps more promising would
be to require any entity that receives telephone numbers to pay a universal service
fee based upon the percentage of their revenues likely derived from voice service.
Because the entire point of VoIP is that the traffic appears to be the same as
other Internet traffic, the FCC would have to engage in some sort of sampling or
other estimation to determine a baseline voice percentage as to which the
universal service charge would apply. These difficulties might be enough to push
the political process toward the more competitively neutral "tax and spend"
structure. In all events, the imperative is to continually revisit the universal
service mechanism as the unpredictable path of telecommunications innovation
continues and to adjust the collection and payment mechanisms to eliminate
competitive imbalances.
A better result would seem to be a tax on all services that provide access to
electronic communications, including all of those services currently known as
telecommunications transmission and those known as information services
transmission. This means taxing Internet access, which has been forbidden from
time to time by the so-called Internet tax freedom acts.407 Taxing the Internet

telecommunications regulations prior to technology convergence).
404. See supra note 384 and accompanying text (describing possible problems with not
regulating VoIP).
405. See, e.g., Gregory L. Rosston & Bradley S. Wimmer, The ABC’s of Universal Service:
Arbitrage, Big Bucks, and Competition, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1585, 1606 (1999) (recounting the
FCC’s justifications for federal universal service mechanisms).
406. See S. Hr’g, supra note 363 (FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell) (addressing tax
jurisdiction concerns).
407. See generally Joseph R. Feehan, Comment, Surfing Around the Sales Tax Byte: The
Internet Tax Freedom Act, Sales Tax Jurisdiction and the Role of Congress, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI.&
T ECH . 619 (2002) (providing background on legislation).
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does run counter to the prevailing impulse to leave the Internet free from
regulation. But taxing Internet access on an even basis with the taxes placed on
telecommunications services becomes necessary for competitive neutrality when
those services compete with one another—as VoIP and other developments
promise. Exempting Internet access services from taxation seemed valuable in
their infancy, but it is hard to argue today that the likes of AOL, Microsoft,
Earthlink, and others continue to need an implicit subsidy.408
The more important point from the perspective of introducing new
competition into telecommunications markets is that regulatory policies which are
actually universal service policies should be identified as such and evaluated for
their effectiveness as such. To return to the example of television broadcast
spectrum, the must-carry rules that put broadcast content on cable systems were
defended on the basis of "preserving free broadcasting" for those who received
television in that manner—in other words, to provide universal service to
video.409 Judged from that perspective, the policy just does not make sense.
Although there remain some 15% of television households that do not subscribe
to cable or DBS, many of those nonsubscribers are in higher income brackets and
might subscribe if there were no broadcast.410 What is needed is an analysis that
compares the number of subscribers to free television that depend upon it to the
value of the spectrum for other uses. I suspect that it would be more efficient to
fund a universal service program for cable or DBS. This would be wrenching to
the broadcast industry, to be sure, but the competitive gains could be quite
significant.
Similarly, one of the arguments advanced in favor of cable open access rules
is that competition among ISPs would ensure users greater free speech
possibilities than if the cable companies had exclusive control of the ISPs.411
This is not precisely a universal service argument, although it is similar in that the
regulation is designed to advance a noneconomic good.412 If cable company
408. It is beyond the scope of this Article, but much of what I have just said also applies to
state and local taxes on telecommunications, even those not designed to find universal service.
See, e.g., Jonathan Bick, Implementing E-Commerce Tax Policy, 13 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 597, 604
(2000) (noting that, in 1998, the average state tax on telecommunications was 14%). All taxes
suppress demand, but competitively neutral taxes are less problematic.
409. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 644–46 (1994) (examining
the burden of must-carry provisions).
410. See Ninth Annual MVPD Report, supra note 162, ¶ 13 (summarizing developments in
the broadcast market).
411. See, e.g., Harold Feld, Whose Line Is It Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable
Open Access, 8 COMM LAW CONSPECTUS 23, 35–37 (2000) (evaluating the arguments for
competition in light of the First Amendment).
412. Universal service is occasionally justified on economic grounds—that the network is
more valuable to all subscribers as subscribership rises, but the network owner cannot capture
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restrictions on user speech are considered problematic, however, then the
relevant comparison is between open access policy and an explicit rule, á la
common carrier regulation, that forbids the cable companies to interfere with user
speech. This rule might be more susceptible to a First Amendment challenge, 413
but it would focus the discussion on the respective technical and economic
advantages of the proposal. From a purely economic perspective, the conversion
of cable systems to common carriers would meet the speech goal in the same
manner, without the technical costs of changing the cable systems to
accommodate additional ISPs.414 This might not satisfy the advocates of open
access rules, but the debate could then proceed on other grounds.
F. A Return to the Unbundling and Pricing Puzzle
I have already identified the 1996 Act’s unbundling regime as highly
contentious, and indeed, its difficulties are part of the premise for a new focus on
intermodal competition. This new paradigm, if implemented successfully, will
have implications for the network sharing regime, and despite my desire largely to
steer clear of the current controversies over unbundling, this topic now requires a
few comments. The FCC has adopted, and the courts have approved, a forwardlooking cost methodology known as TELRIC for those parts of the incumbents’
network that it is forced to share. 415 TELRIC, as I have noted, is successful at
squeezing the incumbent’s monopoly profits out of the prices charged for local
loops and other essential network elements. The regulations therefore permit a
certain level of retail competition, and TELRIC limits monopoly profits at the
wholesale level much as rate regulation historically controlled them at the retail
level. For this reason, unbundling and TELRIC pricing make the most sense if
one views the natural monopoly characteristics of the local loop and other
elements of the local network as relatively stable.
Adopting facilities-based, intermodal competition to the local incumbents as
the legislative and regulatory priority does not necessarily require abandoning the
all of those gains and will therefore supply a less than optimal level of service. But this is more
of a welfare argument than an efficiency argument. More importantly, universal service is
usually justified on noneconomic grounds of subsistence and equality.
413. See generally Lee, supra note 282 (discussing court decisions finding that open access
rules violated the First Amendment and assessing arguments).
414. There might be economic costs to a common carrier rule depending on its design, such
as an inability to price discriminate. See Noam, supra note 400, at 967–68 (discussing the need
for price discrimination in the provision of telecommunications services). The point is to debate
those costs and benefits directly.
415. See supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text (discussing the 1996 Act’s
justification for unbundling).
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unbundling regime or TELRIC, but it does require some modification. The
extreme, current criticisms of TELRIC as inadequate compensation (to the point
of being a constitutional taking) are wide of the mark.416 The FCC’s TELRIC
rules do require that interconnection and unbundling prices be set so as to make a
fair contribution to the maintenance of the incumbent’s local network.417
TELRIC is therefore not marginal pricing in the sense that the incumbent cannot
recover its fixed costs or the contribution that the foregone provision of a certain
retail service would make to the joint and common costs of the incumbent’s
network. Moreover, the FCC, prodded by the courts,418 has eliminated those
applications of TELRIC most likely to upset a level playing field by limiting the
number of elements that must be unbundled under that scheme. In fact, under
the current rules, the FCC has limited the elements presumptively required to be
unbundled to local loops 419 which, because of their sunk cost characteristics, are
the least likely to be duplicated by new entrants.420
Nevertheless, an affirmative attempt to develop new platforms will require
intensifying the vigilance that the FCC adverts to in its third-generation
unbundling rules—that mandatory unbundling should be lifted when the market
demonstrates that one or more entities actually have bypassed the incumbent’s
facilities with substitute facilities.421 More importantly, it requires sensitivity to

416. See, for example, Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131, for the argument that TELRIC
constitutes a taking. For a rebuttal, see Baumol & Merrill, supra note 132. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument that TELRIC methodology offends the Takings Clause in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 533 U.S. 467 (2002).
417. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 519 (2002).
418. In its initial rules implementing the local competition provision of the 1996 Act, the
FCC required all elements to be unbundled and made available to CLECs. The Supreme Court
reversed this aspect of the rules in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). In
its second set of rules, the FCC limited the list of elements to be unbundled to seven, but the
D.C. Circuit found that this nationwide list did not adequately account for likely local variations
in conditions of competition in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 422–24
(D.C. Cir. 2002).
419. See Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, supra note 308, ¶¶ 197–342 (analyzing loop
deployment, types, and unbundling proposals).
420. See Hausman & Sidak, supra note 126, at 462–63 (noting that items with sunk costs,
as opposed to fixed costs, are less likely to be duplicated).
421. See Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, supra note 308, ¶ 178 (evaluating arguments
supporting and detracting from mandatory unbundling); see also 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000)
(requiring the forbearance from regulation when competition develops). This analysis requires,
of course, an assessment familiar from antitrust law of the demand and supply substitutability
of the goods on all dimensions. For example, while cable-based VoIP and cell phones are
technical substitutes for local loops, it is not clear that they are yet in precisely the same
economic market as traditional voice. The quality of those services is lower; they are often not
compatible with the same range of vertical services such as call-waiting, caller ID, and voicemail;
and they may not have independent power in emergency situations.

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art17

DEREGULATING TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1151

the possibility that bypass, even if not currently feasible, will arrive in the (nearer)
future. To the extent that unbundling is necessary at any particular time because
the local loop (or some other facility) is then a natural monopoly facility, the
TELRIC unbundling price must be based upon a projection of the useful life of
that facility. As the FCC has long acknowledged but only just begun to
implement, the depreciation rate should include not only the expected life of the
facility based on wear and tear but also the expected useful life of the facility
based on the prospect that it will be rendered obsolete by a new bypass
technology.422
This possibility of developing bypass has led a number of commentators to
argue that TELRIC should be replaced entirely by the efficient component pricing
rule, global price caps, or another rule that permits the incumbent greater leeway
in recovering from new entrants contributions to the incumbents’ fixed and joint
and common costs.423 But, as William Rogerson has pointed out, keeping
unbundling prices lower and thereby "artificially handicapping incumbents in the
most profitable areas of their territories is actually a reasonably good way of
encouraging . . . entry."424
Thus, for the same reasons that I am willing to tolerate a degree of
regulatory asymmetry when that asymmetry benefits new challengers to
incumbent carriers,425 I do not think that a regulatory policy designed to further
the possibility of bypass must necessarily abandon TELRIC at the outset. When
and if the hoped-for facilities-based competition begins to develop, TELRIC can
then be revised.426 And when it develops completely, then the pricing problem
will, mercifully, go away.
422. See Local Competition Provisions, supra note 127, ¶ 686 (claiming that "properly
designed accounting depreciation schedules should account for expected declines in the value of
capital goods"); Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, supra note 308, ¶¶ 685–91 (analyzing
depreciation rate components).
423. The ECPR was developed by William Baumol and Robert Willig, and it sets the
unbundling price at the incumbent’s retail price less the incremental avoided costs (that is, the
incremental costs of that part of the service that the new entrant will supply) of providing the
service. See generally Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 109 (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1979) (discussing technical network
access prices); Baumol et al., supra note 354. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole advocate a
global price cap, by which the incumbent maintains the freedom to price access and final goods
subject only to a price cap weighted by the relative provision of both wholesale and retail goods.
See LAFFONT & T IROLE, supra note 131, at 170 (examining the benefits of a global price cap).
424. William P. Rogerson, New Economic Perspectives on Telecommunications Regulation,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (2000) (reviewing LAFFONT & T IROLE, supra note 131).
425. See supra notes 354–61 and accompanying text (justifying regulatory disparity in
certain circumstances).
426. In this regard, one’s regulatory prescription flows from how one reads the evidence
concerning current competition and (an even less objective matter) what one thinks will happen
with competition in the near term (not to mention how near one thinks the near term is).
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VI. Conclusion: Not a Political Pipedream

It does not seem necessary or appropriate, after setting out this proposal at
such length, to conclude with a rote summary of the foregoing. What does seem
necessary, by contrast, is at least a few words on why this radical proposal to
rewrite telecommunications law—a task the Congress thought it successfully
accomplished less than a decade ago—is anything other than an academic’s
pipedream.427
The answer is again supplied by some of the earlier deregulatory successes
in transportation and long-distance. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk have
made a study of some of these deregulatory episodes,428 and their conclusions
suggest that a window for further telecommunications reform may now be
opening. In particular, they studied airline and trucking deregulation as well as
the early stages of telecommunications deregulation, and they identified a number
of economic and political forces as important. First, they note that, prior to
deregulation, "[e]lite opinion converged in support of reform."429 Second, they
note that "[o]fficeholders in positions of leadership took initiatives."430 Third,
they note the importance of economic analysis that justified legislative action.431
To Derthick and Quick’s factors should be added the important force that
industrial users of utility services have sometimes added to pushing for legislative
reforms.432

Christopher Yoo and Daniel Spulber advocate eliminating TELRIC pricing right now. See
Spulber & Yoo, supra note 131, at 1019–21 (arguing against compelled access to broadband
networks and then basing prices only on direct cost). I think they read the evidence of
competition far too optimistically and see competition that has, in fact, yet to develop. As
explained above in Part IV.A, there is reason for optimism, but the current evidence reveals only
limited competition.
427. Excuse the pun.
428. See generally DERTHICK & QUIRK , supra note 45.
429. Id. at 238.
430. Id. at 239.
431. See id. at 246 ("As vividly and impressively as possible, our cases demonstrate the
role that disinterested economic analysis can play in the formation of public policy. If
economists had not made the case for procompetitive deregulation, it would not have
occurred.").
432. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1395–96 (addressing another important force
in deregulation). Kearney and Merrill state:
In addition to struggles among rival producer groups, there is also evidence that
powerful consumer groups have played a greater role in more recent reform
initiatives. It is always instructive to consider who are the winners and who are the
losers from major policy changes. With respect to changes in telecommunications
(both long distance and presumably local exchange service), electricity, and gas, the
big winners appear to be large commercial and industrial users of these services.
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Each of these factors is emerging. In a very recent hearing prompted by
VoIP, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain stated his preference
for overhauling the Telecommunications Act and stated unequivocally that he was
not alone in the Senate:
In many ways, VoIP is a microcosm of the broad array of
telecommunications regulatory issues that have been debated since
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . . We began the 108th
Congress with a hearing on the state of competition in the industry and I
reminded the public, the FCC Commissioners and my colleagues then of my
long held beliefs that the 1996 act is a fundamentally flawed piece of
legislation. Since then, some of my colleagues have joined me in expressing
the need for Congress to take a serious look at reforming the act.433

At the same hearing, FCC Chairman Powell agreed:
[W]hether it’s now or in the near future, it is my responsibility as your
expert agency to tell you, I think the days are numbered on the way we’re
doing this under the current statute. I do believe there is going to have to
be a statute in the future that recognizes these dramatic technical changes
and gets us out of the buckets of the ‘96 Act.434

Senator Lautenberg agreed with one of the principal proposals in this paper: "I’d
urge some day that a whole bunch of wordsmiths get together and simplify the
language and the structure and have a better understanding of it, because it seems
to me at times we’re fighting for definitions."435 It may be that a reprise of the
Kennedy hearings—which built political momentum for airline deregulation436 —
can occur for local telecommunications.
Economists and legal commentators strongly support reform of the
communications laws, as detailed above, and companies that have experienced
lower long-distance prices can be expected to advocate for further legislation that
promotes competition. With these groups in agreement and the seeming energy
both of important Senators and of the FCC Chairman, it is possible that a window
of legislative opportunity is available. Economists and other commentators need
to marshal evidence of the success of markets in telecommunications—such as
the evidence of how the intrastate airline markets or the unregulated agricultural
commodities markets, each behaving competitively, helped spur reform in those

Id.
433. S. Hr’g, supra note 363.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (discussing the 1975 "Kennedy
hearings").
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areas.437 Such evidence should be at hand, for competition in long-distance and
other telecommunications and cable markets has succeeded.438 Prompting this
legislative action is important because the FCC is bound to the current definitions
of the Act and because its actions are going to be challenged and subjected to
judicial review. In passing the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Congress faced
the question of what more there was to do after CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn had
already instituted much of the deregulatory agenda. The answer was clear:
[A] revised act is needed to insure that a future CAB’s do not undo the
work of the present CAB and reimpose strict regulation. And even with
respect to the present Board, its programs have not been subjected to
complete judicial review, and it is not clear that the courts will conclude that
existing law allows these programs. Moreover, the different elements of the
Board’s reform programs are interrelated . . . and a court decision overruling
any single CAB policy could set back the entire CAB program. 439

The FCC has been doing heroic work trying to keep up with a market changing in
Internet time, but legislative confirmation and assistance is now necessary.
I have not provided all of the pieces to implementing this agenda, but the
framework for the future seems clear. New competition will need more than the
lifting of legal prohibitions on entry; it will need a comprehensive review of the
economics of regulations that may deter entry as an economic matter. Only then
can there be a test of whether communications markets can become more fully
competitive as a structural matter, and only then will a "deregulation" in the model
of trains, trucks, and planes yield competition’s benefits.

437. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text (describing airline deregulation).
438. See supra notes 150–77 and accompanying text (addressing competition between
wireline and video service providers).
439. Air Service Improvement Act of 1978, H.R. REP . NO . 95-1211, at 4 (1978).
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